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of tho ArohiTos aad Library of Loaisiaaa Stato Bairorslty*
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The ain of this dissertation lo to show that the aueh- 
erltielsed diploaaby of Hoary Lane Wilson ia Nexlee was, ia 
reality, larisly approved aatil Proaidoat Woodrow Vllooa 
reversed tho traditioaal recognition polloy of tho Baited 
Statos hy rofusing to aeeopt Yletoriano Huorta as tho eeasti- 
tutional proaidoat of Noxleo* It waa thoa that (H* L#)
Wllaoa foil a victln to polltleal elrewaataaeoa*
Through hla brother’s influence, (H* L*) Wllaoa waa 
appointed Idolater to Chile la 1S97* Ho labored to iaeroaao 
polltleal aad eeaaoreial intercourse between tho United 
States aad Chilof aad whoa hia serviee ia Chile ended ia 
1905* there had beoa a noticeable laprereaent ia this re- 
apeet, attributed, ia large part, to the attitude aad energy 
of the Aaarieaa Mini at or*
Recognition of WilaoBta hard work at aueh an insignifi­
cant post led Proaidoat Theodore Roosevelt to transfer hia 
to Belgian, a aero eeafertable post* Contact with royalty 
and association with Xnropeaa dipleaats helped to broaden 
his experience*
Wilson waa appelated Aabassader to Maxieo by Proaidoat 
Taft aad he took up hia duties at that post ia 1910, the true 
representative of a "dollar dlploaaey" adnlaiatratioa* The
Im i u i  Ttlwi of Aaorloaa kuliMS laveetaeate la Moxleo 
Soto Vllooa aoro iaportaaeo tkaa ko kad ever eajoyodf ko 
faaelod hiasolf a epoolal gaardiaa of private oatorprlooa la 
whiek oltlooao of the Halted Statoe voro internoted, aad waa
aatarally diotarbed whoa tko dlotatoraklp roglao of Porflrlo 
Dias began to oraaklo koforo tko oaslaagkt of a revolation 
hoadod ky Fraaolooo X* Madera*
As lladoro ovopt lato power la 19X1# Vllooa koeaao ever 
aoro approkoaaiTo of tko fntnrej especially so when Madoro 
rofaood to eoart tko favor of tko Aaorloaa lakaoaador,
Madoro*o sensitiveness to Mexican noods was iatorprotod by 
Vllooa ao aati-Aaorieaniaa, while Vllooava iapatloaeo with 
tko aastablo ooaditloa of Moxleo eaaaod lladoro to regard tko 
Aaorloaa iakaooador as a daagoroaa eneay*
Taft aad Secretary of Stato Knox voro eogalsaat, at all 
tlaes, of eoadltloao la Moxleo aad polley was foraulatod 
vlth an oyo to otaklllslag eoadltloao la that eovatry* This 
polley laeladod tho probability of araod intervention la tho 
aot too distant fataro*
In Pebrwary, 1913* lladoro was saddoaly faeod with a aec- 
oad aprlalag andor Ptllx Dias* Tlotorlaao Haerta, tho con- 
aaador-la-eklof of tko aray, dopoood lladoro daring tko 
oaoaiag slogo of Moxleo City aad tkoa olgaod a paot with Dias 
by whleh Naorta boeaao Provisional Proaidoat* Thooo elroaa- 
otaaeoo wore actively oaeoaragod by Hoary Laao Vllooa as 
aoaoaroo to oad tko fighting ia tho city* Vllooa had tko
•ipHrt ef the uest influential aonbers •f the Mpleaatle 
Corps* Tho poet between Puerto and bias woo oigood lo tho 
Aneriean kbtuy.
Two days after hie resignation, Nadere woo ooooooiootod 
wader nysterieus cirewantanoee, oo set which hladorod Aabas- 
oodor Vllooa'o plow to ooenre tho recognition of Huerta by 
tho felted States. Voodrow Vllscn, who hoeooo President of 
tho feitod Stoteo lo March, ignored his Aaboocoder to Mexico 
oad refwsed to recognise Huerta* (V*) Vllooa*a deaaad that 
Puerto otop down drew tho feitod States late o unique pool* 
tloa oo recognition hod been traditionally extended on o 
4ft footo bools after international eoanltuento were satis­
fied.
Although (H* L*) Wilson woo not allowed to resign, 
agents wore sent to Mexico to investigate conditions* CM 
tho basis of their reports, which were unfavorable to the 
Ambassador, ho was suddsnly recalled la July, 1913, and 
diaalssed fren the serviee after sixteen years as a career 
dlplonat*
INTRODUCTION
The rol« of Henry Lane Wilson in Latin Anarloan diplo­
macy hae ao oftan baan tha subject of a fan linaa or para­
graphs in stadias of tha history of tha Unitad Statas and 
Latin America, particularly Mexico, that it has baan Judged 
useful to attempt a mors spaoialisad trsatiss on tha sub­
ject# It Is tha authorfs contention that tha part playad 
by this nan who, was tha Ambassador of tha Unitad Statas to 
tha Rapublie of Maxieo during tha initial phasas of tha 
Mexican Revolution,cannot be explained or thoroughly under­
stood while his personal and professional background is 
neglected*
Tha question of tha recognition of General Huerta, who 
overthrew tha Nadero government in Maxico, was as perplexing 
in its way as similar questions of recognition today# It 
is hoped that this account of tha conduct of diplomatic 
affairs may add, at least in modest degree, to tha growing 
body of knowledge about tha aims, objectives and practices 
of twentieth-century American diplomacy In Latin America'
Tha author makes no apologias for tha limitations in 
source material that are frankly admitted to exist' Pinal 
conclusions are rejected in those matters where the sources 
are silent or are not yet available# The personal papers of
Kiary Lane Wilson have not boon placed at tho disposal of 
tho author and ho doss not bailors that tho? will bo avail- 
ablo for examination for some tino to come. Wilson did, 
however, publish his aemeira and tho latlonal Arehlros of 
tho United States furalshod a woalth of information* Tho 
author has oxaninod thoso carefully and compared tho infor­
aatlon they contain with tho porsonal papers of sueh im­
portant figures as MeKinley, ftoosevelt, Taft, Knox, Woodrow 
Wilson and Bryan and with pertinent secondary accounts. In 
spite of tho limitations in source material, this account 
is more couplet# than has boon giron of Henry Lane Wilson's 
diplomatic career.
Wilson's serrlee as a diplomat spanned that era known 
in the United States as "Frogresslrlsm." It was an age of 
both internal reform and external expansion. "Dollar Diplo­
macy* found its most natural expression ia Latin America 
and to men such as Wilson it simply meant the understanding 
and acceptance of Latin American psychology while fostering 
the expansion of the American profit system to the region 
"south of the border." Wilson's training, reinforced with 
experiences in that area, led hia to form a concept of his 
field of usefulness in the cultivation of the upper classes 
as junior partners ia the world of business expansion. Mot 
personally woalthy, he undoubtedly felt a sense of triumph 
as the representative of a country with great eoonoaic power 
endeavoring to find fertile fields for investments abroad.
He aade an earnest affort to aarra tha intereata of tha 
party of Big Buainaaa in tha Unitad States whila at the sane 
tin# obaerving tha atandarda of American diplomacy* Ha 
aought to attain tha idaal atatua of ona who served hia own 
paopla wall whila commanding tha raapaot of thoaa in polit­
ical poaitiona in tha countries to which ha waa accreditad* 
Wilaon waa thoroughly initiated in diplomacy at a 
Latin Anarlean post whila serving hia firat eight yaara in 
Chile* Proa there ha waa tranaferred to Balgiua aa a atap 
toward pronotion in rank* Whan an experienced diplomat waa 
needed for tha Mexican Embassy, ha waa rained in rank and 
aent to thin more active poat* Hia career aight have con­
tinued for several aora yaara had tha election of 1912 in 
tha Unitad 3tataa not brought a change of adainiatration* 
Until recently, Wilaon waa euatoaarily blaaed for tha 
averthrow of Pranciaco Kadaro and for aialaading tha Taft 
adainiatration* It ia gratifying to note that a few achol­
era are now lean ready to accept uncritically tha condemn- 
ationa of Wilaon which ware aada by thoaa with a definite axe 
to grind and repeated by eounder hiatoriana for lack of 
evidence* It auet be adaittad that thaaa earlier viawa of 
Wilaon ware not altogether erroneoua* Hia baeic political 
philoaophy was* indeed, interpreted in a fairly correct way* 
Sweeping concluaiona baaed upon auch interpretation have, 
however, led to an exaggerated portrayal of hia weak pointa* 
That there were varying ahadea of gray inatead of all black
or white is only now being recognised as respects ths rols 
of Wilson in Mexioo« Ths writer humbly subwits that a 
better understanding of Wilson's actions and viewpoints in 
the 1913 orisis in Mexico can be gained by a wore complete 
study of his service in Latin America as a representative 
of the United States in a Republican Party era*
I
BACKGROUND AND TRAINING
Henry Lane Wilaon was born on Noveaber 3, 1*57, at Craw- 
fordaville, Indiana* Hia father, Jaaea Wilaon, waa of 
Seotoh-Iriah anoaatry* Tha Wilaon family had moved to 
Laneaater, Penney1vania from Ulatar in tha 1730'a and latar 
aattlad in a plaoa Juat north of Lexington, Virginia, in tha 
Shanandoah Vailay, Aftar a raaidanca of aoaa hundrad yaara 
in Virginia, tha daaoandanta moved firat to Kantucky and 
than acroaa tha Ohio Rivar into aoutharn Indiana* Although 
alave ownara, tha family waa Whig in polltioa*
Jaaaa Wilaon, tha fathar of Hanry Lana, married Sana 
Ingaraoll of Connaotiout* Ha aerved hia country in both tha 
Maxican and Civil Wara having baan in Ganaral Scott*a eom- 
■and in tha former* Ha latar became a Unitad Stataa Congreaa- 
man from Indiana, aarving in that capacity froa 1657 to 1661* 
Upon tha outbraak of tha Civil War ha raaignad froa Congraaa 
to join an Indiana ragiaant with tha rank of aajor* Two 
brothara wara killad at Gattyaburg and Wilaon, hiaaalf, waa 
aavaraly woundad* Hia grandaon atatad that tha appointment 
of hia grandfathar to tha diplomatic poat in Vanasuala 
following tha war waa made oatanaibly to allow his to racovar 
hia haalth but actually bacauaa of hia liberal viewe on tha 
South* Howavar that may ba, Jaaaa Wilaon died at hia poat in 
Veneauela having bequeathed to hia aona tha precedent of a
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career in tha service of his country.
His son, Henry Lana Wilaon, sttandad public school in 
Indians and was graduated froa Wabash Collaga at Crawfords* 
rills in 1679* Ha studied law under Benjamin Harrison and 
later entered the newspaper business as a publisher of the 
Lafayette Journal from 1662-1665* In 1664, he married 
Alice Vajan of Indiana* She was a graduate of Wesleyan 
Female College of Cincinnati, Ohio. Mrs* Wilson remained 
by the side of her husband in every crisis* She was remem­
bered as a kindly and gracious woman*1
In 1665, Wilson began a business career in a new loca­
tion, the Territory of Washington, soon to become a new 
state in the Union. His brother, John L* Wilson, was already 
active in the politics of that region and appears to have
Information about the family ancestry was supplied by Warden McKee Wilson, one of Henry Lane Wilson's sons who presented this data in a letter to the writer dated October 12, 1950* The writer also enjoyed the hospitality of this man and his family in a visit to his home where he was shown photographs and portraits and supplied with documen­tary material in his possession. A silver tray presented to Mrs* Henry Lane Wilson for her acts of humanity during the Pecans Trialca in Mexico was also admired during this visitsAmong tne documentary items supplied the writer for his use was a volume of correspondence carried on by Henry Lane Wilson's sons in protesting an unwarranted statement about their father by Time magasine in 1940* Letters of protest to Tljae brought a direct retraction of the state­ment in question* In spite of such unpleasant incidents in connection with his father's service in Mexico, Warden Wilson has corresponded regularly with the writer and given hia encouragement in his project* See n. 2, Chapter VIII*
2been siring assistance to his brother. Henry Lane entered 
ths investment sad rssl sststs business in ths Territory^ 
and latsr worked for ths slsotioa of his brothsr to Congress. 
Ths panic of 1893 eaussd his failure in busiasss and in 1895* 
ws find hia managing John's campaign for ths Senate.** Hs 
was thus gradually drawn into polities and his brothsr un-
John L. Vi Ison was born at Crawfordsrllls, Indiana on August 7( 18$Ĉ  and graduatsd from Vabash Collsgs in 1874* Hs was appointed a clsrk in ths psnsion bureau in Washington, B.C. but rssignsd aftsr a fsw months, saying that hs was{oing wsst and would cons back a Congressman. Hs studied aw in his father*s office and was elected representative to ths Indiana legislature in 1880 from Montgomery County.He was appointed receiver of the land office at Colfax. Territory of Vashlngton some time afterward. This office was later moved to Spokane. After four years and four months of service there, he was elected the first represent­ative to Congress from the new State of Vashlngton in 1889.He retained this office until February 18, 1895* when he resigned to become Senator. He later purchased and pub-II.ta.dtha 3..ttl« Post Int.lll««na.r whil. r •Mining .etlv. in politic, lnfch* 3t»t>. 3.. the Kn.hlnrton Port.
g r a s :  Ii« Ior“
338-339.It may be noted that Henry Lane Vilson was offered his father*s old post at Caracas in 1889, but rejected it.He may have been following John*s advice in this as in many other instances.
^In a letter to the author dated August 24, 1949, from Qrace Kirkpatrick, Publicity Writer of the Spokane, Vashlngton Chamber of Commerce, the following Information was given:•Henry Lane Vilson is listed in the city directory for 1891. He was then associated with H. Bolster & Co., a firm which had offices in the Eagle Block and which engaged in real estate transactions. Henry Bolster of the firm is also listed as President of the Street Railway Company.fir. Vilson*s address in 1891 is given as 2416 - 2nd Ave., while in 1892 he lived at 1219 - 5th Ave. He is not listed in the 1893 directory.*
^"Henry Lane Vilson" by E. Wilder Spaulding, D.A.B..
III, 325.
doubtedly sought a rewarding position for his.
Washington was now s Stats in ths Union and Hsnry Lans 
Wilson was among ths obseurs worksrs for ths Rspubliean 
Party rsady to saks hiasslf ussful in any way that would 
bring him to ths noties of thoss who eontrollsd patronage.
Hs served on ths eosmittss to notify President McKinley of 
ths lattsrvs nomination and opsna his memoirs with an ac­
count of McKinley's victory. This was not his first ac­
quaintance with McKinley for hs had worked with him to some 
extent in Indiana during ths Blaine campaign and at ths 
recent convention in St. Louis hs had served as a delegate- 
at-large.
Among those who visited McKinley at Canton in search of 
patronage was Henry Lane Wilson who placed before the future 
President his desire to enter the diplomatic service. He 
was given no firm assurance but understood, or chose to 
understand, that he had been promised a post. He was unable, 
due to illness, to attend the inaugural. He was hospitalised 
in Washington. D.C.. during the ceremonies and the President 
soon sent him word that he had decided to appoint him to 
Japan. Such arrangements were, however, being made by Mark 
Hanna and not by the President. Visiting Hanna a short time 
later. Wilson learned that McKinley had not consulted Hanna. 
The Japanese Post was already promised to someone else.
Wilson chose to leave Washington while the matter was 
being decided. He soon heard from the President that during
the early part of tho campaign hia aanagera had proaiaed tho 
Japaneae poat to aoaeone olao and that ho vaa bound to abido 
by thla proaiae* McKinley loft It to Vilaon to aay whether 
ho waa to bo hold to thla proaiae* Although Wilaon auat 
have folt koon diaappolntaont ho graeioualy ropllod that tho 
Proaldont night have a froo hand to do aa ho pleaaed* Un- 
doubt odly Wilaon atill hopod for aoao poaitlon and tho 
Proaldont folt bound to do aoaothing for him. Although Im­
portant for Wilaon, thla wholo affair waa only a ainuto 
aogaont of tho long lino of patronago appointnonta that tako 
placo in every ehango of adainlatrationa*
Minor diplomatic poata woro atill opon and party non 
could atill bo rowardod but many of thoao poata woro in 
Europe and Aala whoro oxponaoa of a poraonal naturo would bo 
required* Wilaon*a brothor John roalisod thia and aftor it 
had boon agrood that ho would do bottor in aoao poat in 
South Aaorioa, Chilo waa docldod upon aa tho aoat idoal 
country froa tho atandpoint of aueh things aa cliaato and 
expenaea*
Hia woleoao to tho Stato Dopartaont waa not, however, 
full of proaiao* Mr* Willlaa R* Day, acting Secretary for 
John Sheraan, intorviowod hia and then turned hia over to 
loaaor official* for routine briofinga and inatruetlona* Ho 
joined tho other produote of tho apoile ayatoa who woro in 
tho procoaa of being thoroughly deflated by thoao officora 
of tho Dopartaont who had had yeara of profeaaional training
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and who daplorad tha wreokage that auat surely ba dona by a 
new crop of spoileat. Vilson. of course. raaantad this dis­
paragement and fait that aora would have baan aooaapllahad 
by spanding tlaa in outlining tha exact natura of his now 
dutias. Tha huabling procass aust have baan slailar to that 
undargona by a naw raoruit in tha allltary service* It did 
not last long, however; and. aftar a eustoaary visit to tha 
Prasidant. tha naw diploaat gatharad his fsally and took 
ship for his naw post*^
Wilson's Initial iaprsssion of South American habits 
was gainad whan tha ship on whieh ha was sailing stoppsd for
a faw days in Callao Bay in Peru* Ha was aistaksn for tha
naw ainlstar to Paru who was expected to arrivs at about tha
sana tiaa. Tha story is bast told in his own wordsI
Tha government's tugboat came off tha steamer and a gorgaously arrayad officialPresented hinsalf at my cabin, addressing as n Spanish with profound bows and grsat defer­ence* I raturnad tha bows in kind and avan amplified thair impressiveness* But I was totally unabla to respond* So. in tha absence of explanations. I was taken on shore with my family in tha government * s tug and a private ear to Lina waa assigned to aa* Before wa arrived in Liaa. however, tha Bistake had baan discovered, resulting.in a considerable cooling of official courtesy*6
„ , , Un# Wilson, Diglofftle Iplsodss in Htxiao.Belgium and Cnila (Haw YorksDoubladay Page and Company. 
1927), 1-6. Hereafter cited as Diplomatic Episodes.
^Wilson, Diplctio toisodss. 13.
u
Th# Minister and hia family arrived In Santiago on 
Sopttabor 5, 1697, and woro coon wolooaod with a banquet by 
tho American colony. Hia first official duty waa, of 
courao, to proaont hia credentials to Don Podorloo Srrisuris, 
tho Proaldont of Chile* Throughout tho attendant ooroaonioa, 
Wilaon waa careful not to aake any roforonco to tho Baltimore 
affair, a subject that would have boon highly distasteful to 
any loyal Chilean and one boat forgotten If friendly rela­
tione wore to continue between tho two countrloa*
In thla connection a few worda aa to the relative im­
portance of the Chilean poat will not be Inappropriate* It 
waa not oonaiderod an important legation and waa located in 
an undeeirable residential auction far froa the center of 
governmental activity* It waa equipped only with the bare 
eeeentiala* The aerioua lack of phyalcal facilities existing 
in most diplomatic posts of the United States waa glaringly 
evident* Wilsons efforts to improve the appearance of the 
building and its furnishings net with only partial success 
and he waa forced to aake some personal expenditures out of 
hia salary to accomplish even thla*
The truth was that Chile had not had very close rela­
tions with the United States and; with one exception, the 
Baltimore incident, the conduct of diplomatic affairs had
12
been a dull and routine matter*? Tho incident referred to 
took place ohortlj aftor the Chilean Civil War in 1#91, when 
teeipere were etill hot and the attitude of Chileans toward 
the United States was one of suspicion and distrust* During 
the oivil strife the American Minister, Patrick Igan, had 
given every evidence of partial feeling for the presidential 
side, even giving shelter in the Legation to sone nenbers of 
the defeated party* The Anerlean government, acting to 
insure the observance of strict neutrality, had also tried 
to prevent the shipment of arms from the United States to 
the congressional!st side* As this was the side that even­
tually emerged victorious, an air of hostility toward the 
United States was encouraged*
While tempers were still hot and the Chilean people 
were pondering recent events, an American naval vessel, the 
Baltimore, out in at Valparaiso; and her commander, W* S* 
Schley, unwisely allowed his crew shore leave* A fight 
ensued and some of the sailors were killed and wounded* In­
vestigations of the affair led to entirely different versions
?The prestige of the United States in Chile had, at times, been affected by the character of some of the men chosen for the post throughout the 19th centurv. Some of the occupants of the post had been men of brilliance, tact­fulness and finesse* Others had engaged in acts destined to arouse distrust and contempt* Pollewing the American Civil War a number of men were appointed to the post in return for service to their country in war or to their party in politics* Wilson, of course, falls in the category of the latter* Por a fuller discussion of the subject see Henry Clay Ivans, Chile and its Relations with the United States 
(Durham, Moron Carolina* Diko University Press,1927J•
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on tho part of aaeh governaeat concerned and tho United 
Statoa denaaded apologlea aad indonnltiea. Even aftor tho •I
analler Republic had dtoidod to aako anonda, a atom ulti­
matum oobo froa Proaldont Harriaoa and Chllo had to oat 
huable pie. Thla incident ooourrod alx years boforo Wilaon
took up hia roaldoaeo ia Chilo bat it waa atill froah la tho
oBlada of tho populace. Whoa tho Mlnlator lator found it 
hia unploaaant duty to call upon tho Chlloan government to 
extradite an alleged onbosalor who had flod to Chilo froa 
Boaton ho aot with dolaya and a hoatilo proaa. While tho 
oourta proeoodod to try tho eaao inatoad of handing over tho 
aeeuaod, tho people, inflanod by proaa notices, lookod upon 
thia Battor aa eoaatltuting revenge for tho huaillatlon of 
tho Baltinoro affair.^
*For a abort auaaary of tho Baltimore affair aoo Lola QaldaBoa. A History of Chilo. traaalatod and oditod by laaae Joalia Cox (Chapel Hills Tho University of Horth Carollaa Proaa. 1941L  403-404* A aoro eoaploto dlaeuaaioa of tho Revolution of 1S91 appoara ia billion Rodorlek Shoraan, T|m  DiolOBatio aad C f  frill SI Relatione of tho Uhitod Statoa j u  oniioT llSO-iClt[Boston! fno florhaorroaa, l y B ),Chaptor 6*
^Diplomatic dispatches froa Chilo. Voluno 47 in tho Archives of tho United Statoa, Wilaon to John Hay, Soorotary of Stato, March 19, 1900* Citationa of diploaatlo corre- apondoneo roproaont roeorda in tho national Architoo of tho Uhitod Statoa ualoaa othorwiao notod.In tho abaoneo of a troaty of oxtradition, Wilaon had to request tho return of tho nan aa an act of courtesy. 
Thia caao pointed up tho aoro need for eueh a troaty aad Wilaon waa authorised to negotiate one* Ho algned it for tho United Statoa on April 17, 1900, and it waa approved by tho Chilean government in January of 1902*
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Vlltw could find little to criticise ia tho eoadaet of 
tho offloo by Edward I* Strobel, hia predecessor, othor than 
tho latter'# rotoatioa of a legation ooorotary who, la 
Vllooa9o eotlaatiea, did llttlo aoro thaa serve ao a glori- 
fiod bartender. Tho aow Klaieter waa oorry that tho govern- 
neat of tho baited Stoteo •* • .does not pay enough 
attention to tho ooloetioa of logatioa secretaries* * • *"10 
Strobel turned over hia office to Vllooa with tho baliof 
that ha (Strobal) had won nuch respect for tho United 
Statoa.11
Wilaon cultivated tha aoot reopectable eleaeata of tho 
Anarloan eoloay la Santiago and wade frlendo among tho 
proainent Chilean faailloo ao wall. Hio high regard for tho 
aaaaitioo of polite ooelety and hio attentiToaeoo to Chilean 
enotoao wore aotehod only by hio inoiotoaoo that equal re- 
opeet bo ohowa to hio own eowatry In aattoro of protocol*
10Roeordo of tho Uhitod Stoteo Legation in Chiles Coaoalar and Kleeellaneoue C— uai cat lone Seat, Volume 7-121; Vllooa to C* 0* Croon, U.S. Tleo-Conowl at Antofogaota, Province of Arlea, Hoy 23* 1S9S*
11Diploaatie dlopatcheo froa Chile, Volume 451 Strobel to John Sherman. Secretary of State, Auguot 10, 1S97* Strobel wrote Sheraaa that *The iaflueaeo of a minioter to Chilo materially depeade upon hio eoeial pooitloa aad hio otylo of living* A aiaiotor with a term of four yeare eaa, to a certain extent, recoup tho groat oxpoaoo necessary to a cultable establishment; but in two yeare and a half I have not had tho opportunity of doing oo* I therefore fool no hunlllatlea la eayiag that I am retiring froa tho diplomatic oorviee la eoadltloao ia whleh even tho oalary of a row weeka io a matter of eoaooquaaeo to no***
He found « predoainat ely conservative government in of flea 
in Chile, ona which was constantly haraasad by tha embryonic 
radical foreaa daatinad latar to baoona an organised rafom 
party* Tha alightaat issue was eftan tho oeoaaion for a 
■iniatarial shift under tha parliamentary ayatan that had 
prevailed ainea tha Civil War, Tha inexperienced Minister 
fron tha Unitad States viewed eaeh tremor, at first, aa a 
governmental earthquake of auoh proportions that the State 
Department, he thought, must be informed at once* Of course 
he had been instructed to report such changes aa they oc­
curred but in time he learned that it waa not necessary to 
use the fastest means of communication* Ha decided that the 
"• • • slower nedlum of the mails would serve***2
The foreign diplomatic corps with whom he was associated 
did not make much of an impression on him* The South Amer­
ican diplomats were changed so frequently and all were of so 
much the same pattern of courtesy and good humored Indolence 
that he could remember only a few amusing incidents concern- 
them**^ Although two or three serious problems arose during 
his eight years as Minister to Chile, there was time for 
extended visits to the United States and elsewhere* The 
Chilean post was far overshadowed with events in other places*
l2tfilson. Diplomatic Episodes, 44*
33-34* The Brasilian diplomat, for in­stance. had drunk a bottle of ink ia childhood and could eat no solid food*
II
DIPLOMATIC PROBLEMS II CHILI
When war broke out between tha United Stataa and Spain 
ever Cuba in tha early part of 169ft, tha preservation of 
Chllaan neutrality became miaou9# firat major diplomatic 
problem* Tha Chllaan government, of eoitraa, expressed at 
all tinea an official daalra to remain atriotly neutral* 
However, remembrance of tha Baltimore affair, anone othar 
things, contributed to a notleaabla ooolnaaa on tha part of 
tha praaa and paopla of Chile* Tha American Miniatar had 
aona eanaa to wondar if Chlla would ba abla to preserve 
actual neutrality, Ha waa not expected naraly to inaura 
neutrality; it waa lnportant that Latin American countrlaa 
undarataad tha aotlon of tha Unitad Stataa and aynpathiia 
with har problana* Tha Chllaan paopla had to ba convinced 
that tha Unitad Stataa waa acting honorably and that it had 
no aril designs on tha fraa republic# of Latin Anarlea*
Iowa of tha explosion of tha battlaahip mine evoked note# 
of aynpathy fron tha Chllaan Mlnlatar in Vashlngton, but 
Wilson racaivad only atiff, farnal and oorraet word# fron 
tha Poralgn Offlea* Ha raallaad that tha tlna for a teat 
of Chilo-Anerlcan friandahip waa at hand*
Ota April 22nd, ha racaivad inatruetlana froa tha Stata 
Department to notify tha Chilean government of military naaa- 
urea being taken by tha Obited Stataa* Tha abruptnaaa of hia 
inatmetlona left him without tha naeaaaary explanation#
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and ha haaitatad to tranamit tha bara information oontalnad 
in hia instructions* Thara waa no othar eouraa open, ao ha 
merely aoooapaniad hia tranaaiaaion of tha nota with an 
explanation that tha aiaa of tha Unitad Stataa would ba 
forthcoming in tiae*^ Dutifully ha procaadad to give tha 
Dapartaant hia opinion of Chile's attitude:
Sir! It ia ay unpleasant, but nona tha laaa nacaaaary dutv to inform * * .that • • • , tha aantiaant of tha paopla of Chile la atrongly and overwhelmingly in sympathy with Spain* Tha duty • • • ia tha aora unpleasantin that tha actual atata of public opinionhara ia contrary to what night naturally hava baan expected, having in view tha long and friandly relation* which hava baan maintainedbatwaan tha Unitad Stataa and thia country,and tha jealous conearn which our govern­ment has alwaya shown for tha welfare of Chile in coanon with othar republics of thia hemisphere*2
Tha Dapartaant waa probably not aurpriaad at all to 
hear that among tha raaaona for Chilean antipathy toward tha 
Unitad Stataa waa tha Baltimore incident, an evidence to 
Chi1aana of tha "• • •intermeddling, graaping and unjuat
Diplomatic diapatohes froa Chila, Volume 46; Wilaon to J* J* LatorrW, Chilean Minister of Foreign Relations. A|ril 22, 1696; enclosure in Wilaon to Sheraan, April 2o,
Wilson to Sherman. May 20, 1696* Ha could not believe that racial and religious ties batwaan Spain and Chila explained satisfactorily tha attituda ha observed, though ha reported that tha Roman Catholic Clergy (aany of them directly froa Spain) was unitad in opposition to an American policy in Chile*
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policy of tho Unitod States*”3 For a time, Americans in 
Chilo had to onduro strong proas attacks upon tho United 
Statos# popular deaonstrations on tho streets, and some risk 
to porsonal safety*^
Tho Stato Dopartaont was anxious to provont possiblo 
reinforcement of tho Spanish navy* Chilo, facod with tho 
constant possibility of war with hor neighbors, had boon 
amassing a modern navy for some time, aost of tho vessels 
having boon constructed in British shipyards. Among those
under construction at the time was tho OtHiggino. a powerful
cstool vessel* Upon tho receipt of rumors early in March, 
1697, that Chilo planned to sell tho 0*Higgins to Spain, tho 
Dopartaont forthwith instructed its Minister to look into 
tho matter*^ Before tho latter had tlao to finish his in­
vestigation and reply, ho was further instructed to inquire 
of tho Chilean government if it would accept bids from tho 
Uhitod States*7 Tho Chilean Foreign Minister offered tho 
explanation that Spain had, indeed, made offers for three 
battleships, the O'Higxins included* Chile had refused to
3Ui4*
Sfilson, Pjjelgggfclg 46-49*
Xlfitt* London, March 17, 1697*
^Records of the United States Legation in Chiles Instructions froa the State Dopartaont, Volume 12; Sherman to Wilson, March 7, 1696*
7Ibid*. March 9, 1696.
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»*11« Vilson explained to tho Department that Chilo would 
bo hinderod in national defense by such a sale** The Depart- 
neat, unsatisfied, required a nore definite statonent to the 
effeot that Chile had neither sold nor would oonslder selling 
the vessel to Spain.9
Ordinarily this would hare closed the whole affair; but 
toward the end of June the State Dopartaont received word 
fron Xngland to the effeot that the sale had been oonpleted. 
On the evening of June 25th. too late for any official busi­
ness. Vilson was presented with the whole exasperating and 
delicate question ones nore. He was ordered to take any 
steps necessary to prevent delivery of the vessel and to 
protest the action as a violation of neutral rights - for by 
this tine the war had begun* He was reluctant to reopen the 
case as he had accepted the Foreign Minister9s word, but he 
was left no alternative. He deoided. however, to have an 
informal talk with the Foreign Minister to whom an hour later 
he stated the substance of the telegram, warning that without 
prompt dissvowal of such negotiation he would be forced to 
enter a formal complaint*
To this Latorrl. the Foreign Minister, stated that it 
was "the desire of Chile to maintain and strengthen the
*Dipleaatio dispatches froa Chile. Volume 45; Vilson to Sherman. March 11. 1896*
9Ibid*. March 16. 1*9*.
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cordial and friendly relation* • • • between tha governments 
of Chlla and tha Uhltad Statas; that tha government. • • 
undarstood auch a aala • • • would ba an unfriendly act to 
tha • . • United Statas; and that sueh • • • had not at any 
tlaa been contemplated.” Asked to put this in writing, ha 
refused on two counts: ha could not do so without conferring
with his colleagues, and tha United Statas ought to consider 
an oral statement sufficient. Thera is no doubt but that 
Vllson agreed with him; but ha was aware by this time that 
tha Department thought it had reasonable ground* for suspi­
cion, and would accept nothing lass than a formal statement 
of disavowal from tha Chilean government. His explanation 
of tha conversation with tha Minister resulted in instruc­
tions tha following day to register a formal complaint.
This was something Vilson had been bending every effort to 
avoid in view of the unfavorable character of public opinion 
in Chile toward the war. These instructions arrived too 
late for immediate action since the Chilean Minister had 
closed his office and gone away for the weekend.Conse­
quently Vilson addressed a formal note to him and delivered 
it in person on Monday morning of the 27th to the Government 
building the moment it opened. The answer, received the 
same day, was a stiff reminder to the United States that
*°Ibld.. Volume 46; Vilson to Villiam R. Day, Acting Secretary of State, July 9# 1696.
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Chile needed no instructions as to how a neutral should con­
duct Its affairs. The United States Minister, completely 
out of patience with his own government, was bold enough to 
question in rather strong terms the wisdom of the State 
Department in pursuing a course obviously based on spurious 
information. The only reason he had not protested before, 
he wrote, was that he had no knowledge of the Department•■ 
source of information.^ The Department explained that 
”• • • repeated reports of our Naval Attach* at London as to 
the alleged sale were so positive and circumstantial, and 
apparently fully warranted by offers of sale made to himself, 
that the Department was not at liberty to take chances.
LatorrN's rather spiteful reply to Wilson's note was 
not altogether due to pique over the 0*Higgins affair.
Fear that Spain might resort to privateering in the war led 
the State Department to warn its consuls and ministers to 
be especially watchful for any suspicious outfitting of 
armed vessels in neutral ports.^ The American Envoy in 
Chile took his responsibilities seriously and relayed his 
instructions, with some embellishment, to the consuls under
U Ibld.
^Instruction. fron th. Stat. Dspart.ant, Volume 12 J Day to Wilson, August 15, 1&96.
^ Ibid.. Volume 12| Sherman to Wilson, April 15,
1*9*.
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under hit jurisdiction.1^ He kept a vigilant peraonal watch 
himaelf, even formulating a epeeial code system for secret 
communications with them* To an admonition by the United 
States that Chile observe certain well known rules of 
neutral conduct, Latorrt had already replied by a simple 
acknowledgement, refraining from expressing his government's 
real attitude toward this unusual display of suspicion*1**
He felt it unnecessary to give repeated assurances of neu­
trality on the part of his government*
The enthusiasm with which Vilson sought to protect Amer­
ican interests during the Spanish-American War is best 
illustrated by his careful vigilance whenever ships of the 
United States Navy happened to be in the vicinity of Chile* 
The consul at Valparaiso, John F* Caples, with whom he was 
on quite friendly terms, reported intense feeling over the 
news of the expected arrival of the United States battleship 
Oregon in that port* The Minister considered this informa­
tion Important enough to merit personal investigation* He 
therefore immediately boarded a train to Valparaiso for a 
personal conference with Caples* The latter informed him
^^Dlplomatie dispatches from Chile, Volume 46; Vilson to U*S« Consuls in Chilet enclosure in Vilson to Sherman, April 23* 1*93.
^ Ibld. t Vilson to Sherman, April 26, 1893* The United States required that Chile observe the principles of the Declaration of 1856*
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that certain nan "whoa* names war* known all over Chile," 
had warned him of a secret plot to destroy the American 
vessel. As this was a holiday, Caples and Vilson could not 
get in touch with the Foreign Office, but they did go to 
see the Intendant of Valparaiso, Don J. M. Cabeson Jordan. 
Jordan was not immediately alarmed over their story. He 
promised, however, that proper precautions would be taken to 
see that no harm came to the ship, and immediately set his 
men to work. By the next day he was able to report that 
such a plot did indeed exist. He brought the matter to the 
attention of the President of Chile at once, and received 
instructions to throw a cordon of police boats around the
harbor allowing none but their own or boats belonging to
American ships (the United States gunboat Marietta was also 
expected) to go near the foreign vessels.
But at nine o'clock the following morning the gunboat 
arrived alone. The Oregon had received advance notice of 
the hostile attitude of Chilean port cities and had con­
tinued on to Puntas Arenas for coaling. It was later
joined there by the Marietta. While the Mrifipta was in
port at Valparaiso a rigid control system was exercised by 
the Chilean police, and cordial exchanges took place be­
tween the Chilean and American officials.
Wilson considered it necessary, upon returning to 
Santiago, to apologise to the Foreign Minister for his 
(Wilson's) Irregular action, and to assure him that the Amer-
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lean gorerament would bo highly pleased with tho cooperatire 
attitude shown by Chilean offioisls in tho whelo affair. 
Latorrd approvod his proeautionary measures whole-hearted­
ly*1^ Tho State Department, as Wilson had predicted, was
17pleased* r It was this ability to aet rigorously and accord­
ing to good judgement that distinguished hi* in Thoodoro
ISRooserelt's oind froo tho Npink-tea" rarioty of diplomats*
Mot all Chileans wore hostile or apathetic toward the 
United States* A snail nucleus of liberals sympathised with 
the American policy* A portion of the press upheld the Amer­
icans; and, while H . yerrocarril. a Journal with a repu­
tation for fairness, remained neutral, its publishers were, 
as Wilson reported, "warmly in faror of the United States* ■ 
The Minister had no doubts that the gorerament would follow 
a politely neutral policy,1^ but he nerer recelred the 
impression, as did the American Minister at Monterideo (from 
the Chilean Minister there) that the gorerament of Chile was
16Ibld.. April 11, 1«9«.
''instructions fro. ths Stats Dspartasnt, Voluns 12 j
Day to Wilson, May 17, 1696*
^*See n* 24, Chapter III*
^Diplomatic dispatches from Chile, Volume 46) Wilson 
to Sherman, May 20, 1696*
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20•madly In love with us Americans."
Gradually tha sympathise of tha intallaetuals in Chila 
tumsd against Spain to aueh an axtant that, as Wilson latar 
racallad, ». « .many Chilaans wara claiming daaoant from 
Arauoanian Indiana in preference to Spanish grandees."2l 
Ona promising young Chilean writer produced a forty-two page 
pamphlet setting forth tha problems whioh had brought tha 
United Statas into war with Spain. Ha praised tha course 
taken by tha United Statas and deemed its action "worthy of 
tha sueeassors of Washington.” His book was lauded highly 
by that portion of tha press which was in sympathy with tha 
McKinley policies. Even tha more conservative newspapers 
called it "interesting.”22
^Records of the United States Legation in Chile; Consular and Miscellaneous Communications Received,Volume 2; W. R. Finch, U.S. Minister to Uruguay to Wilson, Jua. 2, 1*9*.
^■ll.cn, 2 Kpl.od»«. 51.
22Bellsario Garcia. Ch*rgot«r«u do 1* Guerra Hispano>
illtlMlI {gUrtf, d. <t.la Frenaa," by Alberto Frado Martinas (Santiago da Chile; Inprenta da La Lei. 1696). Garcia later wrote several works dealing chiefly with Chilean economy and colonisation. The general tenor of this work is best illustrated by the following statement appearing on page 20s "All the world knows that the Antilles lie adjacent to the ports of the United States, and that the acts of barbarism, the unusual crimes, snd the persecution of the foreign element during the struggle between Spain and the Revolution, has been effeoted with evident disregard of civilisation and of the material interests of the bordering nations."We do not recount these deeds to Injure Spain, but to recognise a true international doctrine.”A copy of this work appears la Diplomatic dispatches from Chile, volume 46| Wilson to Day, June 11, 1499. Trans­lation of the above exerpt is by the author.
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A more friendly attitude toward tha United Stataa waa 
alao evidenced by tha popularity of tha American Embassy on 
tha Fourth of July, tha tandar of congratulations by tha 
Sooiaty of Anarlean Union (opposing colonialism)2  ̂and even 
by tha attltuda of Miniatar Latorri who expressed hia 
government's "sincere congratulations" In cordial terns*2*’
It la poaaibla that Vilson exaggerated tha dangar of 
Chiloan aid to Spain, but ha eertainly did not invent tha 
O'Hiwmlna quaation or tha plot at Valparaiso* Throughout 
tha war ha followad a fim, judicious and taetful eouraa of 
action* By cooperating with tha Chilean government to pre­
vent hoatlle activity toward tha United Stataa ha had a 
anall part In tha Awarlean victory, and at tha aana tine 
played a major role in preaerving tha friendahip and under- 
atandlng of one South Anarlean republic*
There had bean aowe cauae for worry on tha part of tha 
United Stataa that Spain night raealva additiona to her 
navy fron sympathetic Latin eountrlea* Tha moot logical 
country to render aueh aid would be Chile aa that republic 
depended on her navy aa tha firat and naln line of defenae* 
Furthermore, Chile's international relatione with her 
neighbora, eepeeially Argentina, had lad her to make vaet
^Diplomatic dispatches fron Chile, Volune 46;Vilson to Day, July 6, 1896*
2^Ibid. 1 Latorrf to Vilaon, August 13# 1696; enclo- aura in Vilaon to Day, September 6, 1696*
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increases in orders for naval vaaaala of tho latoat typo*
Tho boundary quarrel with Argentina stopped up tho defense 
program until Chile was brought to the brink of financial 
ruin*
Chile and Argentina had been involved in negotiations 
for fixing the boundary between the two countries at various 
tines during the past fifty years* After numerous attempts 
to arrive at a settlement the question had been allowed to 
drop but had been revived in 1676* Since that time negoti­
ations had been carried on to the accompaniment of frayed 
tempers with little hope of settlement* In fact* this 
question of the line between the two countries presented 
at the time the greatest potential threat to peace in South 
America* By a treaty of 1661* the line was defined to 
follow "the highest peaks that divide the waters" along the 
Andean range between Chile and Argentina* This ambiguous 
phraseology was interpreted by each country as best suited 
its interest as it was soon discovered that the highest 
peaks were not always Identical with those which constituted 
the watershed* A compromise was the only possible means of 
settling the issues but the two countries continued to 
wrangle until the turn of the century* An expert from each 
government was appointed to work on the problem and in 1695, 
British arbitration was accepted* The efforts of both 
countries to influence the decision* however* hindered a 
solution and the dispute was reaching alarming proportions
2d
when Vilaon arrived In C h i l e * T h o  Chiloon omy and navy 
were kopt in top condition in proporotion for any aggressive 
aoasuroa on the part of Argentina*
If tho government of Chile was endeavoring to avert 
hostile action, the average oitloen did net seen to reflect 
suoh calmness. Fear and resentment were evident to the 
American Minister on every hand* In January, 1&9&, Chilean 
emotion was stirred when an Argentine expert assigned to 
work on the boundary published a book that disclosed a 
national bias* The controversy now became a public affair* 
Newspapers reserved all available editorial space for dis­
cussion of the subject* The undercurrent of murmuring 
observed on every hand in the latter part of 1397 had 
swelled into a wave of unbridled Jingoism* Late in January 
mass meetings occurred in the larger cities where patriotic 
speeches were heatedly delivered and resolutions calling 
for a strict enforcement of treaty obligations upon Argen­
tina were passed* The meeting which was convoked on 
January 24th in the city of Santiago, under the shadow of the 
O'Higgina statue on the main boulevard, was attended by an 
excited but orderly mob of four thousand people*
2^Qaldames, History of Chile. 405* See also Diplo­matic dispatches from Chile, volume 45} Vilson to Sherman, January 25, 1*93.
26Diplomatic dispatches from Chile, Volume 45;Vilson to Sherman, October 6, 1*97*
29
President Errisuris sought to pacify his people but the 
National Guard was increased to wartime proportions and a 
full training program was initiated. Congress had sat in 
extraordinary session since November. 1*97, trying to save 
the country from bankruptcy in the face of preparedness. It 
was now dissolved, supposedly to give the Executive a freer 
hand with the boundary problem. Vilson did not feel that 
the government could hold a check rein on its subjeots.2  ̂
Preparation for a shooting war continued and even the 
conservative section of the Chilean press Joined in the 
clamor for action. Banks frose assets and business came 
almost to a standstill as all eyes turned upon the govern­
ment for some hint of the direction in which it would go.
The American Minister's fear that an ultimatum might be 
delivered to Argentina was well grounded. but fortunately, 
an attitude of discretion prevailed. Walker Martinss. the 
special envoy to the Argentine government for the purpose 
of dealing with the boundary dispute, gave an interview to 
the press pledging the Ministryfs unyielding efforts to 
settle the question peacefully but warning that Chile should
^Ibid., January 25. 1696. "A brief way of putting the situatra?11 wrote Vilson. "is that the people are for war and the Government for peace, if peace can be maintained without the sacrifice of national honor or the territories of the Republic."
March 7, l«9d.
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29not meanwhile d i s a r m * T h a  Anar lean Minister eonoludad
fron this that tha tin a for finding a diplomatic solution
Tha dsvalopaant of aueh an unusual eriais lad to a 
startling departura fron Chile’s traditional financial 
structure* Unlike moat rising young states, Chile’s 
wealthy, landholding Minority generally favored inflation 
slnoe this class could profit from foreign trade while not 
suffering fron internal depression of the economy* In­
flation, however, was severe in Its operation on the Masses 
of the workers* It became necessary therefore to convince
the Chilean people that a policy of "soft money" was neoes-
11sary in the present emergency* A financial analyst 
discussing Chile's problems at this time believed that the
^Martfnes warned that Chile would neglectno detail
definite treaty and sincere embraoe, the occasion is solemnised by a parade of two hundred thousand soldiers before the olive branch*" fcg, Tarda. Santiago, Chile,May 11, 1696*
^°"The failure of diplomacy to find a remedy for the situation within the next two months," he wrote Sherman, "will in my judgement, bring the government to the point of believing that which perhaps the majority of the people here believe, i*&* that the question betwsen the two countries can only be settled by an appeal to arms*" Diplomatic dispatches from Chile, Volume 46| Wilson to Sherman,
May 19, 1696*
was growing extremely short*x°
if necessary a mo: :e on the riasa de Armas* "it will be
3xFrank W. Fetter (Princeton, Mew Jersey, 1*, Monetary Inflation in Chile 931TT 107-151*
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underlying cause of ths cry for paper mousy was the belief 
on the part of aany upper class Chileans that the gold 
standard was the real cause of depression. They were proud 
of Chile9s foreign credit but did not wind dropping the gold
standard in tine of peace if "soaeone else” should start the
32aovsaent. No individual was willing to risk disapproval 
by proposing it.
War fever reached a high pitch in Chile in June of 1698 
as the boundary crisis grew hopeless of settlement. Senate 
sessions were held daily in secret and this caused uncer­
tainty in the winds of the people as to what financial 
aeasures the goveraaent night t a k e .  33 Thus it was within 
the reala of probability that Chile night seek a way out of 
her financial difficulties by disposing of a costly naval 
vessol or two on the ways in England at wartiae prljes. As 
we have seen, no such sale was aade, either because it was 
never seriously considered or else the risk of incurring the 
enaity of the United States was too great. At any rate, 
attention seens to have been centered acre on financial 
aanipulatlons by cabinet aeabers and legislators as they 
aade the decision to lssuo paper aoney. News of those ma­




the Bank of Chile. This financial oollapao waa followed 
by a four day bank holiday proclaimed by Proaidant Brrfsurls 
on July 6, 1694 and on July 11th by a thirty day Moratorium 
doelarod by Congress, Tho eauaoa and offoota of thia finan­
cial orlaia woro koonly obserred by tho Amorlean Miniator 
and roported in a long diapateh in whieh ho gars a lucid 
analyst• of tho financial condition of tho country, showing 
ita offset upon business and foreign trade and relating it 
to tho prospect of war with Argentina.33
Meanwhile, tho boundary commission made up of exports 
from both countries continued with now rigor to try to roach 
an agreement. Ita report was not expected until around the 
latter part of August, or the first part of September, Ho 
complete diplomatic break would take place until that time, 
Wilson beliered that when the commission had finished its 
work, each gorerament would accept the report of its own 
commissioner, and that Chile would then demand that the 
question be submitted for arbitration, supposedly to the
107.
3^Diplomatic dispatches from Chile, Volume 46} Wilson to Day, August 19, 1696, When one considers that Wilson had no consular staff or body of experts such as are furnished eren small foreign establishments abroad today, the sta­tistics and their Interpretation giren In this dispatch reflect hard work and skill on the part of the American Minister,
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British government.^ Ths Stats Department tendered good 
offices through Wilson, though ths lsttsr was confidant that 
ths offsr would bs rejected.3? In fact, ths American Minis­
ter was bsing drawn more and more closely toward ths Chilsan 
sids of ths qusstion as is revealed in his dispatchss froa 
this point on. Ths attituds of Argsntina toward ths work of 
ths commission may have influenced his thinking.
Argsntina agrsad to submit ths southsrn part of ths lins 
to ths arbitration of ths British government but rsfussd to 
inoluds ths mattsr of ths Puna ds A t a c a m a - * *  claiming that it 
was not a subjsct on which a compromise was possible. In 
ths face of this virtual ultimatum ths Chilsan National 
Guard was further reinforced while regular troops wars 
hastily dispatched to points along ths boundary. Wilson was 
given permission by ths Department to correspond directly 
with William I. Buchanan, ths head of ths United States Le­
gation in Argsntina, in an effort to help find a way of 
settlement. Ths former believed now that ths real Argentine
36lbid.> September 16, 1696.
3?ibid.- August 6, 1696*
3*The Puna de Atacama is a high plateau containing valuable salt deposits known as salars. It lies just north of ths 26th parallel of southsrn latitude where ths Andean range is divided up to about the 25th parallel to form a high valley. This complete division of the range, combined with the far greater value of the region, presented more considerable difficulties than those encountered in fixing the southern boundary.
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attitude "uncloaked of diplomacy" was as follows!
First: That any arbitration under theexisting treaties will result in the affirma­tion of the correctness of the Chilean con­tentions*
Second: That if arbitration can be avoided,Chile, in her present financial straits, will be unable to make effective armed resistance to the demands of the Argentine*
Third: That by evading arbitration, shewill ultimately gain that which she would ulti­mately probably lose by accepting it.™
The full extent of Vilson*s intervention in the dispute 
at this point is difficult to ascertain* He believed that 
it was chiefly upon his recommendation that Buchanan was 
chosen to arbitrate the Puna de Atacama boundary * ^  The 
need for good offices was pressing* Var feeling was at the 
exploding point; only the British Minister and the President 
of Chile were able to restrain Martinss from publishing an
^Diplomatic dispatches from Chile, Volume 46;Vilson to Day, August 6, 189®.
LO^Vilson, Diplomatic Episodes. 59* "Intervening quietly," said Vilson, "in this delicate situation, I sug­gested - whether under Instruction or not I do not recall - that the differences in the event of the failure of the two governments to come to an agreement, should be submitted to the arbitration of a commission headed by • • • Buchanan• • • • After numerous diplomatic exchanges and consulta­tion, the Chilean government, with some misgivings, I think, accepted this plan of settlement and Mr* Buchanan • • « immediately entered upon his duties • • • •"Vilson*s recommendation of Buchanan was not improper provided the recommendation originated with one of the two governments* See Instructions from the State Department, Volume 46; Day to Vilson, July 28, 1898.
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ultimatum he had drawn up for presentation to the Argentine 
government*^
At this moment the Chilean Foreign Minister sought an 
interview with Vilson during the course of which he sug­
gested that Buchanan might be acceptable as an arbitrator 
on the Puna de Atacama boundary* The American Minister, in 
reporting this conversation, does not even hint that such a 
suggestion on the part of the Foreign Minister came as a 
result of any prodding on his part* He simply replied that 
his government would be pleased to hear of this willingness 
to accept the offices of the United States, and that he 
could recommend Buchanan highly*^
Buchanan proved acceptable to both governments and 
succeeded, if not in winning the affection of either, at 
least in fixing the Puna boundary once and for all* In most 
cases his decisions were compromises between the Chilean 
and Argentine claims* The commission, slated to meet Decem­
ber 1, 1B96, did not begin its work until March of 1399*
^Diplomatic dispatches from Chile, Volume 46; Wilson to Day, October 31, 1396*
/f2When, almost a year later, the Chilean press attacked Buchanan for having supposedly initiated a proposal made to the Chilean government by Argentina to remunerate him for his services with a sum of twenty thousand pounds, Vilson com­plained that since he had been "in some measure responsible for Buchanan*s selection" his own position, "had been in some measure affected by the disagreeable publicity given to the proposal*" For his report to the Department on the effect of the proposal upon Chilean public opinion see Diplomatic dis­patches from Chile, Volume 46; Vilson to Hay, August 9* 1693, and the enclosed press clippings*
Tha bitter attacks upon tha Amarloan arbitrator by tha praaa 
of both countrisa was convincing evidence to his colleague 
in Chils that a "fair and Impartial sarias of compromises" 
had bean handed down.^ Hostilltlas wara avert ad for tha 
pressnt and tha msatlng of tha prasidants of tha two coun­
tries in tha Straits of Magellan gave assurance of more 
cordial relations in tha future.^ But tha people on each 
side wara not satisfied* Each country triad to discredit 
tha other in tha ayes of tha British arbitrator on tha 
southern boundary. In Wilson's opinion, tha intervention of
tha United States in tha dispute had bean successful only in
j. 5preventing an immediate war. y Hoping for a promotion and 
transfer to another post, ha took leave of absence early in 
1901, and sailed with his family to tha Statas only to be 
directed by President McKinley to return quickly to Chile. 
This dispute had grown worse. He never saw McKinley again 
and the removal of the President by an assassin's bullet 
destroyed a great deal of Wilson's Influence at Washington. 
He halfway expected that his diplomatic career would shortly 
be at an end.^ His business-like procedure and devotion to
^ Ibid.. April 11, 1*93.
*^*Galdames, History of Chile, 406.
45WHson, Diplomatic Episodes. 59.
^ Ibid.. 59-60.
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duty was becoming a part of his rseord, howsvsr, and his 
ussfulnsss in Chils at this tins was undisputsd.
Ill
THl FRBITS OP DIPLOMACY H  CHILI
Tha Amariean Nialitfr to Chila Hod atd« aaajr friand- 
ahipa in that country and ha had davalopad a wara than 
araraga raapaot far thla amall, bat couragaoua, Latin Amari- 
oan republic* Hit daaira far a tranafar waa nat baaad on 
diallka af tha oonatrp to whieh ha waa aeeradltad but on 
paraonal raaaoma* HaTorthaleaa, hia aequaintanoa with 
affaira in Chila daeraad that ha ba raturnad thara at laaat 
for tha praaant.
Returning te Santiago, ha found war farar at a now high* 
Both Chila and Argantina wara apanding exorbitant awa of 
money in a raea for military aupramacy and, although tha 
financial eriaia had paaaad, Chila could aoarealy hopa to 
attain finaneial atabillty in tha faoa of a throatanad out­
break of hoatilitiea* Tha moat praetieal aid that could 
ba randarad by byatandara waa to adga both eountriaa toward 
a paaeaful aettlamant* Tha praoadant had baan aat by 
paaeaful aolutlona an othar parta of tha boundary*
Tha Amariaan Mini at ar waa by now laudad for hi a rapre- 
aantatiom of Chilava poaition to hia aupariara in Vaahington 
aa raportad in tha Amarioan praaa* Tha Chllaana wantad to 
expreaa thair gratituda in a concrata way and a eoatly 
banquat waa arrangad; but Vilaon aoon diaeovarad othar rea-
3«
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sons for his popularity* do waa approaehod alnoat inmedi- 
atoly by tho Proaidont of tho Republic in poraon on tho 
poooibility of purehaaing two war ahipo from tho United 
Statos* Vilaon countorod with tho advice that Chilo adopt 
a noro paaeaful attitudo* Tonaion along tho border* howoror, 
aado tho only alternative to war a rapid and conatructivo 
aodua vivendl and Vilaon ongagod in actito offorta to aaaiat 
tho Britiah Miniator* Oarald Lowther* in bringing it about* 
Vilaon hinaolf would not have boon aceoptablo aa an arbi­
trator aineo hia riowa of eynpathy for Chilo woro too woll 
known* Ho dooa not* however* appoar to havo boon guilty of 
any public etatement during tho affair that could have boon 
termed unfriondly to Argentina* Ho did tako advantage of 
tho roapoct aeeordod him by tho Chilean gorornnont to adviae 
paaeaful meaaurea in tho developing eriaia* Hia aon told 
tho author that ho auggoatod tho "Chriat of tho Andea*” a 
atatue which waa later erected on tho boundary* Thia nay 
not have originated with him and there ia no reference to it 
in hia diapatohoa or nonoira but it waa hia duty to bo a 
peacemaker and ho certainly would have given every encourage­
ment to tho oatabliahnont of a laating peace between tho two 
countrioa* Ho could not help ahowing* however* hia poraonal 
loaning toward Chile'a contention** Hia official attitudo 
waa atriot and proper* but hia reporta to tho State Depart­
ment leave no doubt aa to hia real convietiona* It waa 
alnoat inevitable that thia partiality in feeling would lead
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hia into embarrassment. Ha finally had to explain an attl- 
tuda which ha had never officially expreaaed*
On tha 31at of December, Marcurio publiahed tha 
raport of a eonfaranea batwaan tha American Saeratary of 
State, John Hay, and tha Chllaan Ministar in Vaahington* It 
waa aaaartad that a telegram froa Vilaon to tha State 
Dapartaant had confirmed tha atatcmenta of tha Chilaan rap- 
reaentatlve to tha affact that Chila rajactad tha naw 
"modification*" nada by Argentina in tha protocola, that tha 
Argantinaa wara "enemies of peace," and that a aatiafactory 
arrangement became "nora remote every day."'*’ Vilaon promptly 
daniad tha raport, calling it a "false telegram," and 
aaaartlng in an interview with JJ. Marcurio that ha had never 
intarpratad Argantina motives in hia corraapondanoa with tha 
Stata Dapartaant, Ha raalisad that it waa not hia duty to 
do ao| thia waa in tha province of tha Unitad Stataa Miniatar 
to Argantina* By way of further exoneration of hlaaalf ha 
than reviewed tha oontanta of hia laat telegram to tha De­
partment which reported what ha believed to ba tha favorable 
termination of tha diaputa* Marcurio printed hia state- 
menta along with those of tha "falaa telegram11 but it waa 
probably tha latter that made tha moat laating impreaaion on 
publie opinion*
Marourio, Santiago, Chila, December 31, 1901*
u
It may be inttrusting to examine thia littlt Ineldant 
in son* (1stail, atnos Wilson's sntirs diplomatic carssr was 
marksd by indignant dsnials of proas storios unfavorable 
toward his actions or motives* Ho eould novor soo tho va­
lidity of public Judgoaont of his conduct in aoral tons as 
long as ho eould stand on technical correctness. Not one 
single telegraa of Wilson's to tho Department contained 
phraseology on which to base all of the statements alleged 
to have been contained in the "false telegram** All of his 
messages on the subject, taken as a whole, summed up reason­
ably well the opinion actually held by the American Minister* 
It was unfair to attribute to him a message which he did not
send even though the views expressed therein actually repre­
sented his own| but if these views had not been known, there 
would have been no basis for a "false telegram*"
Let us analyse his telegrams to the Department during 
this period* The first one in question was sent on Novem­
ber 27th* After summarising the events leading up to the 
new disputes, it said!
The situation between Chile and the ArgentineRepublic difficult but not dangerous necessarily*Chile desires peace* Negotiations proceeding amicably**
It would appear that the "false telegram" was a distortion 
of the wording of this message, especially the phrase "Chile 
desires peace*" The obvious insinuation was that Argentina
^Diplomatic dispatches from Chile, Volume k&t Wilson to Hay, November 27, 1901*
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was aggressive* As ths dispute developed over ths phrase­
ology of protocolf Vilson dlspatehsd a ssoond communication 
on December 9th, informing ths Ospartssnt that Chila would 
aoospt ths good offioss of ths United States* Sows two 
wssks latsr, nsgotiations still proossding, ths diffsrsness 
had bssn amplified and war seemed imminent* Wilson9s report 
of December 22nd, roads "Argsntina sinister about to retire 
from Chile* Government of ths Argentine Republic alleging 
diplomacy exhausted*"^ But instead, an agreesent was 
reaohed on ths following day establishing a nodua rirandl 
pending the arbitral decision of Qreat Britain*^ The nego­
tiators were still far apart but a complete break had been 
prevented* The Argentine Ministerfs attespt to have parts 
of the agreesent changed, in accord with the "modifications" 
referred to in the "false telegram," set with no success* 
Vilson did notify the Department of Chilevs objections to 
modifications in the protocols* **
That part of the "false telegram" which credited him 
with a pessimistic opinion of the outcome of the negoti­
ations seems to have been more completely a fabrication*




whole course of tho negotiations, whatever sight hart boon 
hit private thoughts, reveal that his official ostiaato of 
tho outcome varied with oaoh now turn of events* Ho was 
woll awaro of tho uncortaln element In tho Latin temper and 
of tho nutual distrust which prevailed* Ho seems, however, 
to have andaavorad conscientiously to predict as accurately 
as possible tho problems that sight arise* It was his 
habit of wanting his government to bo prepared for any 
possible contingency that loft hia open for critieisa*
There Is little reason to charge hia with constant pessinisa 
In his reports* He tried to report the facts and trends as 
he saw them* In fact, he was never extremely alarmed about 
this present problea* He sent no wire to the Department 
relative to the new crisis after December 25th; thus, if 
the charge of an improper attitude was to be sustained It 
would have to refer to the period after that date* Since 
&1 Mercurlo published the "false telegrsm" on December 31st, 
the assumption is that the public was being referred to 
some message sent after the 25th of December*
The charge that such a telegram was sent was manifestly 
false and the State Department approved Vilson9s course In 
denying its authorship* Secretary Hay must have been amused 
at his Minister9s careful concern with technicalities*
Vilson quoted his message of December 25th to the Department 
as proof that he had sent no message after that date* Hay 
eould not have been unaware of Vilson9s real sentiments* To
u
the leaders of Chilean society tho American Minister*a hasty 
donlol of tho "false telegram" roprooontod no change In hio 
attitudo of partiality* Ho oufforod no loao of prestige in 
Chilo*
As io well known, British arbitration was aoooptod by 
both eountrios and a troaty of porpotual poaeo was drawn up* 
By Nay of 1902, all difforoneos had boon resolved and poaeo 
waa ostablishod, allowing Chilo to embark on tho journey to 
groator financial stability* Whilo provision had boon made 
in 1496 for tho ovontual retirement of tho papor nonoy 
issues, resumption oould not bo earriod into offoet during 
a war searo* Evon in January of 1902* tho stato of Chiloan 
rosourcos did not pornit tho operation of tho law of 1696*
This law provided for retirement of tho papor but President 
Rieseo had another law passed postponing resumption of 
spooio payments until 1905* Vilson reported, however, that 
there was no more talk of eheap money and unlimited govern­
ment issues as there had been in 1496* In his opinion,
Chile was now as sound in money as any other country*^
This was gratifying to the party in power In the United 
States, the party that had sent Henry Lane Vilson to Chile*
It had been an outstanding leader of that party, James Q* 
Blaine, who had urged eloser trade relations between the 
United States and Latin America just a few years before Vilson
January 3, 1902
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w«nt to Chile* Fear of tha alia tad proximity of tha north- 
arn nalghbor and a long standing oriantation toward Europe 
had kapt Blaine's idaa in tha embryo stags* Ineraasad trada 
would have to wait upon more reoeptive attitudas and tha 
time whan Latin American countrias would saa tha valua of 
closar commercial tias with tha United States*
Tha tast of. a diplomat's usafulnass to his country in 
tha broadast sense is tha skill with which ha hamonisas 
relations batwaan it and tha country to which ha is ac­
credited* Although Wilson had an axaggaratad opinion of 
his own talants and accomplishments, tha racords show that 
raal cradit is dua him in this respect* Evidence could ba 
saan on avary hand by tha turn of tha cantury that ralations 
batwaan tha two countries, Chila and tha Unitad States, were 
becoming mora permanently cordial* Not tha laast manifes­
tation of growing mutual respect was tha incraasa in com- 
mercial exchanges,
Chilean commercial and cultural tias bound har closa to 
tha old world and tha problem of increasing Chilean trada 
with tha Unitad States was as difficult as anything else 
that tha American Minister was called upon to do there* 
Chilaan officialdom and society might accord tha American 
Minister lavish praise in tha Latin manner, but hard-headed 
business man chose to buy where they could obtain long term 
cradit and familiar products* Tha public in Chila had to ba 
shown tha merit of American-made goods before merchants could
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handle than. Moreover, Increased buying powar would have 
to ba oraatad by a graatar danand in tha Unitad States for 
Chilaan product*. Chilaana alao prafarrad to daal with 
foralgnara who thought anough of than to laarn thalr lan­
guage. Not nueh prograaa along thasa linaa had been nada 
pravioua to Wllaonfa tine and it ia a nlnor tribute to hin 
that ha sat about learning tha Spanish language as soon as 
ha reached Chile, though there is no evidence that ha was 
aver vary fluent in it. One cannot have tha necessary 
opportunity to do this, even whan residing in a foreign 
country and dealing with foreigners in an official way when 
daily contacts remain primarily in an American colony. 
Wilson showed perhaps only slightly more interest in speak­
ing tha native tongue than many other Americans who are
privileged to live in a foreign city.
But learning tha language of tha country was only a 
small part of the work to be done. The foremost authority 
on relations between Chile and the United States in this 
period had this to says
The greatest handioap with which the United States was foroed to contend in its aim to ba tha recognised leader of American republics was its lack of material business interests in somany of the larger countries. Nowhere was thismore evident than in Chile.'
British sovereigns were much more in demand than American
.  JfY*11*' SlsUl. BBl & £  5l£h  &hjl UnitedStates, 155.
47
gold coins** and Aneriean conaulatea war*, In many oaaea, in
Qshameful condition.' Tat, daaplta tha increasing burdaa 
boraa by tha Legation in daaling with consular matters, tha 
State Oapartnant rafuaad to appoint a rloa-eonaul. Anarlcans 
did aaak narkats In tha country and tha Bsbassy received 
numerous requests for aid in aatabliahlng trada contacts*^ 
Tha Legation randarad all of tha halp It could to foatar
aTha Vice-Consul at Antofogaata raportad that• • Americans and travelers generally would serve thalr commercial Intaraata in bringing Brit1ah sovereigns to tha ooaat rather than American gold* Par tha former there is always a fair rata of exchange, while Aneriean gold la little known except in larger commercial cantare Ilka Valparaiso, and in interior towna ita aale ia axcaadingly alow** Sonata Document Mo* 176, Volume XX, 55th Congress, 2nd Saaaion; printed in Monthly Bulletlna of tha Bureau of Aneriean Republics. 771* 
oA caaa in point waa tha part-time conaulata at Taloahuano which in 1B95, waa tranafomed into a regular coneular agency* Tha oonaul, an employee of a Chilean commission houae, treated tha amblama of tha United Stataa attached to tha office with much dlereapeet and plowed oyer tha graven of tha Protectant cemetery under hia care* Diplomatic dlepatehea from Chila, Volume 47I Petition from American oitiiena ia Talcahuano, Chila| enclosure in tfllaon to Hay, April 2, 1900*
^°The coatroveray over tha boundary evoked thia intaraatlng requeat of the Miniatari "We herewith aneloaa name facta regarding tha uae of our guns by tha Unitad Stataa Government in tha recant Spaniah-Amarican War* We ehould ba plaaaad if you would call tha attention of tha proper partiea to thia matter aa an aid to a great and growing American induetry*■ Coneular and Miaeellaneoua Communications Received, Volume 2| Sima-Dudley Defanaa Company to Wilaon, March 4, 1*99*
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sound, legitimate sntsrpriss and encouraged any effort that 
had prospaet of succeeding* Wilson was squally quick, how­
ever, to counsel against tha nssdlsss investment of aoney 
in business efforts that were certain not to produce returns* 
Coaaercial expansion was, however, taking place and Wilson 
contributed to it* He was already becoaing well known to 
Aneriean enterprisers seeking extension of aarkets and aany 
who had received the aid of the Legation wrote coapliaentary 
and unsolicited letters to the State Departaent praising its 
Minister in Chile for his efforts on behalf of business*^ 
Despite the difficulties involved in asking Aneriean 
trade attractive to Chileans, a great deal was accoaplished 
in the years after the turn of the century and auch of the 
credit goes to the Aaerlcan envoy who labored to advertise 
the value of closer trade relations* He worked steadily with 
the Bureau of Aaerlcan Republics and helped to induce Chile
^The following are exaaples: "Being somewhatlargely interested in the South Aaerlcan States as President of the Signal Oil Coapany of Pennsylvania I desire to express to you ay gratification of the efforts of the Hon* Henry L* Wilson, our sinister to Chile, by all consistent aethods to render practical and substantial assistance to those seeking to develop Aaerlcan coaaerce in Chile • • • •" Againt "We had occasion recently to notice the activity in behalf of Aaerlcan interests, of the Hon* Henry L* Wilson • • • •"The incident furnishes very eloquent evidence of the fact that the Minister is on the oui vive to protect in every appropriate way, the interests of Aaerlcan insti­tutions* • • *• Consular and Miscellaneous Coaaunleatlons Received, Yoluae 2*
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to become a full-fledged member of the organisation on 
February 3, 1*99.12 Ho rendered valuable assistance to 
Buchanan, forner Minister to Argentina, who becane Manager of 
the Pan Aneriean Inhibition of 1900. The efforts of these 
two non resulted in Chile9s enthusiastic participation ia the 
Inhibition.11 The Minister to Chile was taken on a tour of 
the country in 1901, at the enpense of the Chilean government, 
traveling on a special train throughout the central and 
southern regions. This eneursion was one of nany opportuni­
ties he had to see Chile9s economic possibilities. Al­
though no startling or rapid increase in trade between the 
two countries occurred, the envoy was ever on the alert for 
new business opportunities and he had a definite part in 
laying the groundwork for future iuproveuent of eonaerelal
12Diplomatic dispatches from Chile, Volune 46|Wilson to Hay, March 6, 1*99* and House Document 175,Part 2, 56th Congress, 1st Session, 1375-1376.
^Wilson, however, gave much of the credit to Presi­dent Brrgsuria. Wilson to Hay, October 3, 1900. The Council of State in Ootober. 1900, passed a decree providing for a Commissioner Oeneral for the Chilean exhibit. This exhibit ranked third, being exoeeded only by those of the Ohited 
States and Mexico. Sherman, fiiglgSgAlS, and OfiaBtCfilgl, Eola­tions of the United States and Chile- 203. See also Instruc­tions from the State Department. Tolune 13 f Buohanan to Hay, January 3, 19012 enclosure in Hill to Wilson, January 11, 1901.
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relations*1**
His sympathetic attitude toward the country and its 
people also helped to dispel some of the suspicion enter* 
tained by Chile, as by other Latin American republics for 
SI Coloso del Sorts. Increasing friendliness toward the 
United States was evidenced by the respect and cordiality 
shown to its representative* On the Fourth of July, when 
there are always celebrations and receptions at American 
posts abroad, Wilson was feted lavishly and was moved to 
some sentiments that were probably well received if some­
what exaggerated:
"I have been told,** he orated, "that it is a diplomatic error for me to express a high opinion of the Chilean people* If it be a dip­lomatic duty to seek the faults rather than the virtues of a people, then it is a *custom more honored in the breabh than in the observance,* and I see no reason for accepting its mandates*I confess to a sincere admiration for Chile and the Chileans* I find you a brave, industrious, hardy and patriotic people, preserving the best traditions of the race from which you sprang*"
3>4wilson agreed with Caples, the American oonsul at Valparaiso, that the extension of Chllo-English shipping lines to San Francisco in 1697, would aid American Interests, but it was to be regretted "that the carrying trade of the west coast of Worth and South America should be in hands other than those of the Aaerlcan Merchant Marine*" Diplo­matic dispatches from Chile, Volume A5; Wilson to Sherman, November 12, 1697* The occasion for this comment was the extension of the Coapnta Sud American* de Vanores and 
the Pacific Steam navigation Company jointly from Panama to San Francisco*
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The newspaper that print ad this i u u | i  added!
• . .there does not exist between tha two oountrlas at tha moment any question to ba Bat­tled, there can ba no quarrels about tha demar- cation of frontiers* commercial competition is out of tha question* and there Is no divergence of opinion with regard to international doc­trine.1*
Another editor was even willing to have his own country 
accept the blame for the Incidents
• * .The moment has arrived to admit that a great part of the responsibility for these events was ours.Slow and erratic was the action of the civic authorities In Valparaiso! slow and er­ratic the action of the tribunals of justices stupid was the government* and a thousand times more stupid was our diplomacy in the lamentable case . . . .  and also la the other Incidents^ghieh maintained us on the verge of
The ultimate in self-humiliation had been reaohed. Kvea 
Wilson could hardly surpass such eloquent self-critielomt 
There was even impressive evidence that Chile9s at­
titude toward the United States was permanent. Genuine 
sympathy was shown on the occasion of President McKinley's 
untimely death by an assassin's b u l l e t O n l y  a few 
Chilean newspapers cried "Imperialism1* when American troops 
leaded in Panama in 1903* and* although the general attitude
**11 Porvenlr. Santiago* Chile* July 20* 1901.
an abyss.
1'Wilson* Pi Ini sodas. 75-76. and Diplomaticdispatches from Chile* volume *ft|WLlson to Hay* October 5*
l6i* Tardo. Santiago* Chile* July A* 1901. 
^Wilso D plomatlo l e e
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in the Venesuelan crisis was ons of sympathy toward Germany,
tha bombardment of San Carlos shooksd Chiloans as it did
Americans into rsflaction upon tha prineiplas of tha Monroe 
i aDoctrine. 0 Tha Chilaan government, anxious to bast Argen­
tina, even eraatad embarrassment by insisting upon tha 
randaring of port services to tha Unitad States Nary without 
charge, a thing whieh oould not ba permitted, of course.1^ 
Thara was not or an a graat daal of rasantaant when, with his 
oharaetaristlc dasira to insura protaction of Aaariean busl- 
nass intarasts9 Wilson raooansndad that tha Unitad Statas 
station ona or two ships paraanantly in Chilaan and Parurlan 
watars. Tha occasion for this was a sarias of labor riots 
at Valparaiso in 1903; and runors of such naval action lad 
to spaeulation among Chileans about intervention. Wilson 
fait that if ships ware stationed nearby at a tine whan no 
difficulties existed tha "appearance of unwelcone interfer­
ence" would ba avoided while at tha sane tine wa would ba
^Diplomatic dispatches froa Chile, Voluae 49) Hutchinson to Hay, Septenber 29, 1902, and Wilson to Hay, January 26, 1903.
^Instructions froa tha State Departaent, Voluae 14; Hay to Wilson, January 10, 1903.
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"in * position to protoot Aneriean interests*"20
The rolo of Henry Lsno Wilson in the betterment of 
Chilo-American rolstisns woo clearly sot forth in s roport 
soat to tho Ststo Doportaont by Merman Hutchinson, Wilson’s 
Secretary of Location* Ho observed thatt
Tho position that tho aonbors of a Location have in a soeial sphere not infrequently stands as tho critorion of tho political position a Location nay enjoy in rolatioa to tho oordiality or rostraiat existing between two iadopondont states* In this respect, tho Unitod States Loca­tion at dantiaco is an example of a Location standinc hich socially and politically* Froa •▼ory source, and even in Lina* and on tho Stoaaor eoninc down tho wost coast, I have hoard nothinc but praise for tho Minister and for tho nanaor in which ho has, by his cordial and sympathetic personal intercourse with Chilean people, and by his attention to, and appreci­ation of, their institutions, broucht this Location into a social and political position which it has not hitherto enjoyed since tho unfortunate affair of 1691* Fron beinc tho most disliked of foreigners, wo hare oomo to bo tho most liked and afeired, and our Minister is undoubtedly tho nost popular foreicn representa­tive in Chile, or that has boon in Chile within tho ordinary aonory of nan* This chance of sentiment, brought about mainly by tho personal character of our representative has, I under-
20Diplomatic dispatches fron Chile, Volume 50;Wilson to Hay, June 19. 1903* It should be noted that the suggestion that the United States have vessels stand by, dldnet oricinate with Wilson* Tho British Ambassador had, in the early days of the riots, addressed a confidential note to the State Department inquiring if, in the event of serious trouble, the United States would have any war vessels stationed around Valparaiso* Instructions from the State Department, Volume ltf A* A* Adee, acting Secretary of State to Wilson, August 26, 1903*Great Britain had. since the abrogation of the Glayten-Bulwer TFeaty, relinquished more and more of the responsibility of naval policing around the western hemisphere to the United States in acknowledgement of the Monroe Doctrine*
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stand, dona something for our country commer­
cially, as we have risen, la this rsspsot froa tha savanth to tha third place during Nr* Wilson's tsnurs of offlea here* I an not unmindful of tha faet also that this good foal­ing for our country has deepened sines tha rsesnt Fan-Aaarlean Congress for tha Chileans believe that tha United Statas and their repub­lic draw somewhat elosar together as regards certain questions* • • •
Tha Chileans are a virile, progressiva, and sensible people, and I believe they are growing more like us, If not Imitating us mere, every day* The soeial and political position needs to be maintained by a Minister who will treat them as Mr* Wilson has done; and I believe the trade of the United States will gain an impetus therefrom* Only the fact that our United States merchants, manufacturers and steamship lines find plenty to do at home and elsewhere, can be an excuse for not paying more attention to the trade with Chile*21
The final expression of Chile's respect for the American 
Minister was not given until long after the termination of 
his service there* The Faculty of Philosophy, Humanities, 
and Pine Arts of the National University of Chile bestowed 
upon him the title of Honorary member of that body on 
July 12, 1911, after he had become Ambassador to Mexico*
His diploma, sent to him through the Chilean Legation at 
Mexico City, was accompanied by the following message;
In transmitting the resolution adopted by the said institution to his Sxcellenoy, Mr*Wilson, you will have the goodness to make known to the distinguished American diplomat, the great satisfaction with which the Govern­ment of Chile approves of this designation which It considers not only a just recognition
^Diplomatic dispatches from Chile, Volume 46; Hutchinson to Hay, March 6, 1902*
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of his intellectual gifts but s cordial testi­monial of appreciation of the constant proofs of affection with which His Excellency, Mr*Wilson has earned the gratitude of our coun­try. 22
Wilson took an extended leare of absence in 1902, and 
after a tour of Europe, returned to Washington, D*C* pre­
pared to tender his resignation from the diplomatic service. 
He did not suppose that President Theodore Roosevelt would 
have any interest in promoting him and he did not desire to 
continue in the service without some recognition. He was 
relieved, however, to learn that the new President had 
studied his work in Chile and approved of it. Roosevelt had 
a great deal of respect for the kind of forcefulness and 
loyalty to the ideals of his country and party exhibited by 
Wilson. Seoretary of State John Hay waa also satisfied 
with him and in consequence, Roosevelt assured him that he 
desired very much that he remain in the service; he promised 
to promote him at the first suitable opportunity. Wilson 
was anxious to give his children better educational facili­
ties than were available in Chile and doubtless had other 
reasons also for desiring a more inviting post.
The expected transfer was to be much later than antici­
pated. He spent several months in the State of Washington 
during which time a general reshuffling occurred in the State 
Department but Wilson’s name was not included in the roster
22Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes. 105-106.
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of appointees* It was not until bo arrived in Panama fH
- »■
route to Chilo that ho loarnod of his appointment to Greece* 
Soerotary Hay, however, made it oloar that this was not 
roally a promotion* Wilson loanod heavily on tho advioo of 
his brothor John L* who advised hia to doolino tho appoint­
ment even at tho risk of annoying tho Prosidont* When, 
howovor, Roosevelt loarnod tho circumstances ho dotomined 
to "take tho oarliost possible opportunity of ropairing tho 
injury* * • , Tho "opportunity" proved to bo months 
away and in tho Spring of 1904# Wilson sont his family to 
tho Statos* Ho followod them in July*
It happonod that Prosidont Roosovolt noodod Wilson's 
holp In tho presidential oloctlon of 1904* Tho Minister to 
Chilo was given a prosaic, if soaowhat difficult task, in 
connection with tho political campaign* Although this de­
prived hia of a vacation it was undoubtedly of groat value 
in tho furthering of his career* Ho was mildly surprised a 
little later when, after going to tho State of Washington 
to aid, "in a quiet way," tho senatorial campaign of his 
brothor, ho received notice that tho Prosidont expected hia 
to return to Chilo temporarily and to leave froa there to go 
to a European post* Ho did not relish tho idea of suffering 
tho embarrassment and expense of going to Chile only to 
terminate his residence and threatened to resign from the
23ISil.. 93.
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service if forced to do so. Instead of accepting his resig­
nation, the Department arranged matters so that he could 
report to a new post without returning to Chile.
His brother was defeated in the senatorial race and the 
incumbent senators from Washington were political foes of 
the Wilsons. Consequently his diplomatic career was again 
jeopardised by the protest of these men to President Roose­
velt's proceeding with his appointment. Roosevelt, however, 
overrode the rules of senatorial courtesy and retained Wilson 
in the service, replying to the senators from Washington that 
he was not "appointing" Wilson but transferring him from one 
post to a n o t h e r . I t  was unusual at this time for appoint­
ments of such importance to be made on the basis of merit 
even though Roosevelt's decision was partly influenced, as it 
undoubtedly was, by Wilson's services to the party.
The appointment was to the legation in Brussels, Belgium. 
It was a promotion to a post where he would have increased 
responsibility in ceremonials and protocol. No outstanding 
problems were anticipated. For those who were believed to 
merit further promotion, it was a recognised training ground. 
Belgium proved to be an interlude in a career that involved
2^Ibid.. 112. See also Siting E. Morison, editor,XiUL Letters of Theodore Roosevelt (CambridgeI Harvard 
University Press, 1951-54)# IV, 1089-90. Roosevelt wrote Richard Harding Davis, January 3# 1905 that Wilson was dis­tinctly different from the "pink-tea" type of diplomat who infested the servioe, and that he had done good, hard work in an obscure South American post. He proposed, therefore, to promote him.
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the greatest length of service in Latin America. It waa, 
however, an important four years in hia paraonal adranoawant. 
Hia dutiaa wara much lighter than they had baan in Chila and 
ha had more opportunity to travel. Apparantly ha took full 
advantaga of it* Arriving in Belgium, ha found that ha 
eould not taka ovar hia poat at Bruaaala immediately without 
offanding tha daparting miniatar, Hence, ha enjoyed a tour 
of Paria bafora praaanting hia eradantiala and antarlng upon 
hia dutiaa. Ha raturnad to Bruaaala in a faw days to taka 
up hia raaidanoa and praaant himsalf officially to tha king.
It waa hia firat axparianca with monarchy and hia offi­
cial recaption by a monarch waa a noval axparianca. Although 
unuaad to court caramoniaa and aomawhat amuaad by tha trap- 
plnga of royalty, ha found King Leopold tha "least ceremoni­
ous of all hia court" and got off to a fine start with tha 
old king. Ha even persuaded tha monarch to aat up tha firat 
golf llnka In Bruaaala and had tha honor of being tha firat 
paraon to "tee off" on them.
By and large, tha paraonal aaaociatlona of tha Legation 
and of tha diplomatic eorpa wara plaaaant. Robert Woods 
Bliss, a man daatinad to render important aarvloa in hia own 
right, aoon became tha Secretary of tha Legation and Wilson 
waa pleased with him. Tha Minister also renewed an old ac­
quaintance with Pranelsco da la Barra, than tha Mexican 
Minister to Belgium. Tha two diplomats had baan officially
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received on tho sono day*2  ̂ Thoro woo no Aneriean colony In 
Bruooolo but tho British oolony woo large ond tho Vilsons 
made o number of frionds among then* Tho family, indeed, 
spont tholr summer vacations in England*
Thoro woro fow diplomatic problems of any Importance 
and tho Miniator waa not overworked* Ho waa unablo to per- 
suado hia superiors not to soil American intoroata in tho 
Cant on-Hankow Railroad to tho Chinese government, a matter 
of groat importance to King Leopold whoso holdings woro 
secretly carried by Amorican bankers* Tho King also ex­
pressed his displeasure at times with the criticism by the 
United States of his policies in the Congo*2? Wilson 
observed that Leopold was not a popular king though "admired 
for his kingly qualities*** In the summer of 1907, Wilson 
attended the Republican Convention in Chicago, the Convention 
which nominated his future superior, William Howard Taft, for 
the presidency* Returning to Europe, he toured Italy and 
reported to his post only to be Invited to attend the Hague 
Conference as guest of the American Minister to the Nether-
25Wil#on, Diplomatic Episodes. 131*
26Ibld.■ 148-49.
2?Wllson served an American Ambassador to a Brussels Conference to Regulate Arms in Africa* WhoU Who in America. 
1932-33•
2*Vllaoa, . toiwdH. 153.
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lands* Hara ha aat a number of notablas in tha diplomatic 
service*
Not Ions afterwards ha laarnad that tha Departaent 
wished to tranafar hia* His destiny was onoa aora uncertain* 
Whan ha haard that ha was to ba sant to Russia ha protastad 
that this would ba too expensive for hia, Austria was re­
jected for tha saaa raason and ha requested that ha ba con- 
sldarad for tha post of Mexioo* Although thara have baan 
soaa hints of Manipulation in his transfar to this lattar 
post, it nay ba said that ona doas not have to go far afiald 
in ordar to diseovar raasons why sueh an appointment would 
hava baan attractive to hia* It was a pronotion to tha rank 
of aabassador and a placa naar hona* Ha was not always in 
tha bast of haalth and hia nothsr bacana sarlously ill during 
his tour in Mexico* His brothor, John L*, dlad in 1912* Thus 
tha urga to ba naar his fanily was sufflciant raason for de- 
slring this appointnant*
But ha was not tha only parson baing oonsidarad* Anothar 
nana was baing plaead whila his own was subalttsd to tha 
goramnant of Turkay for prallninary approval* In fact, it 
was virtually ssttlad that ha would ba sant to Turkay*
But tha nan in prospaet for tha Maxican post turnad it 
down at tha last alnuta and Wilson was notiflsd in October, 
1909, of his own appointnant to that country* Ha was anxious 
to naks tha ohanga but thara wara long dalays* Among than 
was tha President's daslra that ha stay and attsnd tha funaral
of King Loopold who ditd whilo Wilson was roeoiving his now 
assignment. This duty woo followod shortly by that of at­
tending, as spoolal Ambassador, tho coronation eoromonlss 
for tho now King Albert. Dospito tho attitudo of tho do- 
ooasod Loopold toward thoso powers whoa ho considorod to bo 
noddling in his Congo affairs, tho old King had troatod tho 
Wilsons with spoolal frlondlinoss in tho last days of his 
lifo and tho Minister to Belgiun loft that country with many 
warn manorits* His cagornoss to got to his now post was 
daaponod only by tho reluctance ho felt in severing his 
official relations with tho now nonarch whoa ho also liked 
and respected.
In March of 1910, Wilson was officially received by 
Porfirlo Dfas, Prosidont and dictator of Mexico. This was 
an asslgnaent with nuch greater responsibility and Wilson 
had proved hiaself to bo worthy of it. Ho took up his now 
duties with tho confidence and diploaatle maturity that 
twelve years in tho service had given him. Both tho letter 
and tho spirit of instructions sent to him by Taft and Knox 
woro followod conscientiously. His tour in Mexico night 
have boon aueh longer but for tho victory of Woodrow Wilson 
in tho election of 1912.
IY
THE CHISIS OP BIO BUSINESS IV MEXICO
By the tiae Henry Lane Wilson arrived to take up his 
duties at tho Mexican post tho stability of that country was 
alroady being throatonod by tho riso of an opposition party 
against tho incumbent dictator, Porfirio ofao* Tho anti- 
O^as movement, crystalising around young Francisco I* Madero, 
was alroady gaining aoaontua; tho government of tho old 
dictator was tottering*
Tho story of "diaspotlsa” is so woll known that it nood 
not bo roeountod horo in detail* Porfirio D^as had estab- 
lishod ordor in Moxlco in tho 1670*0 making it attractive to 
Investors of foroign capital* Ho thon bogan granting induce- 
aonts and eonoossions to thoso foroign investors* A woll- 
organised police force aaintained unprocodontod order* Many 
foreigners, a largo nuabor of thoa Anoricons, eaao to reside 
in tho country and aillions of dollars woro invested in 
mining, stock-raising, railways, agriculture and other prof- 
- itablo ventures* About half of this laportod capital was of 
Aaerlcan origin and, sinoo 1900, a considerable aaount had 
boon invested in tho oil resources of tho country* British 
oil interests woro also granted heavy eonoossions and thoro 
is soao evidence that o£as planned to increase these British 
holdings to offset doainanoe by Aaerlcan oil companies.
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Thus, d/m had bacons tha chief of a wall polio ad and 
crowing eeononlo enpire. hot only waa thia faot appraoiatad 
by intaraatad foreigners, but alao by a growing group of 
waalthy Mexicans who eventually fornad thensalves into sone- 
thing rssenbling a party known aa tha "ciantfflooa." Tha 
financial ganiua of thia group waa Dfas* Miniatar of 
Hacienda, Joui Iraa Liwantour, Tha profita accruing to 
thoaa fortunata anough to ba oountad in tha ranka of tha 
oiant^fiooa wara aada possible, aa thay aaw it, only by tha 
kind of governnant provided by D£as. Thay aoon raalisad that 
an and of dietatorahip would aaan ioao facto an and of tha 
syndicate, aapaoially should tha d£sb ragiaa ba aueoaadad hy 
•one fora of daaooratio rule. This group waa diapoasd to 
preserve tha atatua q u o .
Tha eontinuancs of ordar and stability in Mexloo waa 
alao of graat intarsat to a nuabsr of Anerloana raaping 
profita thara, both Investors fron outaids of tha country 
and Aneriean residenta in Mexico. It waa, indeed, tha avowed 
policy of tha Taft - Knox adniniatration to encourage foreign 
investneats aa a naans of increasing Aneriean influence in 
thoaa areas where tha aaintenanoe of peaoe and tha atatua q u o  
waa of vital intarast to tha Ohited States. This was tha 
real neaning of "dollar diplonaey." As has baan shown, Henry 
Lane Wilson conaidarad tha expansion of foreign eonnarca an 
inportant phase of hia work. It waa only natural that Wilson 
should strongly favor tha existing regine in Mexico. Thara
is mo evidence that he had concerned himself with tha wel­
fare of tha masaas of tha people aithar in tha Unitad Statas 
or ia Chila and Belgium* Ha had basa tha representative 
throughout his carssr of tha partj of Big Busiaass ia tha 
Uaitad Statas* Be spaaial urglag froa tha Quggeahelms,
Dohaay or anyone also would have baaa aaadad to aak# hia 
assuaa tha rola that ha did la Mexico although ho undoubtedly 
walooaad thair approval of hia* Chila had baan a training 
ground, Balglua had baan a vacation and now ha was faead 
with a raal ohallanga* Ha now had tha rank of Ambassador 
and a aora dlgniflad position than ha had avsr enjoyed 
bafors* In Chila ha had baan tha symbol of a powarful coun­
try! I® Balglua ho had basa littls aara than a daeoratad 
arraad bay* ovsrshadowad by far graatar parsoaalitlas aa tha 
gold-braided fiald of Buropaan dlploaaoy* Haw ha was tha 
ranking diplomat la an important American nation and tha 
first oltissn of a large American colony* Important paapla 
brought him problems that thay thought only tha labassy 
could solve* It would ba useless to say that all of this 
failed to make a strong impression on him or that ha did 
not come to feel that his importance should ba noticed by 
everyone. Anorloans and Mexicans alike*
While Wilson was presenting his credentials to Presi­
dent ]>£as and meeting such politicians as Liaantour and 
Corral (Dias* Vice-President) for tha first time, the Madero 
movement was assuming alarming proportions* It threatened
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a revolution If tho administration should sook to withhold 
fro# and fair elections when the tine cane* The nan who 
made the movement articulate was the scion of a wealthy 
family in the state of Coahuila who had gone into politics 
under a cloud of misgivings on the part of the family which 
stood to lose heavily unless he succeeded.
Francisco I. Madero was born in Parras, Coahuila on 
October 30, 1673. After several years of schooling in 
France in the 1860's he attended the University of Cali­
fornia, studying agricultural he returned to his native coun­
try embarrassed that his people should be so backward in the 
midst of such vast material resources. He concluded that 
education and democratic government would lift the people to 
a new level of progress.^ How greatly his decisions were 
affected by his peculiar bent for communing with spirits of 
the dead is not apparent but he approached his goal by a 
practical route. By 1900, he had begun to consider politics 
as the field in which he must realise his alms since nothing 
could be accomplished until Mexico should become a more 
democratic country. His intention was to work at it gradu­
ally, beginning at the local level and finally extending the 
Influence of his ideals so that the central government would
*For the career of Madero and the account of the Revolution and his administration, I have drawn extensively
from Charles 0. Cumberland, glELUB. SgXfibltt&S StOlllA M l £  Madero (Austins University of Texas Press, 19527.
66
feel and be responsive to thin* Ho joined politioal clubs, 
only to hsT« bis candidates bought off or undermined by tho 
administrations yet ho kopt doggedly at it and resolved to 
stay, if possible, within tho framework of tho law* Though 
not of a compromising naturo, ho loarnod somo of tho rulos 
of praotieal politics during this oarly period* It was 
fatal to him lator that ho was too idoalistio to boeomo a 
bottor pupil*
Tho lengthening of tho presidential term to six years 
and tho institution of tho offloe of vice-president, followod 
by tho selection of Raa6n Corral in 1904# to fill tho vice- 
presidential seat, served notice that the dictatorship was 
to continue* When nfas indicated in the famous Creelman 
interview of 1906, that Mexico might be ready for more democ­
racy, Madero began shaping his politioal forces* In January 
of 1909, he published his booklet, Ifc* Presidential Sucoaa- 
AiSM Si 12L&*
His movement against the reeleotion of Dias, centered 
in the dft Hfgjgg, "*• the only
one opposed to the continuance of the present regime* The 
political situation was complicated by the desire of the 
antl-cientfflcos for a change* This movement was not, how­
ever, opposed to the substitution of someone else for Ram6n 
Corral as vice-president since it was not expected that Dfas 
would live out another term* Bernardo Heyes, an administra­
tion general, was the central figure of this group and when
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the popularity of Reyes began to decline, with obvious as­
sistance fron tho Dias forces, Madero roallsod that Dias had 
no intontlon of stopping down* Dias oithor believed, or was 
porsuadod by tho cientificos to believe, that a continuance 
of tho prosont syston was vital to tho woll boing of Mexico*
Tho wintor of 1909* was a bloak ono for Madoro* Path­
ways sooaod to bo closing instead of opening* In January of 
1910, Just prior to tho arrival of tho now Amorican Ambassa­
dor, it boeamo clear that Madoro himself was tho only logical 
candidate of his party for tho presidency* Tho platform 
embodied tho ideals of education, democracy, land reform and 
a fair deal for labor* While Madoro was stumping tho country 
in an effort to influence tho congressional elections, Henry 
Lane Wilson presented his credentials to Dias* Soon after 
Wilson’s formal reception on March 5, 1910, he took up resi­
dence in the Kmbassy on the corner of Vera Crus and Puebla 
streets not far from the National Palace and the Paseo de la 
Reforma*
The Ambassador had no reason for the moment to take 
much notice of Madero* Doubtless it did not even occur to 
him that Madero could displaoe Dias at any time in the 
future* Meanwhile there were friendships to be established 
in the American colony and many official functions to attend* 
Wilson’s dose association with some of the members of the
6*
colony was soon tho subjset of criticism*2 It boeano an 
almost unquestioned assumption that many of thoss whom tha
Ambassador choso for his frlands woro using him to obtain
\spoolal favors. To soma axtsnt this assumption saams to 
bars boon a valid ono* Among othors thoro was ono Lobbous 
Rodman Wilfloy who was an aoqnaintaneo if not a frlomd of 
Prosidont Taft, Taft had not Wilfloy whom tho lattor sorvod 
as Attorney-General in tho Philippines, sad had boon respon­
sible, at loast in part, for his appointnoat as Judge of tho
2Idward I, Ball, T^g Politioal flMBt of im«iM {Mow 
Torks McBride. Mast and So«. 19117, i34~140»^*oll was tho oditor and publisher of "La rronsa" and "Tho Daily Mexican" of Mozieo City during tho Madoro ora* Mis book eoastltwtos tho most mtofHl first hand aoooomt, though it oontaias a hoavy bias in favor of Madero* Tho faet that Boll did, howovor, havo tho ability to faoo foots nakos his aoeouat valnablo* It has boon oltod oftan. and many tlmos to justify prooomoolvod oomolnslons* Used with duo eautlon, tho spe- oialist will find it a rioh soureo of information and a 
valnablo ohook against othor sonroo matorial* Tho book is not footnoted*
137* To thoso who woro not admit tad to tho imtinato innor elrolo around tho Ambassador tho clique which fomod around him was known as tho "Society of frionds of tho Amorlean Ambassador*" Tho implloatlons in this phraso aro sinistor and would bo moro damaging as viowod by tho 
soholar if any sonoroto ovidomoo of wrongdoing woro givon*It doos indloato tho Important position in tho Amorloan colony hold by tho Ambassador and tho dlaappointnoat of 
thoso who woro not oloao to Wilson*
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United States Court in China* ̂  The Judge became involved in 
difficulties with the consular office and resigned shortly 
after Taft's election to the Presidency* He returned to 
seek a plaoe in the cabinet, possibly as Attorney General 
but evidently Taft did not see fit to appoint him* He turned 
up next in Mexico as a lawyer specialising in the prosecuting 
of claims, assumed by some to have been pressed most vigor­
ously when Wilfloy stood to gain heavily from the transac­
tions* He had become friendly with the previous ambassador, 
who remained in Mexico after Wilson's arrival to look after 
business Interests (apparently one reason for his removal), 
but Wilfley now centered his attention on the new man*^ He
^William H* Taft Papers, Manuscripts Division of the Library of Congress, General Correspondence, Wilfley to Taft, November 30, 1906* At the time of the author's research in these papers,in 1955* no one could lay claim to having ex­hausted their possibilities* The collection was not all available and not well cataloged* Several interesting items were, however, uncovered* It should be noted that much of Taft's correspondence on this subject was included in the records of the departments and was found in the National Archives of the United States*
^Ibid*, Fred W* Carpenter to Taft, February 6 , 1909*
^Bell, Political 136* See also Records ofthe Department of Statef C* A* Hamilton to William J* Bryan, June 4* 1913* enclosed in Hamilton to Woodrow Wilson, same date* Hamilton had been engaged in a suit for some time against Wilfley over proceeds from certain property which Hamilton claimed to be rightly his* He charged that the Ambassador had used, or allowed to be used, his diplomatic position and influence in Wilfley's behalf* Hamilton stated that he stood to lose a great deal in the litigation*Wilfley, he said, treated Embassy affairs as "marketable commodities*" Although there is too much evidence of this kind to permit discounting the Wilson-Wllfley relationship, complaints were made, for the most part, by disgruntled people like Hamilton*
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made himself notorious in Mexico City by flaunting his corre-
7spondsnos with President Taft* Vilson allowed him to become 
closely identified with Embassy affairs*
While the Ambassador was beginning his term of service 
in the Mexican capital* President D^as* whom he greatly 
admired* was promising Madero and his adherents a fair elec- 
tlon in July* During April and May* however* the party began 
to be molested* Madero and D^as had met in a secret confer­
ence in 1909* and had failed to reconcile their views* so it 
was not to be expected that lxfas would keep his promises*
In fact* the degree of control which D^as still had over his 
followers at this time is in doubt* At any rate* while the 
D̂ ias administration prepared to celebrate Mexico's economic 
progress in a centennial exposition at Mexico City in Septem­
ber* Madero* the mouthpiece of the discontented masses* was 
arrested in June* 1910* an act which made him all the more 
popular* He was released on bond the following month but the 
general elections* the results of which were announced on 
September 27th* placed D^as and Corral once more in office*
Political 8ha*«. 137.
Howard F. Cline, The United 3tataa and M«rlaa (CambridgeI Harvard UhiversityPrese* 19*5),llv* This is the first work on this subject in which an attempt is made to present the role of the tfolted States and its Ambassador in the Mexican Revolution in a fair and impartial light*It is to Cline's credit that he examined a good many of Wilson's dispatches - not Just a few selected ones* His thorough knowledge of Mexican history makes this a valuable work*
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These events were dutifully described by the Ambassador In 
hit rtportt to th# Department while ht prepared, at tht sane 
time, for tht otnttnnial calibration at which ht presented, 
on bthalf of tht American colony, a atatua of Otorgt Washing­
ton to tht Maxican government^ Tht irony in this gastura 
will bacoaa apparant later*
Wilton9a disregard of tha importanca of tha Madaro move- 
aant it shown in hit first diapatehaa to tha Dapartaant con- 
carning it* Ha believed that D^ai had blundarad in arraating 
Madaro at tha lattar was made a martyr thereby**® To Wilton, 
Madaro was a "wealthy farmer" of Coahuila "wholly ignorant 
of gOYtranantal affairs" who had baan "arraigning19 tha 
gOYtmaant for two yaara in aaditioua apaachaa and pamphlets* 
Tha goYtraaant had "patiantly" allowad him to carry on hit 
"paeuliar campaign mathoda" but this had only ancouragad him 
and "• • *tha OoYtmaant was finally foroad to rasort to 
draatio aaaauraa by placing Madaro whara, as a mat tar of fact,
Srilaon, Dioloaatic loiaodaa. 191*
*®Records of tha Dapartaant of Stata in tha National Archives* Washington, D*C*| Wilson to Knox, Juno 24# 1910* Diplomatic oorrsspondsnoo pertaining to tha Maxican Ssbasoy fra* 1910 to 1929 has boon fllsd chronologically and by subject in ossa books, aach plaoa baing given a fila nuabar* Ssattorad and confidential papers are to be found loose in a series ef eases only roughly oataloged* Tha correspondence cited in thia paper will, unless otherwise indicated,be found in tha 6l2*00 aeries* XncluslYe dates of tha case books will be found in tho bibliography and fila numbers will net be cited in the footnotes except where two or more communications on tha same data are cited*
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ha ought to have boon soma tlna ago*"** Tha alaction was 
procaading, said Wilson, in an orderly nannar but some 
arraata had boon made bacauaa tha opposition had not observed
democratic methods, "their campaign having baan ona of par-
12tonal defamation and revolutionary appaala to tha masses*" 
This lattar obaarvation was unfair* Vhila Madaro had wamad 
Dfaa that ha oould not ba raaponaibla for tha eontaquanoaa 
if fair alaotiona were not granted, ha was still trying to 
kasp his movement within tha bounds of tha law* It is 
obvious too that Wilson aquatad "democratic methods" with 
loyalty to D^as*
Upon tha announcement of D^as and Corral as wlnnsrs of 
tha alaotion* Madaro flad to San Antonio, Taxaa and thara 
launohad his revolution* Coincidantally, a wava of anti- 
Aaarleanisa bagan to spread, touehad off by tha lynching of 
a Maxican nanad Rodrigues in Rook Springs, Taxaa* Tha Amer- 
loan flag was tranplad in Maxioo City by anragad Maxicans 
and Inflammatory articlaa bagan to appaar in tha prass* Al­
though tha ofas foreas blanad Madaro for tha upheaval, it is 
doubtful that his followsrs wara ancouragad to violence 
against foralgnars* Anbassador Wilson said latar that ha 
believed at tha tina that tha "riots” wara fonantad by mem- 
bars of tha government to divert attantlon from tha dlseon-
11Ibld.. Jon* 27, 1910.
73
teat that was evident with tha Dias regime**^
Vilaon notifiad tha Department of tha anti-Anarloan 
movement and hald numerous oonfaranoaa with Dias In which ha 
urged nor a eonplata control of tha p r e s s * I n  raaponaa to 
hi a pleas, Q  Pals and Dlarlo dal Hatar of Mexico City wara 
s u p p r e s s e d ^  and &  Debate. which published an article an- 
titled "The Cloven Hoof of Dollarlsm” net tha sane fata*
Taft telegraphed Dias, through tha Mexican Embassy in Wash­
ington, to express confidence in tha ability of tha old 
dictator to protect Anarlean cltisane,1? an act which night 
be considered a nild warning* olas was perplexed* Ha 
wondered if tha Anerican goveranent was dissatisfied with 
his rule and was using tha Madaro revolution to gat rid of
hin* Ha needed advice and urgad Llnantour to return fron
isParis, where tha latter was concluding a new loan* Tha
^Wilson, Diplomatic Knisodas, 191*
14.J* Fred Hippy, at al, Anariaan Policies Abroad!
Mexico, Hippyt ■The united States ana Mexico! 1910-1927" (Chicago! The University of Chicago Press, 192$), 9-10*
■^Ernest Oruaning. Mexico and its Haritaaa (New York! Century Conpany, 192$), 560*
l6Ibld.
^Rippy, "The United State* and M*xleo" In An,rla,n Policies Abroad, 9*10*
ldBell, Political ?htr*r 32-33* Bell cannot conceal his admiration for Llnantour * s finanoial genius and he devotes a large part of his book to Llmantour's activities*
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Mud. can President complained to Vashington that tho revolt 
«aa being hatohod on American toll. Thla was partly true*1^ 
An apriaint on Madero*s behalf bagan In tha north on Ko t m - 
bor 16th, bat it proved abortive* Xadoro wont to low Orleans 
hoping to aake hia entry froa thoro bnt raturnad in December 
to San Antonio*
Although Vilaon did not appoar to welcome an overthrow 
of Dias, hia diapateh of Oetobor 31at, giving a comprehen­
sive view of tho Dias rogiao, dooa not indieato a high 
dogroo of aatiafaetion* This night have boon duo to a reali­
sation that Dias had loot hia powor to eontrol tho Mexicans 
and a hopo that tho Xadoro aovenent would degenerate into a 
conservative opposition that would drive Dias froa powor 
but aaintain tho general status quo. In defending American 
olaias in tho courts ho revealodi
• • • I have a east la os knowingly osooodod tho 
llnlts of ay diplomatic character and have as­
sumed dangerous personal risks, but 1 have thought, and shall continue to think, that thoro is no refuge for an American eitlsen whoso 
clear and just rights are being taken away from hia except recourse to tho power and in­
fluence of his Oevoramont through its dlplo- aatle representative.
Ho reminded Secretary Knox that Dias was really an autocrat
and was now S3 years old* Tho United States had a billion
dollars or more Invested in Mexico, yet, whenever ho found it
necessary to defend Anerican interests, tho ciontlficoa who
19tippy, •The United States and Mexico* in Anariaan 
£tU*lt1 Abroad. 10.
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surrounded DiTa# opposed hi# effort• end he could only defeat
then hy naaing then personally to D&s* He vent on to point
out that the great concentration of wealth, the heavy and
offensive taxation on the eeaaerolal and poorer classes and
the corruption in tho govomnent vere arousing an inpatient
20discontent in the growing niddlo class.
The Taft adalnlstration nay also have felt a coolness 
towards ofas for giving weloone to Zelaya, the Hicaraguan
dictator, and for alleged dealings with Japan via-a-ris
21Magdalena Bay* It is Interesting, though sonowhat confus­
ing, to note that ex-3enator John L* Wilson wired Knox one 
day In Hovenber to learn the facts concerning a reported 
attenpt on his brother*a life* The Departnent had no knowl­
edge that Wilson was in any personal danger*22 Mor could it 
find the source of persistent runors froa Doacaber, 1910, to
3°Beeerds of tho Departnent of States Wilson to Knox, October 31, 1910* Ho proof has been found that the Aabaasa- dor took acoey for tho use of his influence* It was charged by one business aan that a friend had had sono papers given to hia for safe keeping ea one occasion, showing a contract entered into by Wilson in which he was to get |250,000*00 in return for services in a cans before the courts* The aan who is said to have had thoso papers was 0* A* Hanllton. an erstwhile business partner of Judge Wllfley* This testinony is highly suspect as see n* 6 above* Ibid*I H* 3* Bryan to Senator Peaerene, enclosed in Poaerene to Woodrow Wilson,July 25, 1913.
^Bell, Political flhggg, 36*
22Keeords of tho Departaeat of State} Krastus Brainerd, Editor of the Plgl Intolllnsaeor, Seattle, Washington to Knox, Hevenber IS, I9io*
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February, 1911, that Wilaon was about to bs superseded*23 
Without additional information ths significance of thsso 
rumors cannot bs asosrtainsd,
Madaro had to move as rapidly as possibls bscauss ha 
was oparatlng cm limitad funds, Tha ldaa that tha Revolu- 
tion was flnanead by powerful American interests is not 
generally accepted though it has been advanced. Charges 
were not lacking, that Taft and Knox, supported by powerful 
financial elements, had launched the movement,The Am­
bassador said later that money was obtained from "certain 
sources in the United States and Europe," and held that 
records in the Department of Justice connected Qustavo Madero 
with certain oil interests, but others who were more 
intimate with the Maderos argued convincingly that Gustavo 
was able to raise practically all of the money by a rail­
road bond issue to be made good when Madero became Presi-
23Ibid, File no. 123 W 691/51
2^Juan Pedro Didapp, Los Bstados Unidoe £ Huestros Conflictos Internes (Mixico, 19131. paeain.Didapp was one of MaderoTs political opponents.
2$Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes. 206* As noted below. Bell disagrees with the story that the Madero Revolution had the backing of large financial Interests. Wilson writes as if he had seen the records mentioned and his view cannot, therefore, be entirely discounted.
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dent*2^
The Madaro movement was also approaching a climax* Aa 
it lnoraaaad in intensity in January, 1911, Madaro sought 
tha opportuna tiaa to cross tha bordar and taka charge* Tha 
American govarm*ant quiatly ordarad cavalry troopa to cartain 
bordar towns with strict ordara not to oroaa into Mexico* 
Madaro waa obviously violating tha Aaariean neutrality laws 
and whan a warrant waa finally obtainad for his arrest, 
Governor O* B* Colquitt of Taxaa, an ardant intarvantieniat,
lat it ba known that ha would nova into Maxico, if naad ba,
27to apprahand him* Madaro, howavar, quiatly erossad tha
bordar want of £1 Paso on February 14th, and sent Dr* VSsques
G6mes to inform tha Departmant of Stata that ha would honor
tha eoamitmanta of tha o£as government up to November 20,
201910* In Maxieo City, Wilson learning that cabinet changes 
wara planned, hoped that Knrique Craal would ba raplaoad aa
2^Bell, Political 09-94* Ball was an intimateacquaintance or Gustavo Madaro and waa convinced that ha raised moat of tha money to finance tha Revolution without outside help* Ball adds, howavar, that if additional funds had bean offered, Gustavo would not have bean tha man to turn them down*
^ C u m b e r l a n d ,  M a y i o a n  Revolution. 120* Much of tha 
pressure on President Taft to intervene by force in Maxico came from Governor Colquitt*
130.
Minister of Foreign Affairs*2̂  He was alee informed that 
the government had began a ay stenotic attenpt to rain the 
Madero fanil7 financially* Hie eonree of information was 
the Madero family legal advisor, V* H. McLaren* Vileon 
did not think the governments policy «ae fair einoe only 
Franeieeo and Gustavo were involved*^®
He believed that the aitnation warranted a conference 
with President Taft and while he proceeded to arrange one,̂ 1 
Limantowr arrived in Hew York where Franeieeo Madero Senior, 
Qestavo Madero, Franeieeo Leon de la Barra and Dr* Vieques 
Gdmes were already gathered* On March 6th, the day before 
Limantour*e arrival In Hew York, Madero’s troops were de­
feated, bat not decisively, in the Battle of Casas Grandee 
in Chihuahua* Acting upon the adviee of Ambassador Vileon, 
President Taft ordered the concentration of 20,000 troops
29Records of the Department of State) Vllson to Knox, February #. 1911, confidential* He did not think Creel to be efficient in the Foreign Office* He personal notive seems to have been Invelved la his attitude*
The impression has always been given that the Ambassador hated the very name Madero* This is far from a true pi stare* Maderov s family did net want to see him get into pellties and some of them, at least, did not hold the Ambassador responsible for his downfall*
31Vll*«n 9 Knlaadsa, 207* Bell, Politicaldbffr 130, charges tnat^tne Ambassador carried a petition with hia to Washington urging Intervention and says it was signed by Vilson'a faction in the American colony*
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12on tho border for "routine maneuvers." Taft sincerely 
felt that the army could profit by some training anyway.
The Ambassador observed that Taft did not intend to Intrude 
in Mexican politics but that he meant only to warn both 
s i d e s . ^ 3  Just what Wilsonfs own intentions and hopes were 
is not quite clear. The Navy at the same time arranged for 
the maneuvering of a part of the Pacific fleet along the 
Mexican coast. De la Barra, in New fork, requested an ex­
planation from the State Department of the meaning of this 
latter action.^ Upon being informed that the Mexicans were 
disturbed Taft replied that nothing had been said of naval 
vessels in the conference a week before and that the visits 
in a routine manner of certain small vessels to Central 
American ports were being misconstrued. He hoped ”• • .that
^Correspondence of Philander C. Knox. Manuscripts Division. Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., Volume 13; Taft to General Wood from Augusta, Georgia, March 12, 1911* The President stressed the training value of this troop move­ment. Under the apparent policy of readiness for possible trouble a valuable opportunity for training was not to be passed up.
^Wilson, Pirlffflltl? Episodes. 210. It cannot be assumed that the Ambassadorwas aware of Taft#s motives at this time.
3^Knox Correspondence, Volume 13; Adee to Knox,March 12, 1911* Mexico had a law which restricted the amount of time that foreign vessels could spend in Mexican ports to thirty days. Huerta cited this law often later on in dealing with President Woodrow Wilson.
do
/ t n o x woulj^ see that thaaa Mall fry do not appaar anymore 
in Mexican porta* * * .
Tha truth waa that Taft had aotad largely on Wilson's 
advice without consuiting his eabinat* Ha had to psrsuads 
Knox that ha waa following tha wisast policy* Knox indaad 
pladgad Toft hia loyalty to tha Naxioan policy in a communi­
cation of March 16th* Tha Secretary of State would not 
andorsa it wholeheartedly but with Wilson "throwing fits" 
and businsss nan "wigling" /ji±s7 In agony at home, what alsa 
oould Taft do but considar tha natter from avary angle and 
act as ha thought best*^
While Taft was explaining his Mexican policy to tha 
Stata Departnent, Dr* Vfsques GSmes and Llnantour net in 
da la Barra's apartment in New York* Vftsques Gtaes was 
willing to agree to an arrangement whereby Corral would 
resign only as Minister of Gobemacibn, not as vice-presi­
dent*^ Madaro did not yet have tha upper hand* Tha defeat 
at Caaas Grandes had bean a serious setback* Da la Barra 
was undoubtedly tha most acceptable provisional president
Taft to Knox, March 14, 1911.
^Archie Butt, Taft gpA Roosevelt. Tha Xntinata Letters Archie Butt. Mjiltarvilas (Garden CityI 
Doubleday Doran ana Company, iy5oj, o03-605• Knox could afford to be cautious* He did not feel all of the pressure that was being put on the President*
37B«11, PolltlB*! 44.
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should Djfat bs forosd to leave office.^ As Maderofs troops 
maneuvered in ths north, hs gained strength, though sons of 
ths border fighting resulted in firing into American terri­
tory. The government subsidised press in Mexico City 
reported victories over the rebels but the people knew better. 
An observer was struck with the degree of calmness in Mexico 
City, even after government forces lost control.3? Wilson's 
predecessor, who was still in Mexico City, gave press inter­
views in which he calaly appraised the situation as not being 
particularly threatening to American lives and property.
On April 3rd, Wilson reported that Madero would accept 
nothing less than the resignation of D^as and assured Knox 
that if more active measures than the mobilisation on the 
border should need to be taken, it would probably result in
some attempts on American lives but the ultimate effect would
A1be "order and adequate protection. ** If the Ambassador was
not worried about possible danger to American residents, how-
,,, 55. 3«« «l»oWll«on Dialectic Bpl«od««.212. Wilson saw Llmantour in Hew York and tried to explain the policy being followed by the Uhlted States but he could not convince Llmantour of the wisdom of it.
^Frederick Starr, end the United Stetes. A
jjttcr S&2 lie (cElcagotffce Bible
40Records of the Department of State; Wilson to Knox, May 10, 1911.
April 3, 1911.
*2
ever, sane of those rooidonto were* Tho State Departnent
waa boalogod vith ploaa for nore adequate security neas- 
42uree*^
Thoro appears, at this point, a doeunent which has boon 
overlooked by Vilaon9a orltlos* Hia Independent eourao 
during tho »j Triala* dooa not aeea so unuaual in tho 
light of inatruetlona given by tha Stato Dopartaont in tho 
aaorgonay under discussion* Kaon wired on Hay 5th that 
ahould tho aorlouaaoaa of tho aituation require "• • • you 
will eoaault with tho other newborn of tho dipleaatie 
eorpa • • *• £aa to the aeaaurea to bo taken to protoot for­
eign livoa and property/.*^ Of eourao thia did not aoan that 
Vilaon waa free to taka drastic action without further ia- 
atrootione, but It rovoala that Knox waa coaing around to 
tha viewa of Taft and tfilaon (porhapa with sows prodding by 
Huntington Vilaon, Knox*a Aaaiatant Soorotary) and waa oon- 
teat to aaeopt Vilaon9a Judgenents*
Tho Anbaaaador waa hinaolf increasingly diaturbod about 
ths future* Hia aubordinatea and tholr faniliaa shared hia
^Aneng thoao waa a requeat frosi Colonel Thoaas 0* Boyd, President of Louiaiaaa Stato University, to Senator J* R* Thornton of Louisiana on behalf of Colonel Boyd9e son who roaidod in a snail Anerleaa colony at Topolobanpo on tho west eoast of Moxieo* Thia group of Anorieana wanted to bo assured of protection in the event tho United States intended to intervene* Reeorda of the Departnent of States File 112.00/15*0,
^Records of tha Departnent of Statef Knox to Vilaon, May 5* 1911*
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LLappreheaaion. He remarked at a dinner given la tha Kabaasy 
that if O^as want out it would ba Ilka embarking on unknown
LKaaao In a ruddarlaaa ahip* On Kay 10th, tha tailing blow
waa daalt tha government foreea in tha north. Kadaro eap- 
turad Oiudad Jwires, a triumph that plaead hin in a atroag 
poaitlon to nagotlata with pfas and allowad hin to import 
araa and nonay* Prograaa waa rapid* Madaro and ftfai now 
oana to tarna whila McLaran arguad with tha Anbaaaador that 
Maxieo would ba raganaratad undar Madaro.^ With Maxico City 
unguarded, inarioana fait aona inaaeurlty and Vilaon callad 
upon da la Barra for guarantaaa, tailing hia that if Amer­
ican llraa and proparty wara nolaatad hia government would 
"• * • ba obligad to aaaune, facia, that lnauffiolant
protection haa bean afforded • • • ," and would plaea on
*Sr*. Bdith O'Shaughaeaaey, Mill flit if? Para (Mow Yorks Harper and Broa., 1917). 17* Mra* O'ShaugEaeaaoy'a booka wore written in the fora of aoapilatlona of lattara to her family* She waa tha wife of Halaoa 0*3haughnaaaay who auaaaodad Fred Morrla Daaring aa Vilaon9a Flrat Secretary in tha tebaaey# For tha neat part* Mra. 0*3haughneaaey'a opinlaaa wore aaraly thaaa gained in conversation with important poraaaalltloa at aaraaonial functiana and tha attitudaa of tha labaaay* Ocoaaionally aa intaraatlng aide light-to fumiahad*t
4*Ibld.■ 19.
^Ibld., 23-24* d*»bt th. Aabaaaador laarnad auch about Franciaoo Madaro froa thia individual* It la entirely paaalbla that hia low eatiaate of Madera9a aental faaultlaa waa partly feraed by tha attitude of Madaro•a family who did not rollah hia raah action in riaklng tha family fortuaaa in auoh a wild venture*
*4
Mexico the burden of proof to tho eontrarp*^ Then, in in- 
forming Knox of tho changes to toko place, ho oald naivelps
Z think tho greatest praise ia due to President Dias for hia patrlotie attitude in saerifising hia personal fortune in the inter­ests of the Mexican people.4*
After daps of tension, the liflfrlitlf ** Nap 24th, 
thronged the streets of Mexieo Citp and the police were pow­
erless against then. Had it not been raining, greater danage 
night hare been dene bp the enthusiastic nob. DJfas, in bed 
with a toothache, feeblp made his wap to his librarp to sign 
the inevitable resignation. On the previous dap, Wilson had 
reported that the revolutionarp forces were now in possession 
of two-thirds of the countrp. D^as did not aotuallp sign his 
nano to the docunent of resignation until the noralng of Nap 
25th. He left the countrp shortlp afterward and others of 
his cabinet seen followed, including Llnantour. Do la Barra 
assuned the presidencp in accordance with the agreenent but 
Madero was the nan of the hour. The leader of the novsnent 
nade his trlunphal entrp into the Capital on June 7. 1911*
^Tkeeerds of the Departnent of Btatef Wilson to do la Barra, Nap 13. 1911* When such strong language was used later with Naders la power it was interpreted bp Wilson's detractors as persecution. Wilson sinplp understood that do la Barra was the spokesnan for all inportant parties at this tine.
^Ibld.i Wilson to Knox, Nap 17, 1911, strictlp con­fidential .^sTas was forced out bp political developnents and there is no evidence that he sacrificed his personal for­tune. He was able to live well abroad.
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an avant daacribad by on# obsarrar aa calling to mind tha 
"antry Into Jarusalan."
Thara lias in tha National Arohiras of tha Unitad 3tatas, 
an unopanad doeumant containing a congratulatory massaga fro* 
Praaidant Taft to Prasidant D^as (whom Taft had mat parson- 
ally in 1909) on tha oooaslon of tha lattar’s suooass at tha 
polls in tha alaotion of 1910. A sultabla tiraa and oooaslon 
wara navar found for its praaantation.^
^Raoords of tha Dapartmant of Stata in loosa packaga Fila no. 812.00/21.
V
WILSON AND THE TRIUMPH 07 FRANCISCO MADERO
• • * When Madero first attracted >7 attention ha waa engaged in the business of asking incen­diary speeches, usually of very little intel­lectual merit, before audiences in remote parts of Mexioo* These Beatings were usually interrupted by the soldiers, and generally Madero was put in jail, his release following 
s o b s  days afterwards* He never appealed to popular sympathy in Mexico* He was s practi­cally unknown person in public affairs who appeared at the psychological moment * * * *
• • • Madero in no sense overthrew the govern­ment of Dias* The govenuaent of Dias collapsed by reason of the desertion of friends, and a tide of anarchy which broke out and surged all about the capital city* , Madero rode into power over the ruins of the Dias government*In the month of June, Madero entered. Mexico City as a private eitisen, after Dias had resigned the presidency of the country*1
^Testimony taken at Washington, D*C*, April 16, 1920 by Francis J* Kearful Esq*, in pursuance of an order or the Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. 66th Congress, 2nd Session, Pursuant to 3* Res* 106 Directing tne Committee on Foreign Relations to Investigate the Matter of Outrages on Citlsens of the United States in Mexico. Part 15 (Washingtont Government Printing Office, 1920)* Hereafter cited as "Hearing - Subcommittee on U*S* Cltisens in Mexico, 66th Congress. 2nd Session*The same attitudes are expressed in Diplomatic Episodes. 204-205* and in an address by Wilson published in tne Boston City Club Bulletin. May 1, 1920*The questioning of Wilson before the committee was carried out by a Francis J* Kearful who said that he was in Mexico at the time* This is undoubtedly the same individual whose law firm was seeking to represent the Embassy as resident counsel* Wilson forwarded a letter from the firm to the Department but when asked if he approved it would not commit himself* Records of the Department of States File no* 124 123/11* At any rate, the questioning was extremely friendly*
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Such waa tha tostiaony of Haary Lano Vilaon atvn yaara 
aftar hia resignation froa tho Moxiean post* Thoaa words 
aro aoro rovoallag of an attitude developed aftor yaara of 
being forood on tha defensive thaa thoy ara of ooataaporary 
judgenont* Vilaon had, howavar, davolopad a high ragard for 
tha well-polloed atata of tha O^as regine* Ho took a dia 
viaw of a revolution with aoro denooratle objectives thaa ho 
baliovad it poaaibla for tha Mexleaas to handle* Zealous to 
iaaaro tha eoatiaaaaeo of ordarly rwlo aad balng unabla to 
iatarfara diroetly, ho had urgad ax-Proaidaat Rooaavolt to 
ooao aad appoar oa tho platfora with D^aa ia tho hopo that a 
roeoaolXiatioa, at loaat, alght bo offootod with tho insur­
gents* Hia iavitatioa waa rofaaod2 though it eould hardly 
havo boaa earriod oat ia any ovoat aiaeo Dias' govaraaaat 
waa oollapaiag rapidly* Thia waa aooa ovidoat to tho Aabas- 
sador whoao foara wara ooaauaioatod to Soeratary Knox ia a 
aota of tha 23rd of Nay* Thai
• • • gravaat change about to ba offootod ia tha adoption of uaiversal suffrage* That it will raault la ordarly paaoaful aad progroaaivo govarnaoat 1 auoh doubt, but I axpaot to aaa uaharad la a long period of corrupt practices la alaotlaaa, violoaoo at tha pells aad of araad aattloaaat of tha olaiaa of varioua chieftains* • * tha paadulaa swinging book aftar yaara of trial, to ooadltlaaa oiallar to thoao
2M orison, Lottora of Thaodara Eooaovalt. VII, 245*
*6
under which we are now living. • • *3 
Nor could he foresea what conditions might develop immedi­
ately after the firm hand of D^as might be withdrawn. He 
was afraid thats
• • .the Government installed by the Mexican preacher of love and toleration, may prove inadequate for the pressing emergencies of the hour* • • «
* • .whether Madero shall be able to control the spirits he has called from the vasty deep, or whether he, failing to meet the demand of a situation which needs the curb­ing force of a strong hand and not the empty phrases of an altruistic statesman, shall yield precedence to a stronger man, is yet an unknown problem.American interests have suffered and are suffering throughout the Republics not so much on account of anti-American feel­ing - which practically subsided and disap­peared with the placing of troops on the Rio Grande - as because of their large influence and predominance in the industrial and commercial affairs of Mexico.*
These words make it appear that the Ambassador harbored 
a strong hope that Madero would be a mere figurehead in the 
new regime. Although it is entirely possible that de la 
Barra's retention of the presidency would have been more 
satisfactory to the United States, and certainly to Wilson,
^Records o f th e Department of S tate; Wilson to  Knox, 
May 23, 1911* For the opinion o f some resid en t Americans on 
"universal suffrage" for Mexicans see O'Shaughneseey,Davs. 70.
^Records of the Department o f  S tate; Wilson to  Knox, 
June 23, 1911*
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there was no question of recognition of the interim govern­
ment and no problems arose* The ubiquitous de la Barra was 
President in name only* Bell informs us thats
Ambassadorial activity during the de la Barra period was confined, aside from its social features, to routine matters and formal presentment of claims* President de la Barra possessed a sense of humor| he per­mitted himself to be amused by Mr. Wilson's patronisingly protective attitude* • • •*
Most of the patronising was saved, however, for Madero
who was the reoognised "man of the hour*" At the various
social functions attended by both men, Madero found himself
the object of flattery and concern by the Embassy staff, a
position that impressed his followers more than it did the
man himself* JosA Vasconcelos was present at one of these
functions and. heard the praise lavished upon his leader by
the American Ambassador* "Most of us," said Vasconcelos
later, "who were close followers of Madero felt that we were
enjoying a sort of political honeymoon which would never end*
One must remember that we were very young persons*"^
Madero did not respond to these overtures in the manner
expected of him* He remained politely on his pedestal and
5Bell, Political flftgm* 93* Bell offers a personal interpretation of Washington's attitude toward de la Barra's interim government which throws little light on the subject* There was slim hope that the de la Barra regime could be permanent*
6Rippy# At. ila American Policies Abroad. JosA Vasconcelos, "A Mexican'sPoint of View," 105-106*
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. .aeeaed ecarcely to bo walking with tho aoaa of men."? 
Mo hod developed on inferiority complex during hlo yeara of 
atudy abroad aad tho latoaaity of this feeling had lad hia 
to tho heighta ho b o w  occupied - holghta whieh aooaod to 
mako hia a llttlo diasy.* Ho roaaatod even tho aXlghtoat im­
plication that hia country or ita government noodod advice. 
Thoro would ba no tutolaga by tho American tabaaay.9 Bofora 
tho triumphal ontry of tha idol of Mexico, Vilaon had re- 
forrod to hia aa a "dreamer" but had boon raaindad that 
"Joaeph waa oallad a droaaar but baoaaa tha practical rular 
of a groat kingdom and aada hia brothora princas.* 10 Madaro 
gara littla evidence of practicality.
^O'Shaughneaeey, Flrtfffljfrif Daya. 160.
Cumberland, Revolution. Chapter II. fleealao O’flbaughaeaaey, Biulpnetlc Deva. jLi7 aad 157. Mra.
0 *Shaughneaaey raaarkad that "X Sort of aiaplicity ataapa all that ho doee,” aad again 4(adero aaw talka of eruahiag all revolutionary aovaaunta with aa iron hand) but hia hand* alaa haa ao likoaoaa to iron or anything that can crumb.»
’it waa widely obaerved that tha Aabaaeador aought to taka Madaro "under hia wing” but tho latter reaaiaed cool and Indifferent to all auah overturea* He appeara to have boon aabarraaaod by the praiao laviahed on hia bv Vilaon at foativa aad aoraaoaial ooaaaioaa. Tot, Judge Vilfley wrote Taft that Madaro had aaaeuaeed publicly that ho waa la favor of a program auggoatod by tho Aabaaaador in a roeoat epeech. Vilfley aaid that tho general diapoeltlen waa to give Madero "a ahow for hia white alloy." It la interoating to note alao that Vilfley admitted tho opproaaioa of tho pooplo by Dlaa aad tho claatiflaoa. Recorda of tho Dopartaoat of States L. R. Vilfley eorreelmeat Taft, July 11, 1911.
Vilaon to Kaon, May 23, 1911, confidential.
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The fall of Porflrio o£as froa power deprived powerful 
foreign interests in Mexico of the feeling of security they 
hsd enjoyed only a little while before* The sudden change 
in political developments in Mexico was of especial interest 
to American investors and great pressure was exerted upon 
the Taft administration to Insure the protection of their 
interests* Unrest along the border brought increasing demand 
for active intervention as the Madero government took the 
helm of the ship of state and appeared to be unable to steer 
a smooth course* Absentee investors with heavy financial 
stakes in the country demanded more effective action from 
Washington* Americans who lived and worked in Mexico usually 
cautioned their government to refrain from meddling in 
Mexican politics* believing that business would be better off 
to take its chances with whatever faction happened to be in 
power* This latter group also stressed the safety factor* A 
show of force abroad could jeopardise their very lives*
The American Ambassador understood his responsibility to 
both resident Americans and to those with large holdings who 
were able to reach the ears of the administration at Washing­
ton* He was the representative of a leading industrial and 
commercial power many of whose citlsens had chosen to Invest 
time* energy and capital in an underdeveloped country in ex­
pectation of a suitable profit* Here* as in other Latin Amer­
ican countries* one might admire some of the quaint cultural 
features and certainly Americans oould have no quarrel with
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the general principle of national self-determination? but no 
mere sentiment must ba allowed to lntarfara with profits* 
Whila playing thair childish gamss of running governmental 
institutions and judicial systarns, tha paopla must not ba 
allowad to extend thair absurd and complicatad lagal machin- 
ary into tha sphara of Amarican businass with ragulatory 
action or confiscation* Tha Amarican Embassy was tha agancy 
of Amarican citisans and undar tha Taft administration with 
its stress on dollar diplomacy its duty was clear* Tha 
native population must, meanwhile, be content to enjoy tha 
paltry crumbs of wealth that might sift down to those fortu­
nate enough to receive steady employment*
It was Madaro9s keen resentment of tha humiliating 
position of tha Mexican masses that had caused his interest 
in politics* His popularity with tha paopla was a disturbing 
factor to tha Amarican business interests and this concern 
was reflected in tha Embassy* Tha Ambassador had felt, how­
avar, that tha leader of these masses could ba won over to. 
tha Amarican viewpoint so that tha United States, acting 
through its diplomatic agancy, could throw tha mantle of 
approval over him* Tha Ambassador summoned all of tha dig­
nity of appearance at his command, seeking to impress tha new 
and untried authority with tha importance of tha diplomatic 
establishment of tha United States* A more political mind 
would undoubtedly have succumbed, but tha idealist was con­
fronted with tha realist, and neither was disposed to
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compromise*
By November 6, 1911, when Madero took office as consti­
tutional President, tha Ambassador could aaa that tha new 
adalniatratlon would ba more concamad with tha welfare of 
tha Maxi can paopla than with tha volume of Amarican buainaaa 
proflta and tha Maxican laadar had laarnad that tha Amarican 
Ambaaaador waa not kindly dlapoaad toward him* Claima, aoma 
of which wara of diract intaraat to frianda of tha Ambaaaador, 
wara praaantad to tha naw government, atill endeavoring to 
atablliaa political condltiona in tha country* Although thare 
waa nothing naw about tha preaantatlon of claima after a 
period of diaordar, Madaro knew that a more aympathatlc atti­
tude would have induced laaa abruptness in tha demanda of tha 
Bsbassy* "Now Mr* Madaro," aald Nalaon 0*3haughnessey at a 
dinner given by tha German Minister, "you are going to ba 
President, and I know that whan your government gats in you 
will clear up matters pending between tha two countries and 
let ua begin with a clean slate*" "Tou Americana," Madaro 
replied, "always act on tha presumption that wa Mexicans are 
always in tha wrong. " 11 "foreign relations," wrote O’Shaugh- 
nessey9s wife, "are to ba founded on brotherly love instead 
of interest* • • | - - - OjalaJ but it makes me sad. " 12
U 0*3haughnasaay, Diplomatic £gyg, 76. 
126.
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Wilson conceded, however, that while Madaro "seems to ba 
highly nervous and uncertain aa to hia eouraa in ragard to 
many important public questions,* ha had "one radaaming fea- 
turs - a pair of axeallant ayas, which indicates to ma 
earnestness, truthfulness, loyalty, and it may ba, reserves 
of strength and force of character which time may more fully 
reveal# Tha "important public questions" one may have no 
doubt, referred to tha claims in which tha Ambassador was 
interested and time was already revealing the necessity of 
revising his estimate of Maderovs character*
The new regime was not, however, unduly pressed by the 
Taft administration* Madero was given an opportunity to 
prove himself equal to the trust his people had placed in 
him* Neutrality was enforced by the United States more 
greatly than ever in the Spring and Summer of 1911;^ and, 
after a conference with the Ambassador, Taft had withdrawn 
the troops from the border in August* It developed, however, 
that Madero was thinking in more long range terms regarding 
his promised program of reform than his people had been led 
to believe by his impassioned pleas for support in the cam­
paign* Promises were not being fulfilled, estates were not 
being divided (a course which indicated compromise with power-
^Reoords of the Department of State; Wilson to Knox, July 11, 1911* confidential*
14Rippy, "The United States and Mexico," in Arnerjcan Abroad. 10*
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ful hacendados) and other campaign promises vara slow in 
baing fulfilled* Long before ha became President, Madero 
had been expected to initiate these reforms and failure to 
do so had led the American Ambassador to believe that the 
old familiar pattern of Latin American politics would be re­
peated in that Maderofs government would have to incorporate 
conservative elements which would in turn oause a defection 
of the liberals* The latter must then seek a new political 
alliance*The appointment of numerous relatives of the new 
President to office did little to remove the stigma of hypoc­
risy from the Madero administration*
Although the State Department was notified that the 
election of Madero was unaccompanied by official Interference 
by police or army, Wilson, not finding anything else to com­
plain about, credited Maderofs victory to the terror of the 
latter,s name* There is no doubt that Wilson was unwilling 
to give credit where credit was due* He was simply unwilling 
to concede a completely fair victory, not wishing to place 
himself on record as testifying to Madero's popularity* Most 
observers agreed that the election was the freest ever held 
in Mexico* In spite of growing apprehension as the early 
spell of the leader's oratory wore off, he was still the most 
popular man in Mexico*
^Records of the State Department; Wilson to Knox, October 27, 1911*
It was believed that such powerful latsrasts as ths 
Rockefeller*Aldrich enterprises aad ths Quggenhein nining 
and sasiting ooapanlss wars oppossd to ths control aaln- 
talnsd by ths Madsro fanily in s o b s  of ths alning arsas and 
that thsss sans lntsrssts wars closely tlsd to ths Taft ad- 
alnlstration. Ths Quggtnhtias, according to ths word of a 
cartful obssrrsr, would now find it aors difficult to gbbble 
up ths Nadsro aining opsrations in Chihuahua*Madsrot 
bssisgsd with ths prsssntation of dubious claias, could not, 
sons psopls thought, clrcunvent ths hostility of ths American 
Aabassador bsoauss hs had aads ths alstaks of appointing ths 
self-centered, aabitious Manusl Calsro, a friend of ths 
Anerloan Aabassador, to ths post of foreign minister.1^
Ths adalnistratlon at Washington did not sss in Madsro 
ths kind of strong executive powsr nssdsd in Mexico and this 
laprssslen was strsngthsnsd by ths dispatchss of ths Anbas- 
sador froa ths United States. Ths question of Madsro•s 
sanity was soastiass posed* Madsro had aanifsstsd a consid- 
srabls intsrsst in ghosts and hs would occasionally rsfsr to 
ths dsad as if thsy wars prsssnt in ths rooa with hi*. Asids 
froa this practios of splritisn, however, ths only rsal 




oeoaaiona when, in tha midst of impaaaionad apaaehaa, hit 
▼oioa oraokad and aquaakad and ha gaatiaulatad wildly* Tha 
conclusion oan hardly ba aacapad that tha moat inaana thing 
about Nadaro froa Vilaon'a point of riaw waa hit datarmina- 
tlon to carry on hit gorarnaant indapandantly* Although tha 
runort of inaanity wara tha oooation for much Embassy gossip, 
thay do not appaar to hara baan takan aarioualy by tha Am- 
baaaador until ha found it naeaaaary auoh latar to dafand hit 
own cauaa* Ha did hint now and than in hit diapatohaa that 
Nadaro auffarad mantal abarrationa but tha Dapartmant waa 
navar lad to baliava that thara waa a madman in tha Prasi- 
dant's chair* Frad Norria Daaring, a Sacratary of tha Embassy 
at tha tima but daatinad for promotion to a plaoa in tha Latin 
American Division in tha Department^ wired Knox thats
Inaiatant rumor circulatad haa it that Madaro 
ia auffarar aarioua mantal troubla but I have 
positive aaauranca from thraa oradibla aoureaa 
that ha ia antiraly in hia right mind and ia only aomawhat worn out from hia atranuoua Ufa of tha laat faw months*1®
Tha now Praaidant'a faith in damooraey for tha Maxioan 
paopla mads him tha objaot of ridioula to thoaa who fait that 
thay know tha country wall* Hia anamiaa among tha Maxioana 
gloried in tha andlaaa caricaturing of tha Madaro faaturaa in 
tha praaa* Lika soma othar prominant personages, Madaro*a
^*Reoorda of tha Oapartmant of State) File no* dl2*00/2250* Oumbarland in Tha Mm»ia»n Isvolution. atrangaly avoids diaouaaion of tha question of Madaro'ssanity*
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personal appoaraneo lant itaalf wall to grotesque and honor- 
o u  caricature and few opportunities vara loot In presenting 
hln ta tha people aa something of a feel* This, along with 
hia bant for nepotism, hia laok of firmness, and hia failure 
to carry out lanedlate land radlatrlbutlon did nuoh to under­
mine hia influence and political power* When orlticised, 
however, he fell back upon hia official position as though 
hia right to the presidency were being challenged* He was, 
in the opinion of one foreign observer, ainply "unfit to 
govern*
A contemporary legislator and scholar credited the 
President with honesty and integrity but thought that these 
qualities were wasted in that Madero used the wrong meth­
ods* He warned the President that neither dictatorship 
nor deneoraey could succeed in Mexico in the short time he 
night have as leader and urged hia to allow true parlianon- 
tary government* It was widely believed that Oustavo, who 
was the organiser of the administration, had swayed his 
brother toward dictatorial methods* In deserting Madero, it 
was observed later, Huerta was only doing what Madero had
*7Leon B* Meats* TfcfHir Ifl XfetlL Veinst A Memoir of U | i i  edited by Hussell Laira, Tfew Torki Tne Century company, 1932)* "I grant hia honesty." remarked Moats, "but It was the honesty of a fool*" See also the lew York Times. August 24*_1913, which quotes tapster Blihu Boot as foilewss"/The trouble in Mexicf/ began when Madero aoeomplished the overthrew of Bias* Madero was an idealist, a theorist, and a dreamer and tried to apply principles in the governing of Mamies for which the Mexican people were net reaoy* • • •"
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urged his own followers In ths Army to do in ths prsTlous 
Revolution. Opponsnts of ths adminlstration charged that 
Madsro*s government was ths worst slnos Independence. They 
oould not hslp thinking that this was trus bsoauss Madsro 
failsd to taks ths only measures that would have girsn his
government stability - opsn criticism frssly allowsd and opan
20opposition in a frss parliamentary system. Sinos Prssidsnt 
Madsro would not always listsn to Gustavo, it way bs that ths 
explanation for ths wavering of ths government bstwssn patty 
acts of despotism on ths on a hand and lack of fimnsss on ths 
othar was dus to ths pull and tug bstwssn ths nsthods dssirsd 
by Gustavo and thoss praotiesd by Francisco* Ths country was 
nsvsr sufficiently frss of intaraal dlsturbancss to allow 
complete parliamentary democracy.
This last was ths rsally disturbing factor and gava am­
munition to Wilson and to thoss who wars becoming mors and 
mors esrtain that Madsro was both too wsak and too idsalistic 
to manags a country in which American profits wars at stake* 
Wilson’s attitude toward Madsro was becoming known to Amer­
icans throughout ths country and rumors wars rife that ths
21Ambassador would soon bs withdrawn. Ths latter was still
90Francisco Bulnes, Ths Whole Truth About Mavlco. 
Prssidsnt Wilson’s Responsibility. Translated by Dora Scott.Iftsw iorkj M. BuInesSooiccoT, 1916), 161-1 S3.
21•^Records of ths Department of States Homer C. Stuns. Board of Porelm Missions of ths M.R. Church to Taft.Deoember 26. 1911. Fils no. 123 W 691/77*
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not overly p e ss im is tic , however, a t tha and o f tha f ir a t  
month o f Madaro*a adminlatration* Ha ballavad that Madaro 
waa an "honest and p a tr io t ic  man" and that ha waa try in g  to  
raeonoila  hia "peculiar p o l i t ic a l  creed" to  tha "stern nacaa- 
a it ia a  o f tha hour** Ha had aaid onea th at Madaro would 
aith ar change hia p o lic ie a  or tha people would change him and 
ha now believed  th at Madaro would change -  that ha would be 
forced to  adopt more and more tha ayatam o f D^as* Ha Beamed 
already to  be abandoning hia idaaa of r eco n c ilia tio n  with  
bandit ch ia fta ina  (Zapata)* Wilson had no objection  to  
Madaro*a cabinet*22
Madaro, though, waa never aeeure from "revolutionary  
movements which kept tha country in  a constant s ta te  o f tu r ­
moil* " Zapata’s reb e llio n  in  Morelos la s te d  throughout h is  
term o f  o ffice*  This revolutionary a c t iv ity  may never have 
threatened the continued ex isten ce  o f the government2  ̂ but 
I t  weakened h is  control and placed foreign  holdings at the  
mercy o f law lessn ess and banditry, a s itu a tio n  which was 
henceforth made the theme o f Ambassador W ilson’s dispatches*  
Although the Reyes fa c tio n  surrendered in  December there were 
other d efection s and some seriou s uprisings* C olqu itt, the  
alarm ist Qovernor o f Texas, spoke for  border Americans in  
demanding in cessa n tly  o f the Taft adm inistration that i t  take
2^Ibld* t k ison to  Knox, November 30, 1911*
23Cu*b*rl«nd, H «rolutlon. 16$.
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really effective action* Taft yielded to tho extent of or­
dering a t^oop concentration along tho border on February 4# 
1912*
There ia no reason to plaoe responsibility for this 
act ion on ths shoulders of Henry Lane Vllson, although he was 
certainly not out of sympathy with it* Ho shared, indeed, 
the fear of many other imerioans in Mexico that suoh a shew 
of fores, if not followed by immediate intervention, might 
endanger countless American lives* The Ambassador and his 
compatriots eould not be at all sure that they could live to 
see the American troops in control of the country should they 
be ordered across the border* Taft was under pressure to 
insure the peace of the border and the pressure was not coming 
primarily from any single or exclusive source* It was gen­
eral*2^ Seme stedfastly believed, nonetheless, that Taft had 
acted altogether on behalf of the business powers interested 
in Mexico*2* The immediate effect upon Mexico was an increase 
in marauding and brigandage and the oreatlon of a situation 
in which Madero had to appear tyrannical in taking action to 
preserve his government*
2S»11, P.HH..1 »>■— - 160.
25Starr, gad the United States, passim. Starrsaw no complexity in Taft's policy in Mexico* He believed that Taft was following the "dictates* of Vail Street*
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Wilson reported on February 7th that tha whole country
was In a state of unrest and that there was almost complete
26lack of confidence in the government. Dearing, now in the 
Department and familiar with Wilson*s view of Madero, was of 
the opinion that the Ambassadorfs seal to keep the Department 
Informed had resulted in some overstating of the facts.
That Ambassador Wilson eagerly awaited a full scale
pitintervention is doubtful* but he did feel that Madero was 
not taking vigorous enough action2̂  while, for his part,
26Records of the Department of State; Wilson to Knox, February 7, 1912.
2^Ibid.; Huntington Wilson to Taft, February 17,1912.
2®Ibid.{ Wilson to Knox, February 24. 1912 and ac­companying documents. Wilson said that any intervention which was not thorough would be resented by Americans in Mexico and he recommended that if troops crossed the border they do so with the clear aim of aiding constituted author­ity. When the Department drafted a proposed statement to the Mexican government from Taft regarding the return of Americans who had fled the country It was sent to the Ambas­sador for his comments. He recommended changing the phrase "until such time as the Mexican people should have estab­lished a government able to maintain law and order. • ."to "• • .as the MegLcan government shall have established its ability. • .» /to maintain law and orders• Records of the Department of State; File nos. dl2.00/2oo6 and 2914* Wilson bslieved that Taft's order had had a beneficial effect.Ibid.1 Wilson to Knox, March 11, 1912.
^ Ibid. 1 Wilson to Knox, February 20, 1912. Wilson did not agree with E. M. Brown of the National Railways that the fall of Madero's government was imminent butt"In the meantime the President remains serene and optimistic - an honest man, a man of high ideals and patri­otic purposes, dealing with a situation which he comprehends very slightly and whioh he aggravates by the application of homeopathic remedies when the demands of the hour clearly cry for severe allopathic doses.*
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lUdtro «m  r«l«et«Dt to give out itatiatBti to the pros* for
fear that ”1 should norely make acre enemies aad giro aaothar
opportunity to your Anbasaader• Tho nan who noat otoadily
urged intervention wan Governor Oolfuitt of Texas hut Madaro
vao eortaln that Anbaaaador Vilaon van tho ooureo of all of
hia trouble* Tho Anbaoaador waa growing juat aa oortaln of
Madoro9a rank incompetence* Huntington Vilaon (ao oft an 
#
aeeuaod of plotting with Anbaaaador Vilaon for tho overthrow 
of Nadaro9a government) ronindad Proaidant Taft that it would 
bo ohaapar to remove all Anarioana fron II Faao whila tha 
fighting waa going on around Ciudad Judres than to riak inter­
vention*^
Aa a mattar of fact, intarrantion waa not raally tha 
obJoat of tha troop oonoantration. Vhan tha Conaul at Ciudad 
Judraa (who thought that tha dangar to II Paao waa boing 
exaggerated dalibaratoly in ordar to forea tho adniniatration 
to action) notlfiad tho Dopartnant that tha rabala woro about 
to attack the city, Taft waa consulted* "Tou know,1* aaid tho 
President, "that I an not going to croaa the line* That ia 
acaethlng for which Caagroaa will have to tako responsibil­
ity* * * but I auppoao it will do no ham to threaten then
Political 156.
^Stocorda of tho Dopartnant of State; Huntington Vilaon to Taft, February 24, 1912*
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a little*"'*2 Nadaro believed that a great daal of harm had 
baan dona and Ambassador Wilson was blamed* Whatever may 
have pradpltatad tha troop ooneantratlon in tha first place, 
Taft was advised by many who wara intarastad in Maxioan busi- 
nass activity that it was nsithsr nacaaaary nor wisa to 
carry it further*
It has also baan charged that Ambassador Wilson mads usa 
of tha subsaquant Orosco raballion to furthar ambarrass 
Madaro but tha racord claarly shows that tha Dapartmant was 
not dspsnding upon Wilson's dispatchas alona for Information 
about tha prograss of this raballion in various localitias in 
tha northern statas but had tha raports of consular officials 
as wall* Though oopias of thasa wara filad with tha Embassy, 
tha raports wara forwardad diractly to Washington* In fact, 
dua to tha intarruption of communications, tha Embassy was 
oftan lass wall informad than tha Stata Dapartmant* It was 
tha Department's policy to warn Americans in dangerous areas 
to leave tha country* Tha Ambassador merely issued tha warn­
ing* His report on March 1, 1912#that it was likely that 
soma decisive event might lead to an uprising in Mexico City
^2Ibid.l Memorandum, Division of Latin American Affairs, February 26, 1912* File no* 612*00/2912* A furthar explanation of Taft's policy lias in his proclamation in March of an embargo on military suppllas* All such orders had to be approved by tha President item by item and whan there was ground for belief that tha supplies might be going to rebels tha orders could be refused* Evan a saddle, ordered from Montgomery Ward, could not be sent without a permit*Ibid.i Joan Bassett Moore to Woodrow Wilson, May 5, 1913*
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and tha overthrow of tha govsrnmant waa mads in raaponaa to 
a rsquast by tha Dapartmant for astimatss and poaalbilitiaa 
and doaa not oonatltuta suffleiant grounds for charging tha 
Ambassador with an ovarwhslming daaira to praelpitata tha 
oollapaa of Madsro's regime. Undar tha haadlina "Vilaon 
Urges Precaution" tha Now York Sun oarriad a story quoting 
Vilaon as sayingi "In tha first plaoa wa should obay tha 
Maxi oan Government and in tha naxt protact proparty, espe- 
olally our own." Ha recommended that committees ba ap­
point ad to handla praparation for any eventuality and that 
a apaelal committea ba sat up to work with foraign colonias. 
Ha fait that tha Maxioan government's policy, which had baan 
weak, was improving and warnad that thara must ba no inter- 
farance in Maxioan polities. Tha Ambassador did arranga to
Vilaon to Knox, March 1, 1912. Tha British Embassy raeaivad tha raport from its Vies Consul at Guadalajara that tha faallng of want of confidence in Madaro was unlvarsal.
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•quip an Aa trie an guard for standby purposes*^ Mo doubt it 
was ths ssal to make surs just how extensive this extra pro- 
taction would nssd to ba that lad hia to indulga in tha vary 
Interference that he warned others against*
Calero, the foreign minister, was pressed by Wilson for 
figures on the armed forces available for the protection of 
the city* This mat with a polite reminder that these were 
military aatters and that such inforaation could not be the 
affair of a foreign government but the Ambassador proved to 
be a hard man to put off* It became necessary to meet his 
insistent notes with a flat refusal to furnish the desired 
inforaation, in spite of the fact that he had used his posi­
tion as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps as authority for re­
questing the figures* The feared uprising did not come and 
he duly notified the Department of the improvement in the 
situation, though expressing his customary pessimism as to
^*These sentiments had been expressed, according to the report, in a speeoh to the Y*M*C*A* in Mexico City on March 7th, Mew York Sun. March 6, 1912* Wilson denied that he had made the speech, telling Knox that his own speech had been *>siaple, dignified and cautionary** in tone* The re­ported statements were from a speech by someone else at the meeting, he told Knox* They had been credited to him through "ignorance or stupidity*" One cannot help but be reminded or the "false telegram" in Chile* Records of the Department of State; Wilson to Knox, March 26, 1912*Wilson was active in the formation of the American Guard, organised into companies* Pains were taken to insure that no secret activity was carried on within Its ranks as it was purely a protective measure taken for the purpose of being prepared for an emergency* There was some quarreling over the legality of some of the companies* Records of the Department of State; "Captain" W* B* Randall to Taft,April 3, 1912*
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the final outcome. Ha told Calaro that tha Unltad States 
would hold Maxioo raaponaibla for any damage that might 
occur In Maxioo City to American Ufa or property^ and noti- 
fiad tha Dapartmant that wiras had baan laid for two blooka 
around tha Babassy in an attempt to blow it up.^
Tha dialika harborad by tha Ambassador for Madaro was 
daspaning and irritants wara increasing* It was svan ru­
mored that Vilson was sohaming to plaoa da la Barra in offica
again and was bringing him back from Paris for that pur-
17pose**" This was an unsubstantiatsd charge* Most probably 
other forces wara behind da la Barra*s decision to return at 
this time*^ But Vilson was becoming disgusted with Madaro* 
One of tha Ambassador*s friends, E* N* Brown, President of 
tha National Railways, informed him one day on tha golf 
course that an order had gone through forcing tha use of tha 
Spanish language on all of tha railroads* This would, of 
course, place American workman at a disadvantage but tha 
right of tha Mexican government to taka such a measure cannot 
ba questioned* Vilson, however, sent his secretary. Nelson 
0*3haughnessey, to exact a promise of Madaro that tha order
3*Ibld*i Vilson to Calaro, March 25, 1912*
36Ibid.j Vilson to Knox, March 26, 1912*
Vilson to Calaro, March 27, 1912*
38B.ll, Political abau, 175-76.
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would not be executed and O'Shaughnessey had reported hie 
mission successful* When confronted with his promise to 
O’Shaughnessey, Madero replied that he had made such a prom­
ise but had been powerless to stop the order*^ Madero was 
merely dodging here because he fully agreed with the decree; 
nevertheless, the order stood*
The censorship policy of the Madero government was also 
viewed with concern by Vilson and the American colony*
Rumors of the defeat of the Federal troops by Orosco, on 
March 24th, soon reached Mexico City and there was fear that 
rioting might break out* Madero, after consulting his cab­
inet, refused to give out a statement either confirming or 
denying the rumors* When the Mexican Herald attempted to 
put out a Spanish language edition in the afternoon of 
March 25th, the paper was closed down by the government*
Vilson was highly incensed and asked that Vashington take a 
clear stand*^ He sent for Calero and registered a vigorous 
protest, though the State Department did not see fit to treat 
the matter with any importance*By March 30th, the restric­
tions had been removed, though the Herald had become defunct, 
not, in the opinion of contemporaries, due to the suppression,
^ O ’Shaughnessey, Diplomat!a Pars. 266*
^Records of the Department of State; Vilson to Knox, March 29, 1912*
^ Ibid*i Huntington Vilson to H* L* Vilson, March 30,1912*
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but to  fin a n c ia l d i f f i c u l t i e s .
The Ambassador received  l i t t l e  encouragement in  th is  
a f fa ir  from Huntington V ilson who was in  charge o f the De­
partment w hile Knox was on a foreign  tou r. Nor did Hunting­
ton V ilson approve when i t  was reported that V ilson  had 
sounded the B r itish  M inister, Strong®, on the p o s s ib i l i ty  of 
jo in t  m ilitary  in terven tion . I t  turned out that Stronge had 
m isrepresented the conversation to  h is  own government to  
some extent but there could be no doubt that the American 
Ambassador had a lso  committed an in d isc r e tio n .^ 2 V ilson gave 
evidence occasion a lly  o f not understanding, or e ls e  not re­
sp ectin g , the l in e  between o f f i c ia l  correctness and correct 
diplomacy. The whole a f fa ir  was turned over to  President 
Taft who probably took l i t t l e  n o tice  o f i t .
Meanwhile, Madero, in  the face o f a major m ilitary  
d efea t, was enduring much c r it ic ism . Caricatures and car­
toons were fed  d a ily  to  the public and he was charged with  
lnoompetency. In d u str ia l en terp rises amounting to  m illio n s  
of d o lla r s , many of them involv ing  American investm ents, were 
su ffer in g  work stoppages. In desperate need o f a v ic to ry , 
Madero placed V ictoriano Huerta at the head of the forces  
operating against Orosco. The American government demanded 
a ctio n . Huntington V ilson forwarded, on April 13th, a lengthy  
telegram to  th e American Ambassador for  communication to  the
^ Ib ld . t V ilson  to  Knox, April 4, 1912
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Mexican government. This meaaage was in  r e a l ity  an ultim a­
tum. I t  ca lled  upon the Mexican government to  g ive  protec*  
t io n  to  American l i f e  and property or be prepared to  accept 
the consequences.^  The Mexico City press issu ed , as usual, 
stin g in g  reb u tta ls , c a llin g  th is  message a "blow struck  
unexpectedly a fte r  a long and s i le n t  meditation,** and one 
that could only be read with much d isgu st and some heavy 
s tu p e fa c tio n ." ^  The note was form ally delivered  on April 
15th, a fte r  some la s t  minute changes, suggested by Ambassa* 
dor V ilson , had been m ade.^ Although the note was popularly
^ Ib id.1 Huntington Wilson to  H. L. V ilson , April 13, 
1912. H. L. V ilson wired the Department on the same day that 
i t  was generally  b elieved  that the Madero family had sent 
f iv e  m illio n  d o llars in  gold out o f Mexico. He recommended 
in tervention  in  Chihuahua and Guerrero to  protect Americans 
against Orosco, i t  being understood that the authority o f  
Madero*s government would not be undermined in  any way.
H. L, V ilson to  Huntington V ilson , April 13, 1912.
^ E d ito r ia l .  EJ. Im narcial. April 17, 1912 and Lg 
Prem a. April 16, l$ l f 7
^Records o f the Department o f S tate; F ile  no. 
812.00/3690. W ilson's superiors resented some of the changes 
in  wording suggested by the Ambassador. On a memorandum in  
the records containing t h is  correspondence J. R. Clark 
(counselor) asked Dearing i f  i t  were not about time to  sug­
gest that V ilson **is not our in stru ctor  in  English grammar 
and R hetoric. • and that "* . .we want what we want when 
we want i t ."  V ilson had completely rearranged the la s t  
paragraph but did not change the e s se n tia l meaning. Never­
th e le s s .  s in ce  the Department had already released  the 
o r ig in a l to  the p ress , V ilson was in stru cted  to  f i l e  i t  a lso  
with the Mexican Foreign O ffice . Ib id .t Huntington V ilson  
to  H. L. V ilson , May 1 , 1912.
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referred  to  as an ultimatum, Secretary Knox in a ia tad  on tha  
designation  "friendly adm onition,"^ Tha ta sh n iea l absence 
of a time lim it  made th is  p o ss ib le , Wilson laam ed  from 
da la  Barra th at Madaro'a government was on vary shaky 
ground and ha urged da la  Barra to  support Madaro up to  tha  
point where i t  became evident that tha government would f a l l ,  
than to  appeal to  Congress for a change. This was not a 
secret arrangement that was being d iscu ssed , for  the Ambassa­
dor reported h is  exchange with de la  Barra very frankly and 
openly to  K nox,^ Furthermore, he d iscussed  very fr e e ly  
with Knox the inform ation that he had received  from one 
Oscar Branif to  the e f fe c t  that Orosco, having received  pow­
erfu l f in a n c ia l a id , was about to  triumph and that de la  
Barra's name was being much mentioned in  the event o f v ic -  
tory , De la  Barra would, indeed, be ju st the man fo r  such 
a r o le . The important point i s ,  however, that Taft and Knox 
could have been l e f t  with no doubt whatsoever as to  W ilson's 
views and i t  i s  patent th at th ese  views were shared by the 
Taft adm inistration e ls e  th e Ambassador would not have d is ­
cussed them so fr e e ly . The overworked theme o f Ambassador 
W ilson's representing no one but h im self in  Mexico and
Ib id , ; Knox to  Letcher, Consul at Chihuahua, 
April 22, 1 9 i2 ,
Wilson to  Knox, April 22, 1912, 
Wilson to  Knox, April 26, 1912,
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carrying out a p o licy  independently o f  hia superiors i s  thus 
weakened considerably* I t  I s  even more weakened by h is  con­
tinued frankness with h is  superiors*
Pedro Lascurain who had ju st replaced Calero as foreign  
m in ister (Calero was accredited  to  the United S ta tes) proved 
more lo y a l to  Madero and le s s  amenable to  the w i l l  o f Am­
bassador Wilson. His reply to  the " friendly admonition" was 
p o lite  but firm . Mexico could not accept the assumption 
that the United S tates had a r igh t to  make such a represen­
ta t io n .  ̂  Madero»s a tt itu d e  was s t if f e n in g . Although there  
was some trouble with Huerta over h is  fa u lty  bookkeeping, 
th e General was su ccessfu l in  h is  o ffen s iv e  against Orosco 
w hile de la  Barra stayed in  the background and seemed to  
lend strength  rather than weakness to  the government. The 
tran sfer  o f  Calero to  Washington, however, seems to  coincide  
c lo se ly  with an in te n s if ic a t io n  o f  W ilson’ s Impatience with  
Madero. The Department was flooded with dispatches urging 
that Madero be ca lled  to  account. Wilson does not seem to
^L ascurain  sa id  that h is  government n. . • fin d s  
i t s e l f  under the pain fu l n e c e ss ity  o f not recognising the  
righ t o f  your Government to  g ive  the warning which the  
aforesa id  note contains s in ce  i t  i s  not based upon any action  
imputable to  th e Mexican Government s ig n ify in g  th at i t  has 
departed from the observance o f the p r in c ip les  and p ra ctices  
o f  In ternational law." Mexico would not be "forced" beyond 
her regular r e sp o n s ib ility  under In ternational law and the  
government would accept no r e sp o n s ib ility  fo r  the a c ts  o f  
reb el leaders except w ithin  th ese  bounds. Ib id .t Lascurain 
to  W ilson, enclosed in  Wilson to  Knox, A pril 17 , 1912.
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have rea lized  that w hile i t  was not the p o licy  o f the Taft 
adm inistration to  s a c r if ic e  order and s t a b i l i t y  in  Mexico in  
order to  help Madero e s ta b lish  a true democracy, there was 
no wish e ith er  to  p r e c ip ita te  a c r i s i s  at th is  time* This 
did not keep the Ambassador from urging, however, some more 
fo rce fu l action*
He was f in a l ly  driven by h is  consuming zea l to  make the  
Mexican government more responsive to  American wishes in to  
an unfortunate choice o f words* In the course o f ordinary 
procedure the Mexican government had deported two non-natu- 
ra lized  foreign  "Americans" fo r  actin g  through a "Tampico 
News Company" to  forward arms to  Zapata* This act r e f le c te d  
badly on two o f Vilaon*s fr ien d s who were in terested  in  the  
Company f in a n c ia lly  but who had, as fa r  as i s  known, nothing  
to  do with the gun-running* I t  appears that V ilson acted on 
an Impulse when he telegraphed Knox on the day th at the men 
were arrested  th at "in certa in  c irc le s"  in  the c ity  an "of­
f i c i a l  reign o f  terror" p r e v a i l e d * T h e  "reign o f terror"  
did not in te r fe r e , however, with the Ambassador's plans to  
return to  the S ta tes to  d iscu ss p o lic ie s  and claim s with the  
Department and a lso  to  fo llow  more c lo se ly  the Republican 
Convention which met in  June* I t  was the Democratic Conven­
t io n  that commanded the in te r e s t  o f Madero*
°̂ Ib id .t V ilson to  Knox, May 3 , 1912
VI
WILSON AND THE COLLAPSE OP THE MADERO GOVERNMENT
A fter a reat In tha Unitad S ta tes , which waa no doubt 
much needed, Wilson raturnad to  h is  p o st, w all plaased with  
tha outcome o f tha Convention. Ha found a s te a d ily  d e te r i­
orating situation* There was cr it ic ism  of Madero on the  
one hand and anti-American fe e lin g  on th e other* President 
T aft, meanwhile, made i t  d e a r  to  Calero In Washington that 
the United S ta tes expected Mexico to  l i v e  up to  her in te r ­
national o b lig a tio n s and when Calero assured Taft that the  
Madero government was in  e f fe c t iv e  con tro l, Ambassador 
Wilson could not understand what he took to  be hypocrisy on 
Calero*s part* This was more fu lly  explained when Calero 
made h is  famous *1 l i e d 1* speech to  the Mexican Congress in  
January o f 1913* Meanwhile in  July of 1912, Taft was d is ­
turbed at the b ittern ess  o f Senator Albert B* P a ll o f New 
Mexico who l i s t e d ,  in  one o f h is  speeches, a great number 
o f outrages against Americans in  Mexico* Wilson, queried 
for v e r if ic a t io n , explained co n fid en tia lly  that F a ll might 
p ossib ly  have spoken out o f  disappointment for heavy lo s s e s  
su ffered  in  some mining en terp rises in  which he was in te r ­
ested* ̂  I t  appears that P a ll r e a lly  compiled hia speech
^Records o f the Department o f  
July 2d, 1912. P ile  no. 312.11/759.
S tate; Wilson to  Knox,
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mainly from the pages of in terv e n tio n ist newspapers in  El 
P aso,2
Such outbursts drowned the vo ices o f those who urged 
support of Madero and retained  fa ith  in  h is  a b il i ty  to  over­
come h is  opposition . Professor L, S, Rowe of the U niversity  
of Pennsylvania, a fte r  a two months on-the-spot study of 
conditions in  the disturbed republic wrote Taft th a ti
In sp ite  o f appearances to  the contrary, 
the government of President Madero i s  s tea d ily  
growing in  strength and I am confident that i f  
outside in flu en ces, e sp ec ia lly  certa in  in te r ­
e s ts  in  the United S tates w i l l  remain neutral 
i t  w il l  not be long before the government w i l l  
have the s itu a tio n  w ell In h a n d , 3
Such information did not harmonize with the news from various 
parts o f the embattled land, A consular report came from 
San Luis P otosf which must be taken very ser iou sly  sin ce i t  
was praised by that experienced and able o f f i c i a l .  A, A, Adee, 
as a "good report, c lear and temperate showing no excitem ent, 
prejudice or p a r t ia l ity ,"  I t  sta ted  that the lo y a lty  for  
Madero among the common people waa waning due to  d isappoint­
ment, and that the upper c la sse s  in  that region had never
2Ib id , t  Consul Thomas D, Edwards o f Ciudad Ju£rez to  
the Department, F ile  no, 312,11/771,
^Ibid,s Rowe to  T aft, August 12, 1912, Judge Delos 
J, Haff o f Kansas C ity, am attorney fo r  some mining companies 
with in te r e s ts  in  Mexico, was a c tiv e  in  s t ir r in g  up a favor­
able opinion o f the Madero government among American con­
gressmen and government o f f i c i a l s .  Ib id ,t Wilson to  Knox, 
April 19, 1912,
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adhered to  tha adm inistration* This report went on to  point 
out th at the fa ilu r e  o f Madero to  deal adequately w ith the  
revolutionary forces in  the immediate v ic in ity  o f Mexico 
City had proved hum iliating to  h is  o f f i c ia l  supporters and 
outside o f  th is  group there appeared to  be no outspoken ad* 
vocates o f the Madero government* I t  was further sta ted  
th at w* • « anti-American feelin g*  • « /c o n t in u e ^  as usual 
and the public and p rivate comment upon the government of 
the United S tates i s  generally  su sp ic iou s, h o s t i le  and 
u n f a i r * W i l s o n ,  however, has been taken to  task  fo r  re ­
porting at the same time th a t:
I think now that I should say to  the  
Department for  the esp ec ia l consideration  
of the President that un less some d ra stic  
and convincing a ttitu d e  i s  taken by gur 
Government none of th ese  murderers / o f  Amer­
ican c i t iz e n s /  w il l  be punished and that 
crim inals w i l l  be emboldened to  commit 
further crimes against American c itizen s*
^Ibid.r William L* Bonnev, Consul at 3an Luis Potoaf 
to  the Department, August 13, 1912* See a lso  Photostat copy 
of ex tracts from the report o f  Special Agent L* E. Ross, 
Bureau o f In v estig a tio n s , Department of J u stic e , July 22, 
1912 from £1 Paso, Texas* Agont Ross w rites:
"Of la te  I have mixed fr e e ly  with the Mexican e le ­
ment in  £1 Paso and I find  that the consensus o f opinion i s  
that Madero has fa i le d  m iserably in  most o f h is  promises to  
the people; that there i s  a general a ir  o f d isgu st and d is ­
s a t is fa c t io n  with the turn o f events, e sp ec ia lly  with regard 
to  th e Terrasas holdings which have not been divided up in  
accordance with Madero's promises* A l i t t l e  encouragement 
would s ta r t  these men o f f  on another campaign*"
Îb id *: Wilson to  Knox, August 22, 1912*
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Tha Ambassador furthar pointad out that tha Maxican govern­
ment's p o licy  toward some Amartoan firm s was costin g  tham 
graat sums o f money and that a groat prafaranea was baing 
manifastad fo r  Suropaan trade# V ilson ra a lisa d  th at th is  
would ba d isturb ing news# I t  may have had soma a ffa o t on 
T a ft's  d ecision  to  have naval v a ssa ls  c a l l  at Mexican ports  
q u ietly  for  tha next eight or tan months for "moral a ffect#  
This p o licy  would a lso  g ive American c it is a n s  a greater  
fe e lin g  o f security# I t  su pp lies concrete evidence o f tha  
increasing  concern o f tha Department over tha Mexican s i t u ­
ation  because Taft had ordered "small fry" naval v a ssa ls  to  
quit Mexican waters in  tha e a r lie r  phases o f tha Revolution# 
Tha p ictu re , so often  painted , o f tha Dapartmant de­
pending for information s o le ly  on tha raports o f Ambassador 
V ilson would have appeared r id icu lo u s to  contemporaries#
I f  there was exaggeration o f the d eclin e  o f Madero's p o l i t i ­
ca l and m ilitary  strength , the Ambassador was not the only  
g u ilty  party# An ardent supporter o f the Madero regime
^Ibld# t Huntington Vilson to H# L# Vilson, August 24* 1912, confidential• Huntington Vilson later changed his name to Francis Mairs Huntington-Wilson# He was Assistant Secretary of State until his resignation in 1913* He had been Secretary of the American Bcbassy in Japan and 2nd Assistant Seoretary under John Hay# See Who's Who in America. 1932-33*
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wrote concerning t h is  period th ets
I t  I s  not my Intent to  deny that there  
was grave disorder In Mexico, or that the  
United S ta tes  had cause fo r  anxiety as to  
the sa fe ty  o f  i t s  n a tio n a ls  on th e other  
sid e  of the border*7
Wilson was a t a lo s s  to  understand how Madero could remain
o p tim istic  and he was convinced th at Madero would y ie ld  to
nothing but force in  the matter o f the claim s, which were
m ultip lying stead ily*
The Ambassador's patience was wearing thin* Madero's
coolness when confronted w ith "wrongs" done to  Americans
strained  the Ambassador's usual courtesy in  dealing with the
President o f the Republic* After one se ss io n  with Lascurain,
he frankly admitted to  Knox that he had remonstrated "* • •
sometimes in  words not compatible w ith my diplom atic char*
acter* Nor did Taft mince words with Calero in  Washington*
He considered c a llin g  Congress in to  sessio n  to  p lace the
matter before that body*^ Wilson, however, could get no
more s a t is fa c t io n  from Lascurain than Taft could get from
7B e ll ,  P o l i t ic a l  SbflU, 217*A
Records o f the Department o f S tate! Wilson to  Knox, 
August 2d, 1912, con fid en tia l*
9lbld* t Memorandum forwarded by H* L* Wilson to  
Huntington W ilson, September 4 , 1912* P ile  no* 312.11 /135AB*
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Calero*10 I t  was under th sss  circumstances that a Ions l i s t  
o f grievances, rafarrod to  as tha "strong nota o f  September 
15th," was prasantad to  tha Nadaro government* Thara i s  no 
doubt that Wilson dallvarad tha nota In a rightaous and 
vangaful manner. I t  was n ot, however, a groat surprisa to  
tha Maxican laadars and not without soaa ju s t if ic a t io n *
Tha a ttltu d a  o f Madaro toward t h is  move was datarmlnad 
to  a groat axtant by p o l i t ic a l  ehangas that had transplrad  
in  tha United S ta tas. Tha question n atu rally  a r ise s  as to  
why ha did not ask for tha r e o a ll o f  an Aabassador whoa ho 
obviously d is lik e d  and feared* Ha did not have to  g ive  any 
reasons for  such a request; th is  was estab lish ed  in  in te r ­
n ational practice* Tha explanation i s  that Madaro under­
stood what many students o f tha h istory  o f th is  period have 
strangely overlooked or fa ile d  to  understand co a p le te ly , 
i*a* that Aabassador Wilson was carrying out tha in ten tio n  
and in stru c tio n s  o f a government that was ju st  as anxious 
to  sea Madaro f a l l  as was i t s  Aabassador unless ha would 
accept tha d ic ta tio n  o f tha Ifolted S ta tes in  o a tter s  that 
involved c it is a n s  o f tha United S ta tes  with in te r e s ts  in  
Mexico* That Madaro hoped for a new and sympathetic admin­
is tr a t io n  in  Washington i s  beyond doubt* Thera was a n o tic e ­
10A Vara Crus judge, in  w ritin g  o f Lascurain, cred ited  
him with in te l l ig e n c e  and uprightness but sa id  that ha was 
a lso  inexperienced and in d ecisive*  Ramin Prida. Froa Des­
pot ism to  Anarchy (Copyright by Ramin Prida, 1914)# 159-160.
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able s t if fe n in g  in  h is  dealings with Washington in  a l l  mat­
te r s  soon a fte r  the nomination o f Governor Woodrow Wilson by 
the Democratic Party* After the e lec tio n  of a Democratic 
president, Madero was in c lin ed  to  trea t the Taft adm inistra­
tio n  as having been repudiated by the American people* As 
Vasooncelos says:
The f i r s t  thing that Madero was disposed  
to  ask from h is  friend  President Wilson was 
the withdrawal.of h is  personal enemy, Ambas­
sador Wilson.
This a ttitu d e  was not kept secret but was widely known in  
Mexico. I t was not ca lcu lated  to  improve the personal f e e l ­
ing o f the Ambassador toward Madero* Nor did i t  cause the 
Taft adm inistration to place any curb on the Ambassador*
The presentation  of the "strong note" was the culmina­
tio n  o f a p o licy  developed by Taft and the 3 ta te  Department* 
Taft had a ta lk  with Calero on September 4th in  which there  
was a c lear understanding that he expected the Mexican 
government to  act more firm ly than i t  had in  the past to  
guard American l iv e s  and property and to  s e t t le  outstanding  
claims* The American President was lo s in g  patience.
Vasconcelos, "A Mexican*s Point o f View" in  Amer-  
IfiSfi. P o llp is s  Abroad. 109-110* Madero to ld  Vasconcelos on 
one occasion: "Do not worry; i t  i s  only a question o f tim e.
In a few months we sh a ll have a friend  in  Washington*" The 
President o f La Cia* Mexicana de Impermeables, S.A. wrote 
Carmi Thompson, Taft*s Secretary, that Alfonso Madero, 
Francisco*s brother, had begged the Mexican President to  ask 
the United S tates to  declare Wilson persona non grata. 
Records o f the Department o f S tate; H. S. Bryan to  Tnompson, 
enclosed in  Thompson to  Huntington W ilson, September IS ,
1912.
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and falling to obtain satisfactory guarantaaa from Calaro
ha Instructed the State Depart*ent to work out some solu- 
12tion* On September 5th, a dispatch went forward to the 
Anbaeeador Hating the many grievances against Mexico in 
detail and instructing hi* to insist that "predatory perse­
cution” cease "forthwith*” The dispatch went on to say 
that!
The Government of the United States finds Itself compelled to say on behalf of the Amer­ican people that its faith in the effectiveness of the Mexican Ooveraaent has been shaken to its base*
The note also called upon Madero to show that he could 
handle the situation, or state frankly that he could not,
in which case the United States must then consider what
13measures should be adopted* In today*s language this 
would be interpreted as a threat of an "agonising reapprais­
al."
*2Taft Papers, Letterbook no* 42, September 5, 1912* Taft instructed ids Secretary, Carmi Thompson, to meet with Huntington Wilson and recommend a move* Thus Wilson does not deserve the full blame for engineering the presentation of unJust claims in order to deal Madero»s government a crippling blow*
^^Records of the Department of States Huntington Wilson to H* L. Wilson, September 5* 1912* File no* 312*11/334A* Had Taft been reelected the State Department was preparing for Intervention by June of 1913 if conditions under Madero had not ameliorated by that time* Ibid.!Fred Morris Bearing, Memorandum on Recognition, April 16, 1913. File no. S12.00/S066*
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There was genuine fear among Americans In Mexico th at  
Taft r e a lly  meant buaineaa th is  time* Typical o f  the many 
l e t t e r s  received  by him mas one in  whioh he was to ld  th a t:
I f  you or Congress are bent on a high­
handed, h istory  maxing ep isode, blockade 
them fore and aft*  • • •
But there would be danger to  the American res id en ts  i f  in te r ­
vention were not carried out in  such a way as to  g ive immedi­
a te protection  to  them. The above w riter did not think that 
an invasion of the country was advisable ju s t  y e t . ^
I t  was generally  supposed at the time that the "strong 
note" had actu a lly  been prepared by Ambassador Wilson1  ̂ with  
the approval o f the Department but the in i t ia t iv e  was taken 
by President Taft h im self as sta ted  above. The b e l ie f  that 
Wilson had prepared the note grew out o f the manner o f i t s  
presentation  and the fa c t  that the Department approved some 
claims in  which the Ambassador was in tere sted  because they  
concerned h is  fr ien d s . Although prepared and sent to  Wilson 
on the 5th, i t  was dated th e 15th o f September and was not 
actu a lly  delivered  u n til  the morning o f the 17th. The reason  
for the delay was the lengthy character of the " b ill  o f  par­
ticu lars'*  and the n ecess ity  o f some rev is io n s  o f a tech n ica l
*• Shafter, Pledras Negras, Mexico to  
T aft, September 9# 1912.
15B«11, Political a u u ,  227-226.
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nature.
As Wilson had pred icted , the note was slow In being 
answered. He was asked pointedly  by Lascurain i f  he could  
be counted on to  represent the Mexican case fa ir ly  and sym­
p a th e tic a lly  to  h is  government. His reply was th at the  
r e sp o n s ib ility  rested  with the Mexican government which must 
act upon matters trea ted  in  the n ote. The Ambassador fu lly  
expected that the answers would be vague and evasive and 
prophesied that in  t h is  case "vigorous and firm action  o f  
some sort w i l l  be necessary to  maintain our r e la tio n s  and 
secure action  r e la t iv e  to  our ju st c o m p l a i n t s . T h i s  was 
in  accord with the Taft p o licy  so fa r  as i t  did not involve  
an outright m ilita ry  in vasion . The S tate Department even 
refused to  allow  the Mexican government to  in terp ret the  
note as an ultimatum. Again, no time lim it  was sp e c if ie d  
and i t  was not u n t il  the la t t e r  part o f  November that a 
reply was received . Madero soon had even more pressing  wor­
r ie s  in  the form o f a new r e b e llio n .
A reactionary movement headed by Ftflix d£ ss was started  
at Vera Cruz in  October. I t  was premature and was soon 
ended w ith  the capture and imprisonment o f Dfas. Madero, 
e ith er  out o f kindness or actin g  according to  advisors re-
Records o f the Department o f S tate  
September 17, 1912. F i le  no. 3 1 2 .1 1 /SS2.
Wilson to  Knox,
Wilson to  Knox, September IS , 1912.
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voked D^at* sentence of execution and the lattar was kept, 
instead, in prlaon In tha Capital where ha vaa to become tha 
cantar of a continuation of tha movement in February* Thie 
uprlaing was aimply additional evldenoe that Praaidant Madaro 
aithar did not know tha aariouanaaa of hia oppoaition or waa 
dataminad not to admit failure* Ha waa abla to ovarcoaa tha 
firat Dial rebellion but tha legislative arguments ovar for­
eign loans, tha failura of tha govaraaant to satisfy Indian 
demands, Madaro* a regulation of tha praas and hia rafusal to 
raoogniaa that tha country was in a chaotic condition stamped 
him as an honaat but inapt leader incapable of handling tha 
problems facing him* His enmity toward Ambassador Wilson 
blinded him to tha need for affective action on hia own part* 
It waa too easy to lay his failures at tha door of tha Amer­
ican Embassy and by encouraging hia followers In this attitude 
ha could save face* Ha told them that a change of adminis­
trations at Washington would solve most of his problems and 
ha was too much of an idealist not to have believed this 
himself* It is interesting to find that one who defended 
Madaro was in essential agreement with Ambassador Wilson on 
tha matter of conditions in tha country:
In these crowded months while tha disturb­ing elements which I have striven to describe ware at work in Congress and throughout tha 
country, and beyond its borders. President Madaro regained tha optimlmn which had always 
bean characteristic or him, and had bean for only a while disturbed • • • • To what extant ha willfully deluded himself after the manner of various faith-cults, I am uncertain, but the
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r e su lt  was very s im ilar  to  th s lr  achieve­
ments even In th s  point o f i t s  u lt in a ts  
fa ta lltv *  Ho gained a nor# asaurod and: 
cheerful a tt itu d s  which had a value whan ho 
appeared in  pu b lio , but ho su ffsrod  th s in ­
ev ita b le  lo o s  in  judgement and in  power to  
think honestly* I t  became aora d i f f ic u l t  
than bafora to  convince h ia  by tha p la in ast  
evidence against a praeonealrad opinion*
Ha had postad a deaf and blind santry at 
tha gat away o f h is  U fa  to  cry "111*0 wall"  
and thsra wars tim es whan ha would haar no 
other voice*1®
Tha Ambassador was more concise:
• • .The Department w il l  doubtless note tha 
o p tim istic  character o f IHadero'a address 
to  Congress on Septem beri6tfc7 which seams 
to  be designed to  conceal rather than 
discuss the rea l condition o f the country*
However, i t  d eceives no one in  Mexico as to  
th e conditions which r e a lly  e x is t  though i t  
may have the e f fe c t  which i t  I s  evidently  
desired to  have abroad*19
Independently o f Wilson, the S tate Department began
90hearing rumors o f the Impending reb e llio n  in  the army.
The Ambassador was on leave when the news of the D^az reb e l­
lio n  reached him at Kansas City* He was g r a tif ie d  to  learn  
that the Department was taking step s to  have the Navy in  
readiness* While there i s  some controversy over statem ents 
that ha made to  the press at t h is  tim e, i t  should be c lear  
by now that the removal o f  Madero from o f f ic e  would be, to
ldBell, Political Shame. 24S-249*
^Records of tha Department of State; Wilson to Knox September Id, 1912*
Adee to Wilson, September 27, 1912*
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him, a welcome r e l i e f .  A secret message from Schuyler ( l e f t
in  charge o f the Embassy at Mexico City) to  the Department
d isc lo sed  that four personal fr ien d s o f the Ambassador had
expressed approval o f the rev o lt  o f General Dias, b eliev in g
that order would be restored thereby and had recommended
recognition  of the "belligerency** o f Dias by the Uhited
S ta tes . They were carefu l to  obtain a pledge that th e ir
21names not be used. One may hasard a good guess as to  who
th ese  men were sin ce Wilson suggested that Schuyler consult 
22Cook, Agramonte, Long, McCarty, Walker and Galbraith in
51the event of a d isorder.  ̂ A ll o f th ese men were in  the  
American colony. Agramonte was president w hile Cook was 
chairman o f the colony. The sw ift capture o f  Dias was un­
doubtedly a disappointment to  the colony and to  the S tate  
Department. Although the Department gave immediate and
21Ibid.t Schuyler to Knox, October 17, 1912.
22George W. Cook was the head of a firm of Moaler, Bowen and Cook which did business in government supplies and was believed to be in close touch with Limantour. Bell, Political & gag, 136-139.
2-*All of the other names appear among those in the American colony who signed a petition dated March 4. 1913 asking that Wilson be retained as Ambassador to Mexico.This petition was addressed to President Woodrow Wilson. Hearing - Subcommittee on U.S. Citlsens in Mexico, 66th Con­gress, 2nd Session, 2266-2267. See also Records of the De-rartment of State} Huntington Wilson to the American Embassy n Mexico City. Ootober 23, 1912 and Schuyler to Xhox, October 27, 1912.
*
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hearty approval o f Schuyler's course In withholding in te r ­
feren ce , there was disappointment in  high p la ces. Governor 
Hay o f the State o f Washington wrote Taft th a t;
Heretofore I have been opposed to  Amer­
ican in tervention  and have requested my people 
to  l i e  s t i l l  hoping that conditions would r igh t  
them selves long before t h i s ,  but I am commenc­
ing to  get the same fe e lin g  the boys in  the  
Mexican o f f ic e  have had for  so long, and that 
i s  our government must in te r fe r e .
Although i t  i s  agreed by contemporaries th at Madero made 
a fa ta l  mistake in  reversing the d ecision  of a m ilita ry  court 
to  execute Diaz, the sw ift capture o f th e rebel leader gave 
Madero unbounded optimism. The e le c tio n  o f Woodrow Wilson 
to  the presidency in  the United S ta tes was even more reason 
to  r e jo ic e . One cannot help wondering i f  the reply which 
was shortly  made to  the "strong note" would not have been 
more co n c ilia to ry  had the e le c tio n  in  the United S tates had 
a d ifferen t outcome. At any r a te , the rep ly , long overdue, 
f in a l ly  came on November 24th. I t  was forwarded through the  
Mexican Embassy in  Washington and contained one f la t  denial 
a fte r  the other that the Mexican government had been remiss 
in  any o f i t s  o b lig a tio n s . The in c lu sio n  of Wilson*s pet
^^Reoords of the Department of State; Governor M. E. Hay of the State of Washington to Taft. November 9, 1912. A departmental memorandum later stated tnati "On theoretical grounds /maderg/ may be absolved of responsibility, but on immediate practical and political grounds no excuse for him can be made." Ibid.t Fred Morris Dearing, Memorandum on Recognition, April 16, 1913* File no. S12.00/S066.
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p rojects  in  the "strong note" c e r ta in ly  weakened tha Amer- 
ioan stand but in  any cast tha a tt itu d e  o f tha Maxi can gov- 
ammant would have been tha same and would have baan 
u n sa tisfactory  to  Taft* Denial o f tha ju s t ic e  o f  tha claim s 
was coupled w ith c ita t io n s  o f American delinquency in  cases  
of in ju s t ic e  to  Mexican c i t is e n s  on United S ta tes so il*
As the "strong note" f a l l  Just short o f an ultimatum, 
no d irect p un itive measures had to  be taken* Meanwhile, 
Madero was bragging openly that he was "enchanted" with the  
e le c tio n  of Clovernor Wilson and a considerable increase in  
anti-American fe e lin g  was becoming noticeable* One member 
o f the Mexican cabinet went so fa r  as to  make public s ta te ­
ments derogatory o f  American o f f i c i a l s  and Knox made t h is  
the subject o f  a message to  Foreign M inister Lascurain*
Madero countered by sending Lascurain to  Washington, osten ­
s ib ly  to  d iscu ss the claim s but a lso  to  explain  the s itu a tio n  
to  P re sid en t-e lec t Wilson and urge him to  remove Ambassador 
Wilson as soon as he was in  o f f ic e * 2  ̂ That the reply o f the  
Mexican government to  th e  "strong note" caused a flu rry  of 
a c t iv ity  i s  evidenced by the immediate c ir c u la r is in g  o f the  
consuls throughout Mexico* They were asked to  report a l l  
in stan ces in  which Americans su ffered  lo s s e s  in  l iv e s  or
2*tfilson, Diplomatic Episodes, 234-235.
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property s in ce  October 1 , 1910.2  ̂ I t  was a lso  decided that
each item o f the l i s t  o f claim s would be studied  and trea ted
27independently ' a project that would consume a great deal o f  
tim e.
The fa c t that the Taft adm inistration would soon leave  
o f f ic e  and that i t  could very e a s ily  leave under a cloud i f  
too firm a stand were taken in  Mexico made for  considerable  
confusion in  the Mexican p o licy  during January of 1913*
There was no le ssen in g  o f the d esire  to  make Mexico more 
w illin g  to  meet the demands o f the American government, but 
there was l e s s  and l e s s  read iness to  commit the- adm inistra­
tio n  to  a firm  course. T aft, preparing to  leave for Panama, 
n o t if ie d  Knox that he desired  a conference on the Mexican 
s itu a tio n  adding that he was:
. . .  g e tt in g  to  a point where 1 think we 
ought to  put a l i t t l e  dynamite in  fo r  the  
purpose o f s t ir r in g  up that dreamer who 
seems u n fitted  to  meet the c r i s i s  in  the  
country o f  which he i s  P resident.
^Records o f the Department o f 3 ta te ; Circular L etter  
to  a l l  Consuls in  Mexico from Huntington W ilson, November 25,
1912.
^ stu d y in g  th ese  claim s would provide p lenty o f time 
fo r  the Taft adm inistration to  d r if t  along without having to  
come to  a f in a l  d ecision  on the Mexican question . Wilson 
does not mention t h is  in  Diplomatic Episodes where he d is ­
cusses the m atter, 247-249*
2**Taft Papers, Letterbook no. 46; Taft to  Knox, 
December 14* 1912.
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Washington newspapers soon oaught th s  note o f impatience in  
Mexican -  American r e la tio n s  and i t  was w idely reported in  
December that Madero no longer had the confidence o f the  
American government* No doubt the presence o f  the Ambassa­
dor to  Mexico in  Washington was partly  responsib le fo r  th is  
but Taft was a lso  under pressure from strong elements in  h is  
party who did not want to  to le r a te  Madero further*
N evertheless, the Mexican question was l e f t  more and 
more in  the hands o f the Ambassador* Let i t  be said  again  
th at h is  views harmonised with those of h is  superiors* His 
opposition  to  Madero was w ell known and had there been a rea l 
d esire  to  allow  the Mexican imbroglio to  subside u n t il  March 
4th , Wilson could have been replaced by tran sfer  or by 
several other methods* The shipments o f arms (only allowed  
by p resid en tia l permit in  each case) increased decidedly  
during December and January* Was th is  the means o f " stirr in g  
up the dreamer?" One th ing was certain* There was s t i l l  to  
be no p o licy  having m ilita ry  invasion as a p o ssib le  outcome*
As a r e su lt  o f conferences between Taft and Henry Lane Wilson, 
another ultimatum (the th ird  of the year) was drafted fo r  
delivery  to  th e Mexican government* This time the draft 
o r ig in a lly  carried a time lim it  but th is  la t t e r  featu re was 
canceled by the President and the note i t s e l f  was never de-
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l i v e r e d .^
Far from being m ystified  by the p ess im istic  character 
o f the Ambassadorfs dispatches in  January o f 1913# a fter  he 
returned from Washington,^® Taft and Knox were alarmed l e s t  
he involve the United S ta tes in  the consequences o f a p o licy  
that they them selves had formulated. For h is  part, the  
Ambassador could not understand th e sudden in c lin a tio n  o f  
the Department to  question h is  reports on conditions in  
Mexico. How could he know that he was being abandoned to  
carry on the p o licy  alone while the adm inistration q u ie tly  
placed i t s e l f  in  a p o sitio n  where i t  could avoid p o l i t ic a l  
damage regardless o f the outcome. Madero*s government was 
experiencing a c r i s i s  th at was equally as important as the  
question o f whether or not the country was, at the tim e, 
under e f fe c t iv e  Federal con tro l. This was evident to  more 
su b stan tia l people than "coffee-house p o lit ic ia n s  /.anc^ 
disappointed f a n a t i c s . T h e  Mexican government was beset 
by fin a n c ia l problems.
^ Washington P ost. December 22, 1912. See a lso  Knox 
Correspondence, Volume zu; H. L. Wilson to  Knox, December 24, 
1912 and B e ll ,  F g l iU g l l  252.
■*®The tra d it io n a l view that Wilson was playing a 
lone hand i s  carried  over in to  th is  period by C line, The 
United S ta tes and Mexico. 130.
3^Ib ld . Cline i s  in  su b stan tia l disagreement on t h is§o in t . Apparently h is  view i s  s t i l l  c lo ser  to  that o f  ruening. The United 3&£klft. and Mexico, passim.
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Wilson's dispatch#* did begin to take on a tons of des- 
psration stinulatsd by hia contempt for Madero* Hs bins- 
tsrsd that ths situation was hopeless^2 and had to bs given
a wild rsbuff by Knox for talking to Lascurain in sharp
33tones* ' Wilson, apparsntly not undsrstanding ths rsasons 
for ths rstlosnes of his superiors, intarpratad this ysars 
later as being ths rssult of Knox's legal training which 
•* • ♦ sonatinas affected or dslaysd ths rigour of his 
action in aouts c r i s e s * W h a n  ths Ambassador issusd a re­
quest for warships to sntsr Maxi can waters^ and whan ths 
intsnsity of his emphasis on ths antl-Madero movsment reached 
alarming proportions sons checking was dons in ths Dspartasnt 
and Fred Morris Dsaring asssnblsd substantial proof that ths 
Anbassador was eoaposing his dispatchss fron ths colunns of
^Record* of ths Dspartasnt of Stats; Wilson to Knox, January 7, 1913* Knox was not ths only ona who was disturbsd by Wilson's sesalng dsslrs to fores things to a culmination* Judge Dslbsrt J* Haff of Kansas City who rsprsssntsd firas with large investments in Maxles warned Wilson in a telegram that friendly relations between ths United States and Mexico now depended upon his wise and courageous action* Ms felt that ths resort to force would be the great catastrophe of ths age* Ibid*; Haff to Wilson, quoted in Wilson to Knox, January 6,19x3*
Knox to Wilson, January 7* 1913*
^Sfilson, Diplomatic Episodes. 297-296*
^Records of the Department of Stats; Wilson to Knox, January 14, 1913*
133
the Mexican Herald# ^  Vhen ca lled  on fo r  an explanation o f  
the unwarranted pessimism of h is  reports^? Wilson took an 
in so len t tone and threatened to  d iscontinue h is  d ispatches
u n til an apology was forthcoming# His only excuse for h is
3fSmessages was that Madero was incapable o f governing# One 
h isto r ia n  has assigned the term "personal vendetta" to  th is  
fe u d ^  but that Wilson was a lso  pursuing a S tate Department 
p o licy  i s  ind icated  by the fa c t that in stead  of r e c a llin g  
him fo r  insubordination, Secretary Knox swallowed h is  pride 
and rep lied  that the Department wished him to  continue h is  
reports but to  be guided by the "cautionary in ten t"  o f h is  
in stru ctio n s  which the Department "regretted to  see were 
much misunderstood# Of course, Wilson should have been 
able to  view h is  own p o s itio n  in  a more p o l i t ic a l  l ig h t  but 
he was in  no mood for r e tr e a t•
Knox was, o f course, caught in  the middle o f the whole 
a ffa ir#  In some desperation he la id  the recent correspond-
3^Ib id .g Memorandum, Dearing to  Buck, D ivision  of 
Latin American A ffa ir s , January 27, 1913#
^ I b id .s  Knox to  Wilson, January 21, 1913#
^ Ib id # i Wilson to  Knox, January 22, 1913*
^ C lin e , United S ta tes and Mexico. 130.
^Records o f the Department o f S ta te; Knox to  W ilson, 
January 24# 1913*
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•nee o f the Department w ith the American Embassy in  Mexico 
City before the P resident, c a llin g  h is  a tten tio n  to  the in ­
creasing pessimism of the reports as in d ica tion  "that the  
Ambassador has taken a stand o f h is  own with regard to  claim s 
o f American c itizen s*  • • •" and " • • • an in ten tio n  on the  
part o f  the Ambassador to  force th is  Government's hand in  
dealing with the Mexican s itu a tio n  as a w h o l e * I t  must 
have been d isturbing indeed when the Department one day 
received  word at 6:30 P*M* from the Consul at S a l t i l lo  that 
there was no disturbance in  that d istr ict*  to  hear at 
11:00 P*M* on the same day from the Embassy that the "Na­
t io n a l Line has been cut north o f S a l t i l lo  and a number o f  
bridges burned."^2
I t  was indeed true that Madero had not p a c ified  M exico*^  
In addition  to  the continuance of armed uprisings in the  
south, th e f in a n c ia l s itu a tio n  was acute and accusations 
against the Madero adm inistration were shouted d a ily  in  the  
h a lls  o f  Congress* To add to  Madero'a m isery, Calero re ­
signed h is  p o s itio n  as Ambassador to  the United S ta tes to  
take h is  p lace in  the Senate and jo in  in  the arguments on the  
condition o f finances* I t  was l ik e  the bursting o f a bomb-
Knox to  T aft, January 27* 1913*
^2Ib id *: Wilson to  Knox and Holland to  Knox, January 
2d, 1913.
^ B e l l ,  P o l i t ic a l  Shame. 242-243.
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sh e ll when, on February 4th, In a f la t  statement to  the  
Senate, he admitted that he had l ie d  to  the American govern­
ment for  ten  months about conditions In Mexico* Lest th is  
be in terpreted  as mere m alice, he added a strong recommenda­
tio n  that the Madero government be supported as the only 
a lter n a tiv e  to  anarchy*
On the same day. Ambassador Wilson addressed a lengthy  
dispatch to  Washington which was c ircu la ted  to  the President, 
the Secretary of War and the Secretary o f the Navy* He 
re itera ted  the generally  m iserable s ta te  o f Mexico as a 
whole and the e f fe c t  t h is  had upon foreign  in terests*  Madero 
was about to  carry the government h opelessly  in to  debt in  
order to  stave o ff  co llap se  and Madero him self was v a c i l la t ­
in g , sid in g  with f i r s t  one fa c tio n , then another, and heading 
an adm inistration that was "impatient in  the face of domestic 
i l l s  and disorders and truculent in  i t s  in tern ation a l r e la ­
t io n s . * He had not f u l f i l l e d  h is  promises N* • • and the  
dreamer of Coahulla, who essayed the ro le  o f Moses ^wag^ 
sh rive lin g  rapidly to  the dimensions o f a C a stro ." ^
The causes o f the new revolution  which ensued are not 
pertinent here"'*' but i t  caught the American Ambassador by
^Records o f the Department of S tate; Wilson to  Knox, 
February k» 1913*
^ In d ic a tio n s  that Gustavo Madero obtained a l i s t  o f  
the revo lu tion aries and could not convince Francisco of the 
need for  caution appear in  B e ll ,  P o l i t ic a l  Shame. 261-262*
su rp rise . While he was planning a weekend tr ip  in  the coun­
tr y , d is lo y a l troops, small in  number at f i r s t ,  began an 
attack  on the government by marching on the City and freein g  
General F d lix  Dfai from prison . Thus began the famous 
Pscsna T rlgica- the event that concluded the feud between 
Wilson and Madero. The la t t e r  was murdered by h is  enemies 
and the former was sh ortly  hum iliated and dism issed from 
serv ice  by h is .
VII
WILSON AND THE TRAGIC TEN DATS IN MEXICO
The rev o lt against Madero, which began on Saturday 
n igh t, February 6, 1913, and resu lted  in  a ten day s ieg e  o f  
Mexico C ity , could be made the theme o f volumes o f in te r e s t ­
ing d eta il*  The problem here, however, i s  to  determine the  
ro le  o f  Henry Lane Wilson in  t h is  c r is is*  From h is  view­
p o in t, h is  major r e sp o n s ib ility  was to  see that protection  
was given to  the l iv e s  and property o f  fore ign ers, e sp e c ia lly  
Americans, in  a c ity  without p o lice  protection  and constantly  
under c a r e le ss ly  d irected  gunfire* In try in g  to  perform th is  
duty he was le d , step  by s tep , in to  a p o sitio n  which made i t  
necessary for him to  observe the to ta l  p o l i t ic a l  p ictu re and 
sid e  with the fa c tio n  that gave most promise of restor in g  
order*
Wilson*s behavior should not be interpreted  e n tir e ly  in  
the l ig h t  of h is  opposition  to  Madero*s idealism* Admittedly 
he did not agree with the basic assumption that the Mexican 
people were capable o f choosing w ise leaders* The government 
he represented held no such b e lie f*  The outbreak o f rev o lt  
follow ed by the sw ift defeotion  o f Federal Generals merely 
confirmed h is  studied conviction  th at Madero was an inept 
leader* That he did not favor the reten tion  of Madero in  
power or labor to  support an unpopular regime should not be
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su rp risin g . Hs had no i l lu s io n s  about th s s itu a t io n . His 
rsporting o f th s svsn ts o f th s  Dscsna T rialca wsrs o b jsc tiv s  
enough; thsy wsrs bassd on inform ation from h is  m ilita ry  
attach* and othsr r s l ia b ls  sou rcss. His occasional exagger­
ation  of th s  dangers and m agnification  of h is  own ro le  as 
p rotector o f l iv e s  and property i s  understandable. He 
always enjoyed being the center o f a tten tio n  and he f e l t  
that h is  course would be approved.
The f i r s t  news o f the rev o lt  reached him at seven 
o 'c lo ck , Sunday morning, the 9th of February. By ten  
o 'c lo ck  the &nbassy was a beehive o f a c t iv i t y .  W ilson, w ith  
the approval o f the Diplomatic Corps, sought assurances from 
both s id es  that foreign  l iv e s  and property would be respected  
but he assured the S tate Department that he had done nothing 
that would involve recognition  o f D fas.1 Meanwhile, the 
foreign  guard was organised and guns were passed out. The 
American l&nbassy became the headquarters fo r  emergency meas­
ures. Americans were warned to  stay out o f  danger sones and 
th is  warning was so often  repeated from the Embassy that the  
Ambassador's concern throughout the s ie g e  w ith the protection  
of l i f e  and property was o ften  the butt o f jok es.
By the next day, (Monday, February 10th ), Dfas had 
become firm ly entrenched in  the Cludadela (the arsenal)
^-Records of the Department o f S tate; Wilson to  Knox, 
February 9 , 1913.
139
severa l blocks from th s National Palact whtrt Huarta held  
command o f th s govsmmsnt fo r c ss . "Loyal* Fsdsral foross  
wsrs raported coming In but th sy  arrlvsd  slow ly and thsn  
only In small detachm ents.2 Wilson dteldsd  that th s  Embassy 
could not assurs adequate protaction  to  Amsrlcan c i t iz e n s .
Hs wanted warships with marinas sent to  Vara Cruz.
That Wilson and soma o f h is  fr ien d s in  th s American 
colony desired  mors fo rce fu l action  than th s S tate Department 
intended to  take i s  evident from h is  telegram s. Althoughi
consuls in  Chihuahua and along the border reported no undue 
excitem ent, some of the people at Vera Cruz asked th e ir  
Consul to  request b a ttle sh ip s .^  The Department waited impa­
t ie n t ly  fo r  the Embassyfs estim ate o f con d ition s. Wilson was 
warned not to  indulge in  any act that would co n stitu te  a rec­
ogn ition  o f  Dias but the Department approved h is  course in  
seeking guarantees under any circumstances wherein Dias exer­
c ised  fa c to  con tro l. The Department requested prompt and 
e f fe c t iv e  advice as to  what course the United S tates should 
tak e.^  At tw elve noon the Ambassador telegraphed that the
^Madero ordered General Blanouet to  move from nearby 
Toluca. Troops were a lso  ca lled  in  from Vera Crus but they  
were la te r  returned because o f th e lack  o f ammunition and 
a lso  because the Americans at Vera Crus f e l t  insecure because 
the garrison had been reduced.
^Records o f the Department o f S tate; Canada to  Knox. 
February 10, 1913*
S12 QO/bojl^** Kn°X Febr“sry 1°* 1913. File no.
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Military ciroun stances were uncertain* that pretaotion oould 
not ba guaranteed far foreigners and that eanditiana were 
likaly to bacons aora serious* Ha baliaTad that in tina tha 
rarolt would apraad te tha provinces* and racoonended that 
Mexico ba aurroundad by naval and land forces}* a nota pan- 
cilad on this diapateh by his anpariora raad "too far" in 
referring to this lattar point*^
Knox now raitaratad for Wilson*s banafit tha Depart- 
aant'a previous notioa that thara had baan no change in tha 
policy of tha United Statas. Tha Praaidantf considering tha 
uncertain conditions that night offset Anarloan oitisans
both in Mexico City and tha provinces* wishad only to taka
7precautionary Measures* Sons two hours before this last 
Massage was sent to tha Enbassy* Wilson renewed his call for
*Ibid»i Wilson to Knox* February 10* 1913*
^Ibid* t Menerandun* Division of Latin Anarican Affairs* February 12* 1913* Anoog tha reasons diseussad in tha Departaent for not sanding tha troops to Tara Crus at this tine was tha idea that if tha th&ited States had to use fores they would ba Maintaining only a "principal" Zsifi/ while Mexicans wara fighting with tne entire Republic at stake* "Moreover," tha nenorandun want on to say* "tha present Adnlnistration* if after proper preparation took tha action raaaMMondad by NT* Wilson* would be in tha position of possibly plunging tha country in a war which it would not have an opportunity to carry on and which would have to ba turned over to a now Adnlnistration which would have none of tha responsibilities of tha state of affairs found to exist 
whan it eons ( M l ?  into power."
^Records of tha Dapartnant of State} Knox to Wilson*February 10* 1913* File no* 012*00/6095*
1U
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warships with marines* At s ix  o*clock in  the evening he 
telegraphed that he could not lo c a te  the lure government 
but th at someone who had talked  with Dfaz had reported to  
the Eknbassy* Dfaz knew that delay was hurting h is  cause but 
he preferred to  n egotia te  with Huerta and to  avoid bloodshed 
i f  possib le* Wilson added, for  emphasis as w ell as fo r  in ­
form ation, that a few stray b u lle ts  were entering the Em- 
o
bassy. By eleven o 'c lock  the same evening he was doubting 
ser io u sly  the lo y a lty  of troops under Generals Angeles and 
Blanquet which were supposed to  be on the move toward the 
Capital* He could not, he sa id , lo c a te  any representative  
of the government; however, in  the same dispatch he sta ted  
that General Huerta had been contacted and had promised to  
give some p o lice  p r o te c t io n .^  Madero was away (probably 
n egotia tin g  with Zapata) but there was nothing to  in d ica te  
that he had deserted the c ity  as was implied in  W ilson's 
messages* W ilfley , W ilson's c lo se  a sso c ia te , joined in  the  
appeal for warships to  be sent to  Vera Cruz, by telegraphing  
d ir e c tly  to  the White House*^ The press in  the American 
Capital emphasized D:faz' popularity and believed  that he was
g
I b id .: Wilson to  Knox, February 10, 1913* F ile  no. 
£12.00/6076*
£12 0 0 /b Q ^ ^ '2 to  Knox, February 10, 1913* F ile  no.
£1 00/ 607^ * * Wilson to  Knox, February 10, 1913* F ile  no.
^ Ib id . : L. R. W ilfley  to  President T aft, February 
10, 1913.
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the man to  bring order in  the Capital as w ell as throughout
12Mexico* General Blanquet, meanwhile, denied vigorously  
the rumor that he intended to  jo in  the r e b e ls* ^
The fig h tin g  continued in to  the early hours of the  
morning of February 11th (Tuesday) , and i t  became increasing­
ly  c lear that there was to be a heavy bombardment in  the  
heart o f the city* In the opinion of many observers, Dfaz 
and Huerta had already come to  terms and the b a tt le s  o f the 
next few days were staged to  give time to  plan the overthrow 
of Madero*^ The New York Times and the Washington Post 
continued to  t e l l  th e ir  American readers that General Dfaz 
would probably become "the man o f the hour" but the Times did 
warn that Huerta was a lso  to  be considered. As usual, the 
American people could learn l i t t l e  from the press except the 
most obvious fa c t s * ^  In a sp ec ia l message to  the Times.
Dfaz promised that the issu e  would be decided w ithin a few
^ Washington P ost. February 10, 1913.
^ B l In translgen te . Mexico C ity, February 10, 1913*
^ P r id a , From Despotism to  Anarchy. 159*160. Prida 
agrees with B e ll .  F o l i t lc a l  Shame. 288, that Huerta could 
have taken tin Arsenal at h is  own d iscretio n  but that he de­
layed , not because he had been involved in  the p lo t before­
hand, but because an opportunity had arisen  for him to  play 
p o l i t ic s  for the f i r s t  time and he took advantage of i t .
^ e w  York Tjjaes. February 11, 1913* The American 
press was unusually ignorant o f the moving forces and per­
s o n a lit ie s  in  th is  affa ir*
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hours and that ha would axtsnd protactIon to  a l l  American 
o it is e n a .1  ̂ In such circumstances one would expect th at the  
man who in  a few more days would become the President o f the  
United S tates would have more than a passing in te r e s t  in  
events that were taking p lace in  Mexico, but P resid en t-e lec t  
Wilson sta ted  p u b lic ly  that he did not even bother to  read 
newspaper reports on the s itu a tio n  u n t il  he returned home in  
the evening from h is  o f f i c e .1  ̂ No doubt many in terested  
American c i t is e n s  in  the United S tates were ju st as w ell in ­
formed about Mexico* Madero's subsid ised  press boasted of 
Knox's continued confidence in  the government and denied a l l  
rumors that Madero would res ig n , but the Consul at Tampico 
to ld  Knox that apparently the revolu tion  was regarded favor- 
ably, and the New York Times declared ju b ila n tly  that 
Mexico was w ell r id  o f Madero*19
Meanwhile, the bu ild ings housing the American Consulate 
and Embassy came d ir e c tly  w ithin  the l in e  of fire*  Since few 
of the a r t i l le r y  s h e lls  were fin d in g  th e ir  target, (b o lster in g
^G eneral Dfas to  the New York Times. February 11.
1913.
^ S p e c ia l to  the New York Times from Trenton, N* J . ,  
February 11, 1913.
^R ecords of the Department o f 3 ta te; M iller to  Knox, 
February 11, 1913.
19Wew York Times. February 11, 1913.
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the view th at t h is  was a u se le ss  d u el), most o f them were 
f a l l in g  in d iscrim in ately  nearby making i t  d i f f ic u l t  for  
Wilson and Consul-General Shanklin to  care fo r  the large  num­
bers o f people who poured in to  the Embassy grounds needing
food and sh e lte r . U ndisciplined Federal so ld ier s  occasion-
20a lly  f ir e d  in to  the Consulate-General build ing and Shanklin 
was eventually  forced to  escape to  the sa fe ty  of the Embassy. 
Wilson wired Knox that public opinion, both n ative and fo r ­
eign , seemed to  be overwhelmingly in  favor o f D faz.21 At 
s ix  P.M. the Ambassador asked for permission to  c a l l  Madero 
to  account:
I am convinced that the Government o f the  
United S ta tes in  the in te r e s t  o f humanity and 
in the discharge of i t s  p o l i t ic a l  ob lig a tio n s  
should send h ith er in stru ctio n s  o f a firm , 
d ra stic  and perhaps menacing character to  be 
transm itted personally to  the Government of 
President Madero and to  the l e aders o f the  
revolutionary movement. (Underlining I s  the  
au th or's}•
I f  I were in  possession  o f in stru ctio n s  
of th is  character or clothed  with general 
powers in  the name of the President I might 
p ossib ly  be able to  induce a cessation  o f hos­
t i l i t i e s  and th e I n it ia t io n  o f n egotia tion s  
having for  th e ir  object d e f in ite  p a c if ic  ar­
rangements. 22
20Records o f the Department o f S tate; Shanklin to  
Knox, February 11, 1913*
Wilson to  Knox* February 11, 1913*
312 0 0 / 6 0 9 Înox* February 11, 1913« File no.
U 5
The above message in d ic a te s  that the Ambassador had received  
some communication from General o£as that went beyond mere 
guarantees o f  safety* Mo doubt th e reb el leaders would have 
received  the advantage of th ese  " fu ll powers*" Wilson 
r e a lly  desired  the power to  sanction  a new government that 
would not include the m aderistaa* He was confident that 
public opinion would soon force Taft to  resume a more a c tiv e  
p o licy  in  Mexico, but Taft and Knox were not going to  be 
responsib le for any d ecision  that would possib ly  embarrass 
the incoming adm inistration or r e f le c t  on the p restig e  o f 
the Republican Party* The rea l blame that should be attached  
to  Wilson was h is  fa ilu r e  to  recogn ise th is  fact* I f  the  
s itu a tio n  in  Mexico were to  be s ta b il iz e d , however, now was 
the time to  act* Wilson la id  great s tr e s s ,  in  reviewing h is  
action  la te r ,  on the fa c t  th at h is  views represented those  
of the Diplomatic Corps who were constantly  consulted* The 
Mexico City press carried s to r ie s  on t h is  day that may pre­
sent a p a r tia l so lu tion  to  the question of why c iv i l ia n s  
were ta rg e ts  for so much o f the gunfire from the opposing 
sides* I t  seems there were forces on both sid es  who had 
been companions in  the m ilita ry  academies and there was a 
reluctance on the part o f the common so ld iery  to  shoot down 
compatriots* I f  t h is  was the case and Madero could not com­
mand s u f f ic ie n t  lo y a lty  to  induce a r e a l e f fo r t  to  take the  
Ciudadela then foreign ers might indeed fear for  l i f e  and 
property and p o l i t ic a l  considerations in  Washington could
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have l i t t l e  meaning* The f ig h tin g  might go on in d e fin ite ly *  
In a midnight cabinet meeting, President Taft decided, 
with the approval o f the War, Navy and State Departments, to  
take no more a ffirm ative action  than to  order three more 
b a ttle sh ip s  to  stand by at Vera C rua.^  This p o licy  was 
firm ly agreed upon when Secretary Knox showed the President 
Wilson9s telegram of the previous d ay*^  Wilson was duly 
advised by Knox th a t:
The conjecture that i f  given d rastic  in ­
stru ctio n s the Embassy might p ossib ly  be able  
to  induce a cessa tion  o f h o s t i l i t i e s  leading  
to  n ego tia tion s for  peace does not convince the  
President o f the a d v isa b ility  o f any such in ­
stru ctio n s ju st at the present time* In the  
f i r s t  p lace i f  the Embassy9s representations  
under such in stru c tio n s  should be disregarded  
the enforcement o f such representations with  
the accompanying message to  Congress looking to  
authority  fo r  measures o f actual war might pre­
c ip ita te  in terv en tio n , which could not be con­
sidered except as a la s t  resort and i f  found 
J u s tif ie d  a fte r  d e lib era te  consideration  o f the  
whole Mexican question including the s itu a tio n
•̂Washington P o st. February 12, 1913* This must have 
been a keen disappointment to  Governor C olquitt o f Texas who 
took t h is  opportunity to  renew h is  campaign for  fo rce fu l 
intervention* • He wired Taft th a t:  "• • .continued disorders
and the o b lig a tio n s  of the United S ta tes to  the world under 
the Monroe Doctrine makes i t  now a duty for our government to  
in tervene in  Mexico to  resto re  order* • • *n Records of the 
Department o f S tate; C olquitt to  T aft, February 12, 1913*
2**Tb ld .: Knox to  T aft. February 12, 1913* Knox had 
th e d i f f ic u l t  task  o f explain ing T aft9s p o sitio n  to  Colquitt* 
He rep lied  for  the President th a t:
"Thus fa r  the p o licy  o f  the President remains un­
changed, su b jec t, o£ course, to  th e evaluation of th e general 
s itu a tio n  and th e /a  penciled  9u ltim a te9 appears herg/ e f fe c t  
o f  the sudden c r i s i s  o f events occurring sin ce  Sunday at the  
Mexican Capital*" Ib id . : Knox to  C olq u itt, February 12,
1913.
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of foreigners throughout the Republic* Just 
now action  looking to  in tervention  might 
moreover p rec ip ita te  many o f the e v i ls  o f  
actual in terven tion  and might Indeed subject 
American in te r e s ts  in  the City o f Mexico to  
increased dangers under the cloak of the  
present turmoil* In the second p lace , dras­
t i c  representation  might ra d ic a lly  a ffe c t  
the is su e  o f m ilitary  supremacy at the  
Capital which i s  one for the determination  
o f which i t  i s  not now expedient for th is  
Government to  become to  any degree respon­
s ib le .  and i s ,  moreover, one which, once 
d e f in ite ly  s e t t le d  may w ell create a b etter  
s itu a tio n  for foreigners in  the Capital* bad 
as i t  i s  nothing seems thus far ca lled  for  
beyond the precautionary d isp o sitio n s  as to  
ships and so forth  already taken / s i c ^  and 
in  view o f the warnings given, the kind of 
representations to  both s id es  already ap­
proved and other precautions so promptly 
taken by th e Embassy i t  appears evident that 
foreigners ought to  seek p laces o f sa fety  
u n til a fte r  the f ig h tin g , g iv in g  due heed 
to  the emphatic recommendations which the 
Embassy should continue to  make in  th is  
sense* Meanwhile the Department i s  g r a t i­
f ie d  to  note th at thus far there are no 
in d ica tio n s that Americans or other fo r ­
eigners as such are being subjected to  more 
than the ordinary p e r ils  incid en t to  such 
unfortunate conditions as now e x is t* 25
^ Ib id . t  Knox to  Wilson, February 12, 1913* F ile  no* 
8 1 2 * 0 0 /6 0 9 2 * Knox had good reason not to  put any fa ith  in  
the a b il i ty  of Madero's government to  overcome the rebel 
forces* Typical o f the messages that the Secretary o f S tate  
had received  even prior to  the outbreak of the rev o lt at 
Mexico City was one from the Consular Agent at Torredn, 
Coahuila* This man warned that revolutionary conditions were 
assuming more alarming proportions and that people made no 
secret o f th e ir  opinion that the government could not hold 
out* Furthermore some o f these people were m aderistas. Knox - 
was a lso  reminded that the independent press o f the country 
was demanding Madero’s resignation* Ib id .t G* C* Carothers, 
Consular Agent, Torre6n, Coahuila to  Theodore C* Hamm, Esq*, 
Consul, Durango, January 30, 1913* Enclosed in  Hamm to  Knox, 
February 3, 1913 and received February 13th* Copy to  the  
White House, February 17, 1913*
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While th is  telegram was going forward from Washington, 
Wilson was engaged in  summing up h is  a o t ir i t ie s  of Wednesday, 
February 12th. He to ld  o f having gone to  Madero and then 
to  D^as to  p rotest the aim less bombardment o f the city* He 
spoke in  the most general terms of h is  conversation with  
Madero, reporting only the trend o f h is  representations and 
adding that Madero had promised an early end to  the fighting*  
He was muoh more e x p lic it  with regard to  h is  conference with  
Dfas# He to ld  Dfaz that American warships were prepared to  
land marines which would then march to  Mexico City unless  
the fig h tin g  were stopped# Wilson was flushed  with h is  
sudden importance but he would hardly have been so bold as 
to  have made th is  threat had he not had reason to  b e liev e  
that Taft and Knox would, under the pressure o f  American 
public opinion, change th e ir  course and fo llow  the p ro tectiv e  
p o licy  used elsewhere in  Central America# I t  can be assumed 
that Wilson had been led  to  b e liev e  th is  during h is  recent 
conferences in  Washington# There were, besid es t h is ,  a 
number o f  reasons for  more d ra stic  action# Americans were 
being k il le d  and wounded (Knox did not yet know th is )  and 
surely the adm inistration could not mean to  wait for a whole­
sa le  massacre o f Americans to  take place# The tone of  
W llson9s dispatch does, indeed, in d ica te  that he d ea lt far more 
harshly with Madero than with d£«z. He was b lu ffin g  in  the
#12 00/611?^* * to Knox» Fobrl*ary 12, 1913# File no
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matter of landing marines, but not having received  Knox's 
reply to  h is  request he could not have rea lized  that he was 
going to  be sa c r if ic e d  to  expediency* Prom h is  viewpoint, 
and that held at one time by the adm inistration, in terven­
t io n  might become necessary at any time* I t  would be far  
b etter  i f  i t  were undertaken in  a s itu a tio n  l ik e  th is  than 
under other circumstances when such action  might be in te r ­
preted by the world as persecution o f a weaker s ta te  by a 
stronger one*
Knox fu lly  approved o f W ilson’s n egotia tin g  with both 
s id es  for the purpose of obtaining guarantees* C r it ic s  o f  
the Ambassador have never found i t  necessary to  explain ju st  
how he could have, by throwing the authority o f h is  govern­
ment behind Madero, caused D^az to  withdraw p o lite ly  or
Huerta to  regain resp ect for a President that he already 
27despised* How could a n ational leader whose en tire  admin­
is tr a t io n  had been characterized by p o l i t ic a l  innocence, 
nepotism, misplaced idealism  and disorder be expected to  
esta b lish  order? His troops were doing l i t t l e  to  help him* 
This became evident on the fo llow ing day, Thursday, 
February 13th* Federal troops continued desertin g  to  D̂ &z and 
the Ambassador had every reason to  b e liev e  that the Ciudadela
2?As noted e a r l ie r , Madero had ca lled  Huerta to  ac­
count for  some fin a n c ia l d iscrepancies in  the G eneral's 
records* Huerta was stubborn and unforgiving. No doubt he 
awaited an opportunity to  get even with the President*
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would not fa l l*  Captain W* W* Burnside, the m ilitary  a t ta -  
chS t e s t i f i e d  th a t:
I do not now r e c a ll  the exact date on 
which I sta ted  to  you that the government 
would be unable to  take the Cludadela, but 
such was my opinion g& e l l  tim es (underlin­
ing i s  the author's) a fte r  tne evening o f  
February 13th* Subsequent events only  
strengthened t h is  opinion and made^me fe e l  
more certa in  that i t  was c o r r e c t .28
Consular reports revealed that the Madero adm inistration  
was lo s in g  ground ste a d ily  in  the States* Laredo and Ciudad 
Ju&res remained q u ie t, A guascalientes reported conditions  
unchanged and Tabasco and Nogales were orderly but the reb els  
were gaining ground in  Durango, where f ig h tin g  was underway, 
and there was some brigandage at San Luis P otosf. Madero 
property was su ffer in g  damage in  S a l t i l lo  and the reduction  
of the Federal garrison at Vera Cruz caused concern to fo r ­
eigners* Although Tampico and Ciudad P o rfir io  Dfaz had seen  
no unusual d isturbances, cond itions were reported to  be grow­
ing worse at A c a p u l c o * The Consul-General at Monterey
2ft*°Hearing -  Subcommittee on U*S* C itizen s in  Mexico, 66th  Congress, 2nd S ession . 2262; Burnside to  W ilson, American 
Bzbassy, O ffice o f the M ilitary  Attache, Mexico, June 5, 1913*
^Records o f the Department o f S ta te; Knox to  W ilson, 
February 13* 1913* W ilson's knowledge o f the reb e llio n  was 
confined la r g e ly  to  events in  the Capital where conditions  
were growing s te a d ily  worse fo r  the c iv i l ia n  population* 
Consular reports could not be sent to  the Embassy in  the ord i­
nary manner as wire serv ices  were often  interrupted* The 
Department o f S tate  was b etter  informed about the r e s t  o f the  
country than was the Ambassador*
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assured Knox that that city, true to tradition, was peaceful
but that conditions throughout the country were "worse than
30ever before." The Washington Post likened the situation 
in Mexico to the Boxer Rebellion and predicted the impending 
landing of United States troops,^ A garbled version began 
to circulate of a request by Marquez Stirling, the Cuban 
Minister to Mexico, that Cuba be permitted to land infantry 
troops and it was soon rumored that a company of them was 
about to disembark at Vera Cruz.-*2 Actually the Cuban Min­
ister had requested approval from Madero to do this but had 
been turned down. Apparently, Stirling felt that it was proper 
for his legation to have military protection but any such 
hint from American officials amounted, of course, to "inter­
ference." Foreign Minister Lascurain informed the Senate, 
with thirty members present, that the United States might land 
troops which indicates that Wilson had told Madero, as he 
had told D̂ az, (on the previous day), that marines might in­
deed be sent in. It was suggested that the Senate meet with 
Madero the following day; but only a few senators in the oppo­
sition seemed to favor the meeting and it was held in a private
30Ibid.; Hanna to Knox, February 13, 1913*
31Washington Post. February 13, 1913.
^2E1 Quartelazo. Mexico City, February 13, 1913*Some of the American consuls also reported this.
It nay wall be that Huarta had already made up hi a wind 
by thla time to taka over tha government la machiavellian 
fashion* Tha majority of tha saaatora war# waiting to aaa 
which nilltary faetlan would aalsa powar whlla a minority 
dlaouaaad tha faaalbllity of requiring Madera's resignation* 
Meanwhile tha civilian population, eonfiaad to plaeaa of 
refuge and in eonatant danger, bora tha brunt of tha ordaal• 
Mattara wara aarloua anough to induea tha Secretary- 
Oanaral of tha Pan-American Onion to suggast publicly a plan 
of aadlation to ba undertaken by a group of Latin American 
states* Such a plan seemed absurd to Wilson whan ha learned 
of it through tha press and it was repudiated by an adminis­
tration at Washington that saw it as an embarrassment rather 
than a helps however, Taft was magnanimous enough to forgive 
tha meddling dignitary* Wilson was incensed and wanted to 
know if tho Department could not da senethlng about such 
harmful utterances in a situation •which needs at tha time
firmness, activity, but no sentimentality or amateur poll- 
34tics*" It is of passing interest that Taft also received
^Prida* Prom Despotism tp Amarahu. Chapter XXIV*This is tha basis for tne eaarge, probably true, that tha call upon Madera ta resign came not from Congress but, in reality, Iren a few eppeeitien senators who were half afraid to meet and were only gradually drawn into the plot against Madero*
^Steoerds of the Department of States Wilson to Knox. February 14, 1913*
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at th is  time suggestions that the United S ta tes and two or 
three Latin American s ta te s  undertake in terven tion , a means 
o f settlem ent President Wilson f in a l ly  used in  the Niagara 
F a lls  Conference*
The Ambassador was far more concerned over h is  a b il ity  
to  end the ind iscrim inate f ig h tin g  in  Mexico C ity , and at 
eleven o ’clock on the morning of February li*th (Friday), he 
telegraphed the Department asking once more for fu l le r  
powers* Although Knox’ s in stru ctio n s c lea r ly  in d ica te  that 
Americans in  Mexico would be l e f t  to deal with the danger
as best they could, Wilson was s t i l l  deluded with the notion
that h is  government would a c tiv e ly  encourage the opponents 
o f Madero* His superiors were resolved  to  drop the whole 
th ing in  the lap  o f the incoming adm inistration; but where 
did t h is  leave the foreign  co lon ies in  Mexico City? Wilson 
reg istered  an urgent p lea 1
W ill the Department p lease in stru ct me 
immediately as to  the measure o f control I 
w ill  be permitted to  exerc ise  over the Amer­
ican ships and marines which should arrive  
tomorrow at various Mexican ports? So far  as 
the s itu a tio n  in  Mexico City and Vera Crus i s
concerned I recommend that I be clothed under
such r e s tr ic t io n s  as may be law ful and as the  
Department may think proper with power to  act 
immediately in  c r i s i s  without further in stru c­
tions* The s itu a tio n  i s  becoming hourly more 
acute and dangerous, and conditions here are 
almost chaotic* The sca rc ity  o f food and im­
pending hunger here are now becoming f a i t  
accompli and the Department should consider
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in making its reply to this telegram all 
possible contingencies which may arise.35
Although denied by the Madero press, rumors circulated 
that the Mexican Congress was about to call upon Madero to 
resign if it had not already done so. Headlines in the 
United States announced vivid stories of Americans huddled 
around the Embassy to escape danger. Another American had 
been killed in the city and no relief seemed to be in sight.
As the city continued under siege and while Wilson 
awaited his instructions he was visited by Stirling, the 
Cuban Minister. Stirling wished to consult him about the 
refusal of Madero to allow his infantry to land. Stirling 
wrote later that Wilson told him that if the Mexican govern­
ment did not soon act to preserve order Cuba would have 
every right to send in troops but that this should be done 
in cooperation with him. Stirling then reports the follow­
ing conversation with Wilson:
"£No cree usted, Mr. Wilson, que las 
fuerzas leales decidan pronto el pleito o 
que se Hague a una transaccitfn o a un 
arreglo decoroso?
"Aguarde usted si puede, un rato - 
contest© - y le darS notfcias.
"Yo: (Stirling) iEstd ahora negoci^ndo-
se algo sobre esa base?
"El: (Wilson) Ha ido mister Cologan
/the Spanish Minister/ a la Ciudadela y en 
breve le tendremos aqui."
Stirling preferred not to wait for Cologan*s arrival as
^ Ibid.s Wilson to Knox, February 14, 1913# File no 
312.00/6149.
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Wilson appeared to be busy. So he left the Embassy. He had 
not gone two blocks before he met Cologan who was on foot. 
Stirling returned with him to the Embassy. This gave him an 
opportunity to talk with the Spanish Minister and the follow­
ing conversation is reported;
Cologan - "Vengo de hablar a F6lix Dfaz.
/This. was said in a very low 
voice/•
Stirling - "tY na logrado usted algo?
Cologan - "/Nadal - y moviendo la cabeza, 
para expresar desesperanza, 
aftadio - JEsto es muy grave 
MinistroI
Yo /Stirling/ - "iY FSlix Diaz dispone demuchos elementos?
Cologan - "Me ha parecido un poco dSbil.
Pero el Embajador no querrS 
darse por entendido cuando le 
informe acerca de ello (Re­
flex! onando) Yo s6 a d6nde va 
Mr. Wilson; 61 me habla y yo 
oigo. . . • No se puede nada."
^Stirling, Los Ultimos p£as. 391-393. Stirling’s 
testimony has been generally accepted as convincing evidence 
of the "treachery" of the American Ambassador. His book is, 
however, only one of a number of anti-American tracts that 
were circulated by sympathizers and diehards among the sup­
porters of Madero in Mexico. Stirling had, it is true, first 
hand information and was close to the situation at the Amer­
ican Bnbassy; but Wilson, as was usual, gave most weight to 
the support and advice of the representatives of larger 
countries with more at stake in Mexico. Apparently none of 
the representatives of these latter countries felt any need 
to protest that they had been overridden by Wilson in the 
decisions that were being made. Cologan, the Spanish Minis­
ter, Von Hintze, the German Minister, and Stronge, the British 
Minister, were in frequent conference with the Ambassador.Wilson’s Embassy staff drew up a sworn document testifying that his relations with Huerta and Diaz had been confined at all times to the matter of safety for American lives and property. Hearing - Subcommittee on U.S. Citizens in Mexico, 66th Congress, 2nd Session, 2286.
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S tir lin g  has been taken too ser io u sly  by those who followed  
the tr a d it io n a l view o f the ro le  o f  the Ambassador but much 
of the Cuban M in ister's inform ation was gained by hearsay 
and he was obviously chagrined at not being taken in to  the  
confidence o f the Ambassador from the United S tates whose 
p o sitio n  was so much more important*
While much i s  made o f the argument as to  whether Huerta 
could have overcome Diaz or not i f  he had r e a lly  wanted to ,  
i t  was not the business o f the American Ambassador to  deter­
mine th is*  Wilson reported that Lascurain had to ld  him that 
morning that he was "profoundly impressed with what he be­
l ie v e s  to  be the threatening a ttitu d e  o f our Government and 
intim ated to  me in  confidence that he thought the President 
ought to  resign* " Wilson urged Lascurain to  seek an armi­
s t ic e  and try to  arrange a c a llin g  o f  the Senate* ^  A l i t t l e  
la te r  Lascurain conveyed Maderovs wish that the Embassy be 
moved to  the suburb o f Tacubaya, out o f the l in e  o f f i r e ,  but 
Wilson s te d fa s t ly  refused to  move* When Knox heard th is  he 
was annoyed; however, there could have been a great deal o f  
danger and inconvenience in  such a move -  the Embassy having 
already become a rescue s ta tio n  -  and evidently  there was 
l i t t l e  order anywhere around th e city* I f  Wilson had been 
p lo tt in g  against Madero at t h is  time i t  would seem that a 
p o sitio n  ou tsid e o f  th e c ity  would have been more favorable*
^Records of the Department of State; Wilson to Knox.February 14, 1913* File no* Sl2*00/6153*
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At any ra te , the a ttitu d e  of the Department was passive*
Knox urged weakly that the Americans remember that c ity  
f ig h tin g  was not without precedent and that an Embassy 
could not in  a l l  cases be Interposed in  such a manner as to  
a ffe c t  the issu e  o f f ig h tin g  when there ex isted  a way of 
escape* In times of upheavals in  Mexico no American colony 
anywhere in  the country desired to  make i t s e l f  conspicuous*
I f  Madero was being betrayed, evidence p oin ts to  forces in
30
h is  own government•^ * The Ambassador was not at a l l  averse
to  seeing those forces triumph.
Meanwhile, la te  in  the evening of the 14th, i t  was
learned that Diaz had asked for an arm istice but had been
turned down* He sent two sp ec ia l messengers to  V ilson with
another request that h is  b elligeren cy  be recognized by the
American government* Wilson quickly conveyed th is  informa-
40tio n  to  h is  superiors* Just before doing so he telegraphed
^ Ib id . ; Knox to  W ilson, February 14, 1913* C r itic s  
of Wilson*s p o licy  m istakenly believed  that Knox had "ordered 
him to  move the Embassy* n Ib id . : H* S« Bryan to  Senator 
Pomerene, enclosed in  Pomerene to  Woodrow W ilson, July 26 . 
1913* No assurances could be given that the refugees could 
be moved; thus the gesture of the Mexican government was, in  
r e a l i ty ,  meaningless*
from Vera Cruz were return _ c ity  during the morning
reporting that the Federal government did not have enough ammu­
n itio n  to  use them in  Mexico City* See n* 2, th is  chapter, 
and Records o f the Department of 3 ta te; Canada to  Knox,
February 14, 1913*
^Records of the Department of State; Wilson to Knox,February 14, 1913* File no* 812.00/6154*
39B e ll ,  P o l it ic a l Two hundred troops
that he was try in g  to  confer with h is  colleagues at every 
step but th is  was d i f f ic u l t  due to  the in terruption  of com­
munications , however*
The B r it ish . German and Spanish Min­
is t e r s  and French ChargA are in  en tire
accord with the p o licy  I am pursuing and 
I b e liev e  a lso  the r e s t  o f my co lleagu es, 
though the grea test d if f ic u lty  o f commu­
n ica tion s i s  rendering consultation  
d if f ic u lt .W
There seemed to  be no d if f ic u l t y ,  however, in  remaining in  
touch with General Dfaz.
Madero remained deaf to  a l l  suggestions that he resign
or trea t with the reb e ls . His p rotesta tion s that he was the
co n stitu tio n a l president o f Mexico became almost monotonous. 
F in a lly , driven by desperation, he sent a message to  Taft 
promising to  observe h is  ob lig a tio n s under in ternational 
law:
Indubidablemente lo s  informes que 
usted t ie n e  y que han movido a tomar t a l  
determ ined 5n, sbn inexactos o exagerados 
pues la s  vidas de lo s  Americanos en esta  
Capital no corren mingfin p eligro  se  
abandonan la  zona del fuego y se concentran 
en determlnandos puntos de la  ciudad o en 
la s  poblaciones puede darles garantias.**’2
a ib id . :  F ile  no. 612.00/6173.
^ Ib ld . : Madero to  T aft, National Palace, February 
14, 1913. Fred Morris Oearlng, who tran sla ted  th is  message, 
said  that he was confident that i t  was the resu lt o f a s ta te ­
ment made to  President Madero by Ambassador Wilson on h is own 
r e sp o n s ib ility . White House Memorandum, February 14* 1913. 
F ile  no. 612.00/6532.
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This message was sent in  vain* T a ft's  p o licy  was already 
r ig id  and i t  would do Madero no good to  g ive the American 
Ambassador further reason to  d is lik e  him* The United S tates  
Senate, meeting u n til two o 'c lock  in  the morning o f Febru­
ary 15th, decided that in tervention  was not warranted*
The Decena T rialea was now approaching i t s  end* The 
reb e llio n  had been underway almost a week and no r e l i e f  ap­
peared to  be in  sigh t for  the beleaguered city* Wilson was 
able to  c a l l  together the Spanish, German, I ta lia n , B r itish  
and French M inisters and a d iscussion  was held* Some time 
before dawn i t  was decided to  send Cologan (partly  because 
he was a Spaniard) to  urge Madero to  resign* I t  may be 
remembered that some members of the Mexican Senate were a l­
ready making such representations to th e ir  President. The 
choice o f Cologan was a wise one from the standpoint of 
W ilson's p o sitio n  in  the Diplomatic Corps* While the l a t ­
ter* s rank gave him the tech n ica l t i t l e  o f Dean, Cologan 
had been lon gest at h is  post and was referred  to  by contempo­
ra r ies  as Dean o f the Corps* Cologan was a lso  in  agreement 
with Wilson* The Spanish M inister may, however, have acted  
under the impression that Wilson had stronger authority than 
the Ambassador actu a lly  had to  act in  t h is  case* Wilson was 
not one to  dim inish h is  own importance in  the lea st*  Cer­
ta in ly  I t  was known by now that Madero was being pressed by 
the o ie n t f f io o s . o f whom de la  Barra was actin g  moderator, 
to  resign* Presumably a compromise would then be made and
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the f ig h tin g  in  the c ity  would end* Conditions were worse 
than could be imagined by one not on the scene* There were 
problems of hunger, bad sa n ita tio n  and physical danger as 
w ell as the destruction  o f property. The members o f the  
Diplomatic Corps looked to the United S tates for leadership  
and the Ambassador o f that country had decided that Madero's 
government could not stand any lo n g e r .^
President Madero again tr ie d  to  deal d ir e c tly  with Taft 
through Mexican diplom atic channels* He in stru cted  the Mex­
ican Embassy to  Inform the Department of S tate that Wilson 
and a part of the Diplomatic Corps had urged him to  resign  
in  order to  reso lve the c o n f lic t  in  the city* He promised 
to  g ive a l l  p o ssib le  protection  to  Americans but urged that 
the Ambassador not be authorized to  land troops* He r e i t e r ­
ated a phrase that was being heard with more and more f r e ­
quency in  the Capital - that he would d ie at h is  post before 
he would r e s ig n * ^  Soon a fte r  th is  message was sent he was 
v is ite d  by Wilson in  company with the German M inister at the  
National Palace, a v i s i t  which was made to  see Huerta and not 
Madero* Madero, however, in s is te d  on receiv in g  them himself* 
Wilson reported that "There was a n oticeab le  e ffo r t  /on  
Madero's par£7’ to  prevent our ta lk in g  alone with General
812.00/6:
^ S t ir l in g ,  Los Ultimos Dfaa. 404-AO5.
Knox to  Wilson, February 15, 1913. F ile  no.
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H u e r t a * T h e  Ambassador was Ir r ita te d  when Madero showed 
him the telegram he had sent to  Taft* He to ld  Madero very 
frankly that he considered i t  m isleading and inexact fo r  the  
most part* Vhen apprised of th is  v i s i t  to  the National 
Palace, Knox congratulated h is  subordinate and approved h is  
"excellen t w ork,"^
The Secretary o f S tate was, however, m ildly disturbed  
about Madero*s complaint that the Ambassador was threatening  
to  c a l l  in  American Marines* He asked Wilson to  l e t  the De­
partment know ju st what he had said  to  Madero*^ This re­
quest was sent at 5:15 P*M, le s s  than two hours before the  
convening of an emergency meeting o f the Cabinet which, in  
fa c t ,  met tw ice , once at seven and again at ten th ir ty  that 
evening* President Taft re itera ted  h is  d ecision  not to  in te r ­
vene unless there was "wholesale slaughter o f Americans," but 
i f  Congress chose to fin d  a casus b e l l i  in  the s itu a tio n  he
. ^ Ib id .s  Wilson to  Knox, February 15, 1913* F ile  no. 
312 .00 /6178*^
^ Ib id . : Knox to  W ilson, February 13, 1913*
^7jj2id*j Knox to  W ilson, February 15, 1913* Wilson 
rep lied  that he had been queried by Lascurain u n o ff ic ia lly  
and had to ld  him that he had no authority to  land marines but 
that European powers might p ossib ly  bring pressure on the 
United S ta tes  to  g ive that protection  which the Mexican 
government seemed unable to  give* He denied saying anything 
more than th is  to  Madero. Ibid*: Wilson to  Knox. February 17.
1913.
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would not oppose Wilson denied having to ld  Madero that
he had the authority to  land marines, but th is  was a tech n i­
ca l matter o f the choice o f words*
Wilson i s  portrayed during th is  phase o f the c r i s i s  as 
slamming f i s t s  on the ta b le  and shouting that Madero was a 
lu n a tic  who must step  down! In h is  contempt for Madero he 
may have made some extreme s ta tem en ts ,^  but the s itu a tio n  
was ten se and h is  animosity toward Madero was excessive* He 
to ld  the Diplomatic Corps* according to  one o f i t s  members* 
th at he would n egotia te  with Huerta through Enrique Cepeda 
(e ith e r  a nephew or an i l le g it im a te  son o f Huerta) and with 
Dfaz through an American doctor who was v is it in g  Dfaz regu­
la r ly  in  W ilsonvs name*^° Cepeda had been introduced to  
Wilson by Shanklin* the Consul-General* as a man that might 
prove useful* He carried messages back and forth  to  Huerta 
pertain ing to  m ilita ry  protection* In the course o f these  
communications* Wilson learned that Huerta desired to  meet 
with the Diplomatic Corps and that some movement was under
February 16* 1913*
^ S t ir l in g ,  Los Ultimo* Dfa«. 411-416* S t ir l in g  may 
not have been exaggera tin g*W ilson  was capable o f  becoming 
exceedingly high strung when opposed* The Cuban M inister  
charged him with saying that he did not care about humanity*
Q̂Ibld . ; Cepeda was frequently in  and out o f the Em­
bassy but Wilson made no secret o f h is  l in e s  o f contact with  
the opposing forces* Cepeda was* no doubt* an unwholesome 
p erson ality  but he was u sefu l in th is  situation*
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foot whereby Madero would turn h ie  powers over to  Con-
51gress* The Ambassador never fa ltere d  In h is  testimony  
that he had not met Huerta personally u n til  the day o f  the  
c o u p  d9 fa at and had no knowledge that i t  was going to  take 
place* Again, te c h n ic a l it ie s  and words are involved* To 
Wilson, i t  appeared p er fec tly  lo g ic a l th at the farce o f  
Madero in  the p resid en tia l o f f ic e  had been carried much too  
fa r  and that order should be restored now before further  
damage should be done* I t  i s  not being argued that the Am­
bassador followed a moral course that most Americans would 
approve, but i t  i s  important to  place h is  thinking and 
action  in  th is  c r is is  in  proper perspective*
The comment of an onlooker at th is  point i s  in te r e s t ­
ing:
But Ambassador Wilson had taken that m il­
ita ry  in su rrection  in  Mexico City at a valu­
ation  which he thought a true estimate* He 
knew that the so lid  men o f Mexico were backing 
i t ,  and the in te r e s ts  o f th at country, as he 
viewed them, demanded th at i t  should win* The 
Huerta overlordship of the s itu a tio n , however, 
was something he probably had not, at the time 
of h is  co llea g u e9a ££ologan/ c a l l  to  ask for  
Madero9s resig n a tio n , taken s u ff ic ie n t ly  in to  
account* He had been an a c tiv e  figu re during 
the in su rrection  r id in g  in  h is  car w ithin the  
f ie ld  o f that preposterous m ilitary  duel, to  
the rescue o f endangered Americans and others; 
and he had doubtless acquired a b e l ie f  in  h is  
personal as w ell as h is  o f f i c i a l  r igh t to  be 
heard on th is  v i t a l  subjeot* But h is  share in  
Cologan9s m ission seems to  me to  have been i l l -  
advised, l ik e  so many other proceedings o f h is
^W ilson, Diplomatic Episodes. 273-274
which I have been compelled to criticize, in their official aspect, and without personal malice toward a man who, I believe, was sadly and often absurdly m i s l e d . 52
Another observer interpreted the strange apathy of the
State Department at this point to a desire to allow Madero
to be overthrown without soiling the hands of the adminis- 
51tration. This is the author’s opinion also.
Further proof on this point may be gained from Taft’s 
reply to Madero’s message of the l̂ th. Impatience and irri­
tation are as much in evidence in Taft’s words as in any of 
his Ambassador’s dispatches or contemporary remarks; "Fresh 
assurances," said the President of the United States, "of 
friendship to Mexico are unnecessary after two years of 
proofs of patience and good will." He was anxious to see 
order restored in Mexico and American property safeguarded, 
but "• . .the course of events during the past two years 
culminating in the present most dangerous situation creates 
in this country extreme pessimism and the conviction that 
the present paramount duty is the prompt relief of the sit­
uation."^ We have seen that Taft had no hesitation in pre-
~̂Bell, Political Shame. 292.
^Robert Hammond Murray, "Huerta and the Two Wilsons, Harpers Weekly, series running from March 25, to April 22, i9i6; issue~of April 16, 1916.
^Records of the Department of State; Taft to Madero, February 16, 1913*
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vious upheavals of the Madero era In "threatening them a 
little," and he could not have been ignorant of the possi­
bility that Wilson had indeed impressed Madero with the idea 
of disembarking marines. Another significant point to re­
member is that, while Wilson gave the Department an almost 
hourly account of what was transpiring and the press in the 
United States assumed that Madero's resignation was near, 
the Ambassador was never instructed to give unequivocal sup­
port to the established government in Mexico. What Madero 
obtained were the same threats from Wilson's superiors that 
he got from Wilson himself.
Another illuminating exchange of telegrams clarifies 
the view of the Secretary of State in this respect. At 
seven minutes past eight in the evening of February 16th 
(Sunday), the Department received a telegram from the Am­
bassador in Mexico asking why the Department had, in Its 
wire to Wilson at 4 P.M. on the 15th, spoken of a "turn for 
the better" when the Embassy had made no report to this 
effect. Knox explained in reply that the latest reports the 
Department had, at the time the telegram in question was
sent, was that Madero had indicated a willingness to
55resign. It would seem that no clearer proof is needed 
that Ambassador Wilson was not proceeding entirely on his 
own initiative. Here in Knox's own words is the admission
^ Ibid.t Knox to Wilson, February 10, 1913* Fileno. 012.0075179.
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that the ousting of Madero was expected*
Events moved swiftly on the 16th and 17th as the Decena 
Tr&gica drew to a close. At eleven ofclock on the morning 
of the 16th Wilson notified the Department that Huerta de­
sired to see him some time that day and that he (Wilson) 
would probably ask the German and Spanish Ministers to go 
with him. He hoped for "good results.One is led to 
conclude that such a message was not expected to be received 
with any surprise in the Department. The Ambassador had the 
definite word of his military attach! by now that the troops 
of General Blanquet, on which Madero depended so much, were 
not to be placed in a position to aid iMadero and that D:faz 
would never be driven from the Citadel.
An armistice had been arranged, partly through Wilson's 
efforts, but both sides accused the other of breaking it and 
fighting was resumed, though not as heavily as before. The 
Ambassador had hopes of bringing about a renewal of the armi­
stice on the next day and Huerta's spokesman at the Embassy
promised to meet with the representatives of Dfaz at seven
57o'clock that evening. At midnight, the Department was 
notified that this meeting had not taken place as Huerta 
could not keep his appointment but he had told Wilson that he
, ^ Ibid.i Wilson to Knox, February 16, 1913. File no, 812*00/61857
^ Ibid.; Wilson to Knox, February 16, 1913. File no. 812.00/62077^
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expected to  take atepa "tonight" to  term inate the s itu a -  
t i a n .? It may have been that Huerta had, in  th ia  unforeaeen 
opportunity, auddenly diacovered an ex ce llen t bargaining  
p o s it io n . At any ra te  the meaning of hia words to  the Amer­
ican Ambassador must have been as understandable aa they 
were welcome. The pressure on Madero from Mexican sources 
was growing and th is  was certa in ly  known to the Ambassador*
He co n sisten tly  reported to  the Department that Lascurain 
was d istressed  because Madero would not resign* Lascurain 
was p a rticu la r ly  disturbed about Madero’s course of sending 
id e n tic a l telegrams to  a l l  o f the Mexican governors warning 
o f m ilitary  i n t e r v e n t i o n * ^  To keep the record s tr a ig h t ,
Knox c ite d  the Department’s telegram on p o licy  previously  
given to  Wilson and to  the press* Furthermore, Madero, 
w hile attempting to maintain a r ig id  censorship of a l l  oppo­
s it io n  newspapers, had h is  telegram to  President Taft pub­
lish ed  as widely as possib le*  The Washington Post was able  
to  obtain an interview  in  which Madero sta ted  h is  case as 
p o s it iv e ly  as p o ss ib le . He admitted that the s itu a tio n  was 
seriou s but th is  was true of a l l  c i v i l  wars* He blamed the  
physical p o sitio n  o f the Embassy and the r e sp o n s ib ility  he 
f e l t  for i t s  protection  fo r  the fa c t  that h is  troops were
eg
, Ib id . t  Wilson to  Knox, February 16, 1913* F ile  no* 
812 .00 /61867^
^ Ib id . i  Wilson to Knox, February 16, 1913• F ile  
nos* 812.00/6181 and 6183*
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not attacking the Ciudadela with more vigor* He pleaded 
that he represented the last vestige of constitutional gov­
ernment in Mexico and, though willing to make reasonable 
concessions, he would not resign his post, not because he 
expected material compensation but because a principle was 
involved.^
These utterances made Taft and Knox fear for the lives 
of Americans in Mexico City. It was left to Knox to decide 
how best to handle the situation so as to prevent an out­
break of violence on account of Madero1s statements* Knox 
was afraid to issue an emphatic denial of American inter­
vention lest the "sobering effect" of the idea that under 
certain circumstances intervention might become necessary 
be lost* "Accordingly. * . ," Knox advised Wilson, "it is 
left to you to deal with this whole matter of keeping Mexi­
can opinion both official and unofficial (underlining is
the author*s) in a salutary equilibrium between a proper 
degree of wholesome fear and a dangerous and exaggerated 
apprehension."^^ Wilson later published some correspondence 
in his memoirs to establish the fact that Madero admitted 
his error in accusing him of instigating Cologan1s mission 
and that he (Wilson) called upon Madero to withdraw his note
^ Washington Post. February 17, 1913*
^Records of the Department of State; Knox to Wilson,February 17, 1913*
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to Taft.62
Since the State Department concurred so heartily in 
the procedure of threat-making the question of just how much 
Wilson did say to Madero about landing marines mattered 
little to anybody except Madero himself. Furthermore, 
events were moving along at a rapid pace. Wilson notified 
Knox by telegram, sent at 4 P.M. and received shortly after 
eight o’clock at the Department, that plans for the deposi­
tion of Madero by Huerta had, according to the latter, fully 
matured and the only cause of delay was the desire to avoid 
bloodshed. The inclusion in his dispatch of the statement 
that the Ambassador had made no suggestions beyond request­
ing that no lives be taken except by "due process of law" 
(underlining is the author’s) placed the Embassy on record 
as distinctly opposing any form of treachery with regard to
^2Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes. 266-270. Wilson also stated later that Madero withdrew the telegram and apologized for sending it. Hearing - Subcommittee on U.S. Citizens in Mexico, 66th Congress, 2nd Session, 2263. Both sides, in fact, apologized but Cline, United States and Mexico. 131# holds that Taft was still not sure just what Wilson was doing.
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the l iv e s  of Madero and SuA rez.^
At ten o'clock^ a wire went forward to  the Department 
le t t in g  Knox know that th e  Embassy expected Important d evel­
opments on the "morrow." Federal troops were being with­
drawn from exposed p o sitio n s  and what f ig h tin g  there had 
been during th e Decena TrAaica was dying dow n.^ Madero 
seems to  have been almost the only person in  an important 
p o sitio n  in  Mexico City s t i l l  en terta in in g  doubt that h is  
power had vanished. The treachery o f General Huerta was 
about to  culminate in  the actual coup, y e t , desp ite  the flow  
of rumors as to  Madero*s expected resign ation  (and he had 
declared f la t ly  that he would not resign  without res ista n ce)  
there was no h int o f in stru c tio n s  for the American Ambassa­
dor to  continue f u l l  support o f the estab lish ed  government 
in  any way nor was there any questioning of W ilson's proce­
dure in  trea tin g  with the opposing Generals on questions
6 *5'’Records o f th e Department o f S tate; Wilson to  Knox, 
February 17, 1913* F ile  no. 612.00/6225* Murray in  "Huerta 
and the Two W ilsons," April 16, 1916, charges that Wilson 
ca lled  a rep resen tative  o f  the AP to  h is  o f f ic e  and gave him 
the d e ta ils  o f  the planned action  for the next twenty four 
hours. Conveniently, for  Murray, th is  was done in  the 
s t r ic t e s t  secrecy with pledges being exacted. The most in te r ­
e stin g  th ing about Robert Hammond Murray i s  that none o f the 
r e a lly  damaging evidence that he produced against Wilson can 
be checked. Murray was in  possession  of co n fid en tia l d is ­
patches o f  the Department o f S tate th at could only have been 
sto len  from the Department by someone and Murray ed ited  them 
so as to  p lace Wilson in  the worst p o ssib le  l ig h t .
^Records of the Department of State; Wilson to Knox,February 17, 1913. File no. 612.00/6235.
which might more properly have been taken up with the l e ­
g a lly  con stitu ted  government through regular channels.
The immediate concern of both Wilson and the Depart­
ment was only p artly  with the protection  o f American l iv e s  
and property. The cabinet meetings in  Washington on the 16th 
had resu lted  in  the sta tio n in g  o f the transports with ma­
r in es at Guantanamo Bay ready to  m ove.^  I f  another 
P o rfir io  Dfas should emerge out o f the Decena TrAgica they  
would not be needed.
^ Ib id . : Knox to  W ilson, February IB, 1913.
VIII
WILSON FACES A NEW TRAGEDY
At about two o 'c lock  in  the afternoon of February iS th , 
Wilson was n o tif ie d  that Huerta had arrested  the President 
ju st a few minutes before* The message was brought by 
Cepeda, Huerta's nephew {?) ,  who rushed in to  the Embassy 
with a badly wounded hand* Accounts o f  the exact time o f  
the a rrests  o f Francisco and Gustavo Madero vary but they  
took place in  the period from noon to  two o 'c lo ck . W ilson's 
dispatch to  Knox bearing the time 12:00, noon has been used 
with damaging e f f e c t .  "The assumption," said  W ilson, " is  
that the Federal Generals are In control o f  the s itu a tio n  
and the President."1 In the midst o f a flood  of sim ilar  
telegram s to  the Department in  an attempt to  keep i t  abreast 
of the s itu a tio n , how could the Ambassador know that th is  
one dispatch would la te r  be torn out o f context and made the 
b a sis  for charges th a t he had known ju st what would happen 
and had described i t  to  the Department an hour and a h a lf
.^Records o f the Department o f S tate; Wilson to  Knox, 
February IS , 1913*
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before i t  took place^ or that "he announced to  the S tate De­
partment hours in  advance o f the fa c t ,  that what was yet to  
be accomplished was already done."** A l i t t l e  o b je c t iv ity  i s  
a l l  that i s  needed to  tea r  th is  fab ric  apart. Henry Lane 
Wilson may have appeared to  certa in  people as ir r ita t in g  and 
pompous but to  imagine that he would have been foolhardy 
enough to  time a report to  h is  government before he could 
reasonably be sure that an event he was supposed to  know 
about had actu a lly  taken p lace , taxes the in te ll ig e n c e  o f  
the reader. That Wilson expected and approved the removal 
of Madero from power i s  c lea r ly  esta b lish ed , whatever may be 
said  about the m orality o f h is  stand; that he could reason­
ably be certa in  i t  was taking place on that day, i s  a lso  
c lea r . But to  have placed h im self on record in  a conscious 
manner as announcing an action  he was not tech n ica lly  sup­
posed to  know about and thus convict h im self o f conspiracy, 
can only be supported on the b asis  that he wanted to  "scoop"
Gruening, Mexico and I t s  H eritage. 567. This i s  a 
ch a ra c ter istic  exaggeration o f Gruening*s. Tijne magazine, 
December 9 , 19AD, 27, f la t ly  retracted  an e a r lie r  statement 
that Wilson had "• . • helped plan the downfall and murder 
o f Francisco Madero. • . Time expressed i t s  w illin g n ess  
to  c la r ify  such accounts as th at o f  Gruening. Sumner W elles, 
among o th ers, aided the sons o f Henry Lane Wilson in  gather­
ing s u f f ic ie n t  proof to  persuade the Sd itors o f Time to  make 
th is  re tra c tio n . The author has examined a voluminous f i l e  
o f correspondence on th is  matter in  the possession  of Warden 
McKee Wilson.
^Murray, "Huerta and the Two W ilsons," Harpers 
Weekly■ March 25, 1916.
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everyone else*  He was expected to  keep the Department as 
w ell informed as p o ssib le  but, although h is  communication 
was more than an educated guess, he would hardly have ar­
ranged a telegram that would condemn him self knowingly*
The presence o f Cepeda in  the Embassy and the fa c t that 
he was wounded was embarrassing to  the Ambassador; he sent 
Cepeda away as soon as possible*'*’ A wire was gotten o f f  to  
Washington at once reporting what W ilson's "confidentia l 
messenger with Huerta" had said*'* Meanwhile Huerta addressed 
a note d ir e c tly  to  Taft w ith an abruptness o f words that 
must have been somewhat shocking;
I have the honor to  inform you that I 
have overthrown th is  Government, the forces  
are with me and from now on peace and pros­
p er ity  w i l l  reign* Tour obedient servant*
Victoriano Huerta ,
Commander in  Chief6
Huerta a lso  sent a message to  Wilson asking him to  convey
the new s ta te  o f  a f fa ir s  to  h is  government, to  the Diplomatic
Corps and to  General Dias* The Ambassador complied with h is
'•Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes. 275.
^Records o f the Department o f S tate; Wilson to  Knox, 
February 18, 1913* F ile  no* 812*00/6245#
^Ibid*t Huerta to  T aft, February 18, 1913# "• • •
Huerta, the strange compound of Iago, Caliban and Ghenghis 
Khan*" Thomas B* Gregory, Our Mexican Co
I  B i l i l  Hlifcsqr, g£ MySagg frfla ^E T iudca
Present Times (New Tork; Hearst Internet 
pany, 1914), 129•
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requests and immediately assembled the Diplomatic Corps. 
Huerta was urged to  u n ite  with a l l  other fa c tio n s  and c o n fi­
dence was expressed in  h is  a b i l i ty  to  maintain order. He 
was urged a lso  to  p lace h is  army under the control o f  the 
Mexican Congress.? Wilson re a lise d  that he was skating on 
th in  ic e  in  proceeding without d irect In stru ction s in  th is  
matter but communications were uncertain and the Department 
had made no e ffo r t  to  bind him anyway* His action  was 
taken, by h is  own adm ission, on h is  own r e sp o n s ib ility . 
Huerta and d£sz were ca lled  to  the Embassy about eight 
o ’clock in  the evening o f Tuesday. February lS th ; and w hile  
the Diplomatic Corps w aited. Wilson and the Generals re ­
solved d iffe r e n c e s . Huerta and Dfaz were persuaded to  
is su e  a jo in t  m anifesto by the terms o f which Huerta was to  
become p rovision al p resid en t. Madero was to  resign  le g a l ly ,  
and Dias was to  become a candidate in  the next e le c tio n  
which, according to  one newspaper publisher in  Mexico C ity, 
might *• • .be se t  in  the privacy o f Huerta's mind, fo r  the  
f i r s t  Tuesday a fte r  the f i r s t  Monday fo llow ing  the Day o fg
Judgement." I t  i s  in te r e stin g  to  note that la te r  on P resi­
dent Woodrow Wilson somehow acquired the fa ls e  notion that 
Huerta had promised not to  become a candidate in  that e le c -
7
'Records o f the Department o f  S tate; Wilson to  Knox. 
February IS . 1913* F ile  no. S l2 .00/6244.
8B e ll. P o l i t ic a l  Shams. 297.
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t io n . I t  took some three hours to  get the Generals to  agree 
and they broke o ff  the ta lk s  three tim es before coming to  an 
understanding. Such a w ell planned a f fa ir  as some have de­
scribed  th is  "Compact o f the Embassy" to  have been, should 
have gone much more smoothly.
The restora tion  o f  order in  the c i ty ,  however, depended 
upon the outcome o f th ese  ta lk s . The American Ambassador 
was not "overthrowing Madero" by any s tre tch  of the im agi­
nation sin ce there was no question o f  Maderofs d ep osition .
As i s  the case ord in arily  in much of Latin American p o l i t i c s ,  
the only question remaining was how the stru gg lin g  fa c tio n s  
would arrange a new government.
The Ambassador was, of course, dealing in  a shockingly  
rapid time w ith the deposers o f the former government; yet 
i t  should be remembered that Madero had not been in  e f fe c ­
t iv e  control for at le a s t  a week. I f  t h is  was Huerta's 
fa u lt ,  a l l  the more reason ex isted  to  recogn ise h is  ascend­
ancy and hasten the in e v ita b le . Madero had been ca lled  upon 
more than once to  resign  for  the good o f the country. The 
d ecision  to  overthrow Madero and become president h im self, 
having been made, Huerta was natu ra lly  glad to  have h is  
p o sitio n  strengthened by the prospect o f recogn ition  by the  
United S ta te s . The Ambassador to ld  Knox th at he ca lled  the  
two men to  th e  Embassy to  consider the question o f preserving  
order in  the c ity  but discovered a fte r  they arrived that many 
other questions had a lso  to  be d iscu ssed . He did t h is  on h is
own in i t ia t iv e ,  "• • • without having conferred with  
anyone,” he wrote la te r  in  h is  aempire. ”1 decided," he
continued, "to ask Generals Huerta and d£sz to  come to  the
a
embassy. . ♦ He sta ted  a lso  that a fte r  years o f r e f le c ­
tio n  on the matter he would take exactly  the same course* 
Unfortunately for him, he had unknowingly s lig h ted  the Cuban 
M inister, Mirquez S t ir l in g , who recorded that Wilson had 
announced to  the Diplomatic Corps that he had known a l l  
about the plan to  depose Madero for  three days and th at he 
had advised D:Taz o f th is  long before Huerta had requested  
him to*^° Wilson was cer ta in ly  e la ted  at h is  accomplishment 
and he was not one to  share glory* As risky  as h is  p o s itio n  
was, he made incautious statem ents, h a ilin g  Ftflix Dfaz as 
th e saviour o f Mexico and a friend  o f the foreigners and 
ta lk in g  b reez ily  o f  the fa te  o f Madero and SuWres* What was, 
in  a l l  probability, mere braggadocio was acoepted at face  
valu el About Sulrez, he apparently had no concern at a l l ,  
but he supposed that Madero would be placed in  a lu n a tic  
asylum*
Wilson sent a f u l l  account o f what had taken p lace to  
the Department immediately a fte r  the sign in g  o f the compact
^Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes. 279*
103 t ir l in g ,  Los Ultlmos p fas. 471 f f •
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between Dfaz and Huerta and ended by saying:
I expect no further trouble in  the c ity  
and X congratulate the Department upon the  
happy outcome o f  events which have been d i­
r e c t ly  or in d ir e c t ly  the r e su lt  o f  i t s  
in s tr u c tio n s.11
No one w il l  f a i l  to  recognise the attempt in  th ese words to  
sa lve a somewhat g u ilty  conscience. Wilson was not at a l l  
certa in  that he had not been le d , by h is  enthusiasm and 
eagerness to  get th ings s e t t le d , in to  dangerous paths. He 
wired Knox the next day that the o r ig in a l o f the agreement 
that had been drawn up on the previous night had been placed  
on f i l e  in  the Embassy and that i t  contained p rovisions fo r  
le g a liz in g  the new arrangements. This meant th at the provi­
sion  for Madero*s le g a l resign ation  was in  the hands o f the  
American Embassy; the wisdom of such a procedure i s  ques­
tio n a b le . Perhaps a w iser man would have given h im self more 
protection  but the Ambassador wanted i t  thoroughly under­
stood that peace in  Mexico City and the resto ra tio n  o f order 
had come about la rg e ly  through h is  e f fo r t s .  He must have 
begun to  r e a l is e  already, however, that there might a lso  be 
cr itic ism  o f  h is  p o s it io n .
There was s t i l l  a strong p o s s ib i l i ty  that the agreement 
would not be kept. Wilson to ld  Knox that he had in s is te d  
upon conditions for the maintenance o f peace and order and 
that he believed  that Congress, which was now in  session
13*Records of the Department of State; Wilson to Knox,February IS, 1913. File no. £12.00/6246.
179
(5 P*M* on the 19 th ), would r a t ify  the agreements* He now 
made a plea for d e f in ite  approval o f h is  action :
I have been assuming considerable respon­
s ib i l i t y  in  proceeding without in stru ctio n s  
but no harm has been done and I b e liev e  great 
b en e fits  have been achieved for our country 
and e sp e c ia lly  for our countrymen in  Mexico 
who I b e liev e  w il l  now fin d  the ban o f race 
hatred removed* The l i s t  o f th e ir  in te r e s ts  
w ill  rece iv e  Just consideration at any rate*
Our p o sitio n  here i s  stronger than i t  ever 
has been and I would suggest that I have gen­
eral in stru ctio n s  immediately to  bring to  the 
atten tion  o f whatever Government may be cre­
ated here the complaints se t  forth  in  our 
note o f September f if te e n th  and urge for. at 
le a s t  an arrangement to  s e t t le  them a l l *12
The reader may be l e f t  to  form h is  own conclusions as 
to  the meaning o f the above message* But one th ing i s  cer­
ta in ; Wilson was going to  have trouble* The time l e f t  to  
the Republican adm inistration at Washington was short and 
the means by which Huerta accomplished h is  coup were not 
ca lcu la ted  to  appeal to  the American people* The New York 
Times guessed the s itu a tio n  correctly  by saying that some 
high-ranking o f f i c i a l s  were glad to  see Francisco Madero de­
posed* " esp ec ia lly  sin ce they learned that Madero used a n t i-  
American fe e lin g  to  b o ls ter  h is  adm inistration*"^
On the afternoon o f February 19th (Wednesday)* Ambassa­
dor Wilson went to  question Huerta s p e c if ic a lly  regarding 
the fa te  o f the deposed Executives* This was a lso  done on
12Ibld.t February 19, 1913.
fork Tl*e*. February 20, 1913.
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h is  own in it ia t iv e *  Admiral von Hintzef the German M inister* 
ca lled  upon Wilson early in  the morning o f the 19th and* in  
company with Mrs* Wilson* d iscussed  the n ecess ity  o f making 
an e ffo r t  to  save Madero9s l i f e *  Wilson and von Hintze then  
paid a v i s i t  to  Huerta and got from him "his word o f honor 
as a caballero and a so ld ier  to  protect the l i f e  o f  h is  
erstw hile  superior."  "In future days," von Hintze to ld  
Wilson* "you w il l  r e a liz e  that by today9s action  you have 
added a la u re l wreath to  the crown o f the United States*  
Wilson paid a second v i s i t  to  Huerta in  the afternoon o f  the  
some day ( a l l  o f  t h is  prior to  Madero9s le g a l deposition) to  
obtain guarantees and an explanation of the k i l l in g  of 
Gustavo Madero* This la t t e r  event undoubtedly made Wilson 
f e e l  uncomfortable about the fa te  o f the former President* 
Instead of g iv in g  him a c lear  answer* Huerta turned to  Wilson 
for advice* He asked Wilson whether he thought Madero should 
be committed to  an insane asylum or sent out o f the country*
"I replied*" Wilson wired the Department* "that he ought to  
do that which was best for the peace of the country." This 
sounds cyn ical and i t  in d ica te s  how l i t t l e  Wilson cared about 
the fa te  o f Madero but the Ambassador had taken the trouble
^H earing -  Subcommittee on U*S* C itizens in  Mexico, 
66th  Congress* 2nd Session; L etter from Admiral von Hintze* 
German M inister to  China* to  Henry Lane Wilson* January 3, 
1916* 2274* le t*  Wilson was represented la te r  as having 
made "• • • only the most perfunctory verbal and u n o ffic ia l  
representations respecting  the sa fe ty  o f Madero* • • *" to  
Huerta. Murray* "Huerta and th e Two W ilsons," Hamers Weekly. 
March 25, 1916*
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to  inquire about the matter more than once and cer ta in ly  was 
not abandoning the ousted leader to  a planned murder. I t  
; should be remembered that Wilson was not alone in  h is  view
i
that Madero was not e n tire ly  sane. The choice Huerta o f­
fered  was not between l i f e  and death but as between two 
measures of protection  for the ex-P resident. The idea o f  
committing Madero to  an asylum was not surprising at a l l  to  
the American Ambassador and the suggestion o f h is  being 
allowed to  leave the country may even have been a b it  d is ­
ta s te fu l to  him sin ce  Madero might reach powerful ears with 
h is  com plaints. I t  would be absurd to  assume that the "peace 
o f the country" would be assured by a m ysterious murder of  
Madero. I t  would in jure Huerta's chances o f being le g a lly  
recognised. I t  i s  not certa in  that Huerta was aware o f t h is ,  
but the Ambassador would be.
The Decena TrAgica was o f f i c ia l ly  terminated that night 
when Congress exacted resign ation s from Madero and SuAres and
made Huerta actin g  President by a stroke o f co n stitu tio n a l  
15f ic t io n .  Immense r e l i e f  was f e l t  by foreigners in  the  
c i ty .  The s ie g e , with i t s  consequent p e r il to  inhab itants, 
lack of food, water and proper sa n ita tio n , and the stench of  
dead bodies in  the s tr e e ts  had ended. Nothing but p raise  
could be heard for  the American Ambassador. The Embassy had
^H uerta was appointed M inister of Gobernaci$n by ex- 
Foreign M inister Pedro Lascurain who had been made President 
for  some twenty or th ir ty  minutes in  order to  p lace Huerta 
in  le g a l l in e  fo r  the p o s it io n .
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become the haven of refuge and the Ambassador had risked his 
own life and those of his staff many f : s on behalf of the
foreigners of all nationalities, bej especially solicitous
of the welfare of his own countrymen* He had set up an 
emergency hospital, a bank and other necessities in the Em­
bassy and his prompt and effective leadership in this phase 
of the Decena Trialca is unquestioned even by his sharpest 
critics* Perhaps if he had not had so many urgent details 
to look after he could have exercised more caution in the 
wording of his dispatches. Credit is also due Mrs* Wilson 
who directed Red Cross activities, distributed milk and per­
formed other needed services.
The means by which Victoriano Huerta came to power, 
though brutal, treacherous and legally questionable, were by 
no means unusual in Latin America* Far from experienced in 
administrative and political matters, Huerta was nevertheless 
rough and shrewd* A rather steady alcoholic he was now 
drunk with power. He was now beyond the point of caring 
what happened to Madero and SuArez* Having won approval 
from the American Ambassador, he gave little evidence hence­
forward of worrying about what Americans, or any other for- «
signers (even including Wilson), thought of his seizure of 
power* But while the people of Mexico City rejoiced in new­
found peace and congratulated the parties to the agreement, 
Madero and Suarez waited fearfully in prison in the National 
Palace, hoping to be sent into exile* There is little reason
1S3
to suppose that Huerta did not intend to allow them to leave 
the country* The "law of flight" had been used on Gustavo 
Madero* Huerta could have disposed of the two executives in 
the same way just as easily. Indeed, if he intended a 
crime, why had he not ordered them shot during the arrest?
Ambassador Wilson had, moreover, persistently warned 
Huerta that he had grave responsibilities in this respect.
It would hardly be possible to assert that the Ambassador 
used every scrap of influence at his disposal to prevent the 
deaths of the ex-President and Vice-President. On the other 
hand, whether or not he could have saved their lives is a 
matter of opinion. Wilson had the backing of the Department 
of State in accepting Huerta*s coup as a fait accompli. Un­
doubtedly the Department, as well as the Ambassador, was 
more concerned with maintaining a regime that could offer 
stability in Mexico than with the fate of the deposed officials. 
Wilson must have realized, however, that the chances of rec­
ognition of Huerta would be small if foul play were dealt
Madero. It would appear that Huerta also understood this.
The State Department was concerned that it be clearly under­
stood by both. Knox wired that:
While it is the general duty of thisGovernment to conserve for use on behalf ofits own citizens (underlining is the author*s) and its national interests the influence it possesses, nevertheless General Huerta*s consulting you as to the treatment of Madero tends to give you a certain responsibility in the matter. It, moreover, goes without saying that cruel treatment of the ex-Presi­
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dent would injure, in the tyea of the world, the reputation of Mexican civili­zation and this Government earnestly hopes to hear of no such treatment and hopes to hear tha£ he has been dealt with in a manner £the original of this latter phrase which was lined out read "had supposed that exile would be the disposal2/ con­sistent wi" ’
discretion make use of these ideas,in your conversation with General Huerta*16
The above is an amazing essay in mildness* There are 
no such phrases here as "strongest possible terms" or 
"definite responsibility." Moreover, the only message in 
this wire (which was sent the day following the resignations 
of the former government) that might be considered as in­
struction is directly contradictory! Wilson is told that he 
has a certain responsibility and in the next paragraph is 
instructed not to assume responsibility! In order to make 
any sense out of these phrases it must be assumed that Knox 
was reminding Wilson that he (Wilson) had unfortunately 
placed himself in a position of personal responsibility and 
that he might make known the feeling of the United States,
^Records of the Department of State; Knox to Wilson, February 20, 1913* Yet, according to Stirling. Los Ultlmos Dias. 520, Madero and Su$rez exchanged the following words while in prison:"Madero - Somos hoy simples ciudadanos y debemos buscar protecci5n en las leyes: 4No locree usted asi Minlstro?Suarez - La flnica proteccidn eficaz seria la del Cuerpo Diplomatics*"
derliningWit ho un-your
185
w ithout, however, putting the Department in  any o f f i c ia l  
p o s itio n . Whatever in terp reta tion  i s  placed on i t ,  i t  was 
fa r  from a mandate to  use the f u l l  diplom atic power o f a 
great and in f lu e n t ia l  country to  protect important Mexican 
c i t i s e n s .
Arrangements were made for the two men, accompanied by 
the Cuban and Chilean M in isters, to  be sent to  Vera Cruz by 
tr a in  where they could board a Cuban ship; but these ar­
rangements, to  be carried out two hours a fte r  the P resid en t's  
resig n a tio n , were can celled . The Madero fam ily waited at 
th e ra ilroad  s ta tio n  where a sp ec ia l tra in  was in  readiness  
fo r  them on the night o f the 19th of February, Madero and 
Su4res were not d elivered , Huerta's explanation was that he 
had gotten news from Vera Cruz that an uprising was to  be 
staged there as soon as Madero arrived. No doubt i t  was 
remembered th at Madero had been sent out o f the country pre­
viously* He was not one to  know when the game was over, 
Wilson a lso  received  a message the next day from the Consul 
at Vera Cruz which read su cc in c tly ; "Do not allow  ex -P resi-
dent Madero to  come here now," This message was sent to  Knox 
17as w ell ' and was followed two days la te r  by a f u l l  explana­
t io n , The Consul said  that General Velasco had to ld  him that 
i f  Madero came to  Vera Cruz he would recognize him as P resi­
dent and that he had organized volunteers. Since the sup-
Canada to Knox, February 20, 1913*
186
porters o f  Dfaz were a lso  making preparations a disturbance
18would have been caused.
I t  appears that Wilson already had m isgivings about 
Huerta. He was no longer so confident o f the future* "A 
wicked despotism haft fa lle n ,"  he to ld  Knox, "but what the 
future contains cannot noW be sa fe ly  p r e d i c t e d * M a d e r o * s  
future was, o f course, very insecure. He had a number of 
enemies including the fa m ilie s  o f the men he had shot w hile  
they were r e s is t in g  arrest and even Huerta had been taken 
to  task by him. Huerta was, n ev erth e less , reassuring about 
h is  own fe e l in g . Wilson t e s t i f i e d  in  1920, that Huerta had 
to ld  him "• • .th a t he had no grievance whatever against 
Madero, that he never received  anything but kindness at h is  
hands, and that h is  great problem was to  get him out o f the  
country and get him out o f the s itu a tio n  e n t ir e ly ." 2  ̂ Either  
Wilson was try in g  to  strengthen h is  own p o sitio n  or he had 
been to ld  contradictory s to r ie s  by Huerta, because the new 
President had complained to  the Ambassador on the afternoon  
o f the 19th, that Francisco and Gustavo had tr ie d  to  a s s a s s i-
lg Ib id *t February 23, 1913*
^ Ib id . 1 Wilson to  Knox, February 20, 1913*
20Hearing -  Subcommittee on U*3* C itizen s in  Mexico, 
66th  Congress, 2nd S ession , 2273* Madero had refused  to  
appoint Huerta M inister o f War because o f h is  habitual drunk­
enness and Huerta was aware o f  that fa c t;  Records of the  
Department o f S ta te; William B. Hale to  Woodrow Wilson, June
18, 1913*
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nate him tw ice and had held him prisoner fo r  one day*"^l 
Such "kindness" would be d i f f ic u l t  fo r  Huerta to  forgive*
I t  might not make him determined to  k i l l  Francisco, espe­
c ia l ly  in  view o f h is  own p o sitio n ; but i t  would not produce 
the sort o f mental clim ate that would lead  to  extraordinary  
caution on behalf o f the ousted executive*
On the afternoon o f February 20, a fte r  v is i t in g  her 
husband in  prison , Mrs* Madero went to  see the American Am­
bassador to ask fo r  h is  help in  saving Madero*s l i f e *  She 
was accompanied by her s is te r - in - la w , Mercedes* Wilson 
l is te n e d  im patiently w hile the two women implored him to use 
h is  in flu en ce to  save the l iv e s  o f the prisoners* Although 
he explained to  them that he had received  assurances o f the  
sa fety  o f  Francisco Madero they were not sa t is f ie d *  They 
did not b e liev e  that Wilson r e a lly  understood Just how un­
trustworthy was the man who now held the power o f l i f e  and 
death over the ex-President* Nor was Wilson very ta c t fu l  in  
h is  conversation with them* Mrs* Madero, as a la s t  r e so r t, 
asked that the Ambassador forward a personal message from the  
fam ily to  President Taft; but Wilson only half-prom ised to  
send i t ,  saying that i t  was unnecessary to  do so* As re la ted  
by th ese  women to  more sympathetic ea rs , the story o f t h is  
in terview  grew to  such proportions as to  make Wilson out some
2*Ib id * t Wilson to  Knox, February 19* 1913* F ile  no. 
312.00/6271. Gustavo may have borne the blame for a c ts  that 
should have been a ttr ib u ted  to  Francisco* See Prlda, From 
PfIPgSitff &  A wgfty, 123*
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22kind of an ogre. I t  would seem that Wilson could have 
been le s s  cruel in  h is  a tt itu d e , but Mrs. Madero could a lso  
have approached him with more wisdom. I t  was no help to  her 
cause, for  in stan ce , to  r a ise  the point o f Pino Su&rez as 
Suirez* reputation was one th ing  that had contributed to  
Madero*s lo s s  of popularity . Wilson, as noted above, de-
22(jruening, Mexico and I t s  H eritage. 570-573 and 
n. 572-573# Gruening g ives an account o f an interview  be­
tween Mrs. Madero and Robert Hammond Murray which i s  sta ted  
to  have taken place on August 15* 1916, in  which Mrs. Madero 
recounted her experience with the Ambassador. Murray, who 
was the Mexico correspondent of the New York World at the  
tim e, c e r t if ie d  the in terview  to  Gruening as having been 
sworn to  by Mrs. Madero before the v ice-con su l o f the United 
S ta tes in  Mexico City on April 27, 1927. Conveniently, the  
c e r t if ie d  o r ig in a l was in  the possession  o f Murray and copy­
righted by him. In the context in  which Gruening p laces i t ,  
the interview  i s  highly damaging to  Wilson. He i s  reported  
as saying that he knew a l l  along th at Madero would be over­
thrown. He had, as we know, predicted ju st th a t . The 
statement a ttr ib u ted  to  him, however, that he did not warn 
Madero because then Madero would have prevented i t ,  appears 
to  be apocryphal. I t  would have been ju st the sort o f th ing  
that Gruening and Murray would have wanted the former Ambas­
sador to  say. B e ll says nothing about such a statem ent.
A much fa ir e r  account o f  Mrs. Madero*s v i s i t  to  
Wilson i s ,  indeed, given by B e ll ,  Pol i t i c a l  Shame. 313-314, 
although he had l i t t l e  respect fo r  Wilson e ith e r . After 
presenting h is  account of the conversation. B e ll adds:
"These are the e s s e n t ia ls  o f the in terview . Mrs. 
Madero derived no comfort from Mr. W ilsonfs expressions be­
cause she appreciated the s itu a t io n , and knew that the Am­
bassador must be re ly in g  upon empty words i f  he r e a lly  
b elieved  that her husband would be e f f ic ie n t ly  protected by 
those who had overthrown him. That he did b e liev e  what he 
had said  to  her there can be no doubt, though h is  error now 
seems to  have la in  at the most d istan t extrem ity of reason­
able judgement i f  not beyond."
S t ir lin g , Los Ultimos D ias. 546, g ives a version of  
the in terv iew , emphasising the prolonged conversation over 
the m erits o f Madero and Su&rez. In th is  version  Mrs. Madero 




Wilson simply told Mrs* Madero that he had been in­
structed to say by the Department - that he could not assume 
responsibility* As to the message she wanted delivered to 
Taft, it would have been highly irregular procedure to send 
it and would have placed the Ambassador in an embarrassing 
position* There would have been the natural assumption that 
Wilson was not doing everything that he could do to prevent 
a tragedy; and if, as was possible, Huerta should discover 
such a communication from the Embassy there would be evi­
dence that he was not trusted and Wilson*s influence would 
be at an end* He did report the interview*
The Ambassador may have been stirred by this plea to 
seek additional assurances from Huerta* It is not clear how 
many times he went to see Huerta that day* His own account 
indicates at least two trips* He relates that he had just 
come from a visit to Huerta in company with the German Min­
ister and had found Mrs* Madero waiting in the Embassy*
Then he says that he went to see Huerta a second time* It 
may be that the first visit is to be identified with that 
made on the 19th, certified to by the German Minister him­
self; but one account of the Interview says that Wilson
2^See note 14* Cf* Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes. 283-284* It was given out in the press that Wilson and the Japanese Minister had gone to see Huerta to tell him that if Madero were executed they would retire from the country* Prado, Revoluci6n en Mexico. 268.
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was v is i t in g  Huerta when Mrs* Madero ca lled  at the Embassy 
and that she had to  wait u n til he returned* At any ra te , at 
s ix  o fclock on the afternoon of the interview  he wired Knox 
that he had v is ite d  Huerta at the request o f Mrs* Madero, 
that the German M inister had gone with him and that they had 
u n o ff ic ia lly  requested that the "utmost precaution be taken 
to  prevent the taking of h is ^Iadero, s7’ l i f e  or the l i f e  of 
the Vice President except by due process of la w ." Huerta ex­
plained to  Wilson that he had not sent Madero and Su£rez o f f  
on the previous night because he had feared an attack on the 
tra in  for which he did not wish to  assume resp o n sib ility *
The im plication  i s  that Huerta was concerned for  
Madero*s sa fety  when he was r e a lly  making certain  that the  
former President did not escape to  lead a counter-revolution*  
Huerta added that Madero and Su&rez would be guarded with 
every precaution and that they would be tried* He did not 
know what the charges would be* Wilson informed Knox that 
the prisoners were s t i l l  in  the National Palace and that 
he understood that they were being subjected to severe 
treatment* "This feature* • • ," said  Wilson, "should be 
brought to the a tten tion  of the President and * * . in ­
stru ction s be sent* • • for me to  deal with the matter of 
r e p r isa ls  with General Dfaz as an intermediary with General 
Huerta*" The Ambassador recommended that the American war 
v e sse ls  not be given the d iscretio n  o f leaving  Mexican
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waters#2if Wilson recounts that he a lso  made representations
to  the M inister of Foreign A ffa ir s , the M inister of Fomento
and the M inister o f War and that he offered  Lascurain and
25Ernesto Madero asylum in the Embassy, Lascurain had que­
ried  Wilson about th is  ea r lier  in  the Decena Tr&gica and 
Wilson had been in stru cted  by Washington to allow  temporary 
refuge in  the Embassy only to p o l i t ic a l  refugees# Wilson 
has been c r it ic iz e d  for not o ffer in g  asylum to  Francisco 
but the reader w ill  not need to  be reminded that that in d i­
vidual would never have made sjuch a request#
Why had Wilson asked for in stru ctio n s to deal with Dfaz? 
The d isp o sitio n  o f the prisoners was the personal responsi­
b i l i t y  o f Huerta# , I f  there was some kind of prior agreement 
between the two fa c tio n s  which only Huerta refused to accede 
to  verb a lly , then Dfaz might be the man to see# Certainly  
Dfaz had some reason to  want to spare Madero's l i f e  but i t  
may not have appeared so to him# At any rate , he refused to  
take r e sp o n sib ility  for the fa lle n  leaders#2  ̂ Meanwhile, the
2**Itecords o f the Department o f State; Wilson to Knox, 
February 20, 1913. F ile  no. 812,00/6277.
25'W ilson, Diplomatic Episodes. 2&U*
In an interview  with U niversal. Mexico C ity, on 
February 19th. published on February 20tn7D iaz was asked:
wi(3ull es la  suerte que espera a lo s  sefSores Madero y 
Pino Sufirez?
"-No lo  s£# No son mis prisioneros# fist&n en poder 
del seflor General Huerta y e l dispondrfi de e llo s#  Por lo  
demis la s  responsAbilidados lo s  asumimos juntos#"
I t  i s  c lear that while Diaz and Huerta had planned 
jo in t  r e sp o n sib ility  for the government, no agreement had been 
reached regarding the prisoners#
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two prisoners remained in  a temporary and uncomfortable 
prison at the National Palace w hile the Madero fam ily and 
the Spanish M inister sought to have them made more comforta­
b le and to  arrange for th e ir  e x i le .  Huerta seems to  have 
been occupied with other th in g s. I t  i s  doubtful i f  anything 
more could have been accomplished by advising him further o f  
the danger. I t was w idely known that he was never e n tir e ly  
sober. Wilson, meanwhile, i f  he were as w ell aware o f Latin 
American p o l i t ic a l  psychology as he professed to  be, would 
asstane simply that i f  Madero*s sa fe ty  could be assured u n til  
he were brought to  t r ia l  then the standing p o l i t ic a l  custom 
would be observed whereby he would be given some lig h t  pun­
ishment or sent out o f the country, thus allowing those who 
had served him to  take th e ir  p laces alongside the ru ling  
government. Of course i f  Madero should be sentenced to  
death, t h is  would be by "due process o f law" and one could 
not in ter fereI
The Washington government had no lack o f warning that 
something unpleasant might happen to  Madero and that i f  i t  
did the adm inistration might be held resp on sib le . A band o f  
senators from Texas addressed a request for  the Department to
use every leg itim a te  step  in  in tern a tio n a l law to  save
27Madero. On the day that th is  was received , and undoubtedly 
with W ilson's added warning in  hand, Knox wired the Ambassador
^Records of the Department of State; Morris Shepardto Knox, February 21, 1913*
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that the President was gratified to know that there was no 
prospect of injury to the deposed President or Vice-Presi­
dent or their families.2** What could Knox have thought that 
Wilson meant when he used the phrase "severely treated?"
Why would Wilson ask for instructions to deal with Dfaz if 
Huerta could be completely trusted? Furthermore, Knox had a 
telegram, sent by Wilson at 5 P*M# on the 21st, stating that 
he had been asked by Madero's mother to intercede with 
Huerta to spare the men and allow them to go to Europe since 
this was an "express condition attached to their resigna­
tions# "2̂
The accounts of the exact manner in which Madero and 
Su&rez met their deaths are as numerous as they are con­
flicting. Everyone had his own version of the killing and 
many professed to know the inside story# The only person
Ibid.! Knox to Wilson, February 21, 1913* The press in Mexico City attached greater importance to this communication. El Pais, in a story under current dateline from Washington said:"En los circulos diplomfiticos corre con insistanciael rumor de que el Presidents Taft ha enviado lnstruccionesal Embajador de los Estados Unidos en Mexico. Henry LaneWilson, para que en nombre del Gobierno Americano, notifique al General Huerta, Presidente Interno, de aquella RepCtblica, que los Estados Unidos vieron con desagrado que el ex- Presidente Madero fuera ejecutado sumariamente, considerando que en su actual situaci6n debe mirfirsele como inofensivo y que por humanidad tiene derecho a que si se le sujeta aProceso, goce de todo el apoyo de las leyes mexicanaa#" rado, RevoluciSn en Mexico, 267-266#
29Records of the Department of State; Wilson to Knox,February 21, 1913#
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who could have given a correct version , perhaps, was 
Francisco Cirdenas who commanded the escort in  which Madero 
and SuArez were transferred  from the National Palace to  the  
Penitentiary where they would be more "comfortable** The 
irony in  the event was that i t  took place on George Washing­
to n 's  birthday, February 22, 1913* Madero was remembered by 
many as having been able to v isu a liz e  Washington before h is  
very eyes, so great a respect did he have fo r  America's revo­
lu tionary hero* He lik ed  to  think o f h im self as fo llow ing  
in  Washington's footsteps* Nothing could have emphasized 
more c lea r ly  the h is to r ic a l dilemma o f the ap p lication  of  
American con stitu tion a lism  to  Latin American p ractice  and 
custom*
Huerta and perhaps Dfaz had been Invited  to  a celebra­
tio n  in  the American finbaasy on the evening o f  the 22nd*^
^ An a r t ic le  in  Not!piano Mexioano. Mexico C ity, 
February 22, 1913, reported that Dias had "perhaps" been 
in v ited  also* The meeting was a lso  assumed to  have some 
s ig n ifica n ce ; "Esta invitaoiA n es un reconocimiento tS c ito  
del nuevo gobierno s eg tin eschuch&ramos ayer de la b io s  de 
algunos p o litico s* "  Although the a f fa ir  was described as a 
"tea," B e ll ,  P o l i t ic a l  Shame* 322, c a l ls  i t  a "banquet." 
Whatever i t  was. the Ambassador was unwise, one may even say 
foolhardy, in  allow ing i t  to  take place s in ce  he had no 
In stru ction s to  deal with Huerta except as the only apparent 
government* However, on the b a sis  o f private correspond­
ence, John Lind la te r  connected Wilson with Madero*s a s s a s s i­
nation in  two separate speeches* Faced with a court su it  
on the occasion o f press reports o f h is  f i r s t  speech, he 
backed down and refused to accept re sp o n sib ility  for  the
"reports" o f h is  speeches in  the press* Wilson took th is  as 
an apology and dropped the su it*  George M* Stephenson, John 
Lind o f Minnesota (M inneapolis; The U niversity o f Minnesota
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William B. Hale, Woodrow Wilson*a special agent, attempted 
a connection between this event and the murder of Madero 
just a few hours later but there is no evidence that Wilson 
had any inkling of foul play* The known facts are that 
Madero and Suarez were shot down after the cars in which 
they were carried had passed the gate of the Penitentiary, 
Little credence was ever given the story that they were 
murdered while still at the National Palace, The Ambassador 
was incensed when he heard of the crime. He has been con­
demned for accepting the governments version so quickly but 
he had his reasons, as he later explained to Knox,
First of all, the Ambassador had little love for Madero 
and one could hardly expect him to shed tears over the exe­
cution of the ex-President, Secondly, he accepted the view 
that Madero*s deposition was complete. The ex-President 
was now a private citizen. Thirdly, Wilson was anxious to 
have Mexico tranquilized and to complete the recognition of 
a government that could keep order, even if it were not all 
that Wilson would want it to bej (the popular idea that 
Huerta and Wilson were admirers of each other is a myth). 
Finally, Wilson*a refusal to accept the government*s version 
would have involved an insinuation that the government had 
failed in a criminal way. As Wilson later put it, private 
citizens were getting killed rather regularly in Mexico.
Also, it will be remembered that he had no official respon­
sibility for Madero, according to the express instructions of
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the Department of S tate which, i t  must he assumed, was not 
actin g  contrary to  the p o licy  o f President Taft*
The government's version  o f the a f fa ir  was simple* 
Arrangements had been made to  tra n sfer  the two men to  the 
P enitentiary where they would be more comfortable -  and a lso  
more secure -  u n til public passions had cooled* De la  Barra 
had n o t if ie d  Wilson o f th is  plan on the evening o f the 22nd, 
no doubt w hile attending the function in  the Embassy* The 
tra n sfer  took place about 11s30* The escort was attacked by 
unknown a ssa ila n ts  and the prisoners were shot*
The Ambassador had some h e s ita tio n  in  proceeding in  
regular r e la tio n s  with Huerta sin ce  in  t h is  w ire, sent at 
one o 9clock in  the afternoon of the 23rd, he sa id  that he 
had to ld  de la  Barra (now Foreign M inister) that the sched­
uled reception , by h is  government, o f the Diplomatic Corps 
on the 24th would not take place u n til the matter had been 
understood by the Corps*”** By four o ’clock he had decided 
to  ask Knox to  accept th e government's version  due to  the  
pressure ( o f  businesg^ °n the Embassy at t h is  moment. An 
hour ea r lie r  he reported that the government had lib era ted
31Records of the Department o f S tate; Wilson to  Knox, 
February 23, 1913* Sent at 1 P*M*
32Ib id . t  Wilson to  Knox, February 23, 1913* Sent at
4 P«M* Wilson did not leave the Embassy grounds a l l  day on 
the 23rd although i t  was reported in co rrectly  that he had 
gone to  the P en itentiary to  v er ify  the deaths o f the two men* 
Independlsnte. February 24, 1913*
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a l l  imprisoned deputies and that i t  had decided to  do a l l  
m ilitary  honors to  Madero and 3u&rez before turning th e ir  
bodies over to  th e ir  fa m ilies  for b u r ia l* ^  An hour la te r ,  
at f iv e  o9clock , Wilson gave evidence that he expected 
trouble?
In case the atmosphere c lears measura­
bly in  the next two days, I recommend that 
the Department consider the d e s ir a b il ity  o f  
sending to  th is  c ity  the commanding o f f ic e r s  
of our boats /th e  navy would have been horri­
f ie d  at th is  reference to  sh ips as "boatsf/ 
in  Vera Cruz with the marines and such
s a ilo r s  as may be deemed advisable* I think
the e f fe c t  would be ex ce llen t and i f  the De­
partment approves I . can make the necessary  
arrangements here*34
Wilson had only accepted the government9s version  of 
the k i l l in g  for convenience* He was angry that such a th ing
had taken p lace and when de la  Barra paid a v i s i t  to  the
Embassy on the afternoon o f the 24th Wilson talked to  him in  
such scald ing terms that i t  was heard by "persons in  the  
adjoining rooms*19 Wilson was overheard using such terms as 
that the "incident smelled to  Heaven as the b lackest of 
infamies" and he a lso  to ld  de la  Barra that the bloodshed 
would r e f le c t  on him (de la  Barra) and upon every member of
^^Records o f the Department of S tate; Wilson to  Knox, 
February 23, 1913* Sent at 3 P*M*
^^bid*r Wilson to Knox, February 23, 1913* Sentat 5 P.M.
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35the new government.
As for the c a llin g  in  of American fo rces , Knox must 
have found i t  d i f f ic u l t  to  b e liev e  that the Ambassador s t i l l  
had not discovered h is  abandonment by h is  own superiors*  
Knox's answer to  W ilson's request ended in  a note o f  the  
purest sarcasm:
At some future date when the s itu a tio n  
at Mexico City sh a ll have s e t t le d  down and 
circumstances should be such that t h is  Gov­
ernment would be disposed to  accord formal 
recogn ition  as a p rovision al Government to  
those now in  de fa cto  au th ority , the Depart­
ment w il l  be ready to  consider the sugges­
tio n  o f a v i s i t  of ceremony by the Commanding 
O fficers o f  the warships at Vera Cruz; but 
the Department cannot at present r id  i t s e l f  
of the fe e lin g  that even then i t  would 
probably be unwise to  have them accompanied 
by marines and so ld ie r s .^ &
The incid en t o f Madero*s death upset Wilson and h is  
plans for a smooth tran sition *  Adee received  a communica­
tio n  la te r  from a man who said  that he had been in  the 
Embassy on the day (Saturday) o f Madero's death and that 
Wilson showed confidence that he had prevented rep risa ls*  
This w riter to ld  Adee that Wilson was not only shocked but
^ B e l l ,  P o l i t ic a l  Shame. 320-321* Such evidence as 
th is  seems purposely to  have been overlooked by those who 
have follow ed B ell so fa ith fu lly  in  those passages in  which 
the Ambassador i s  placed in  an unfavorable lig h t*
^Records of the Department of State; Knox to Wilson,February 24, 1913*
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that he su ffered  In health  from the news o f the murder* ^
N evertheless, the campaign to  make him responsib le d ir e c tly  
or in d ir e c tly  for the murders began almost at once.
Upon r e f le c t io n , the Ambassador decided that Huerta was 
not d ir e c tly  responsib le for  the deaths, though he enter­
ta ined  the suspicion that the General had been ca re le ss  in  
le t t in g  the news o f the proposed tran sfer  of th e ir  persons
leak  out somewhere or had fa ile d  to  provide an adequate
38e sco r t. At the tim e, as noted above, Wilson was more con­
cerned with the e f fe c t  on Mexico* He was re liev ed  to  be 
able to  report on the 24th  that "• * * evidently  the tragedy 
of yesterday has produced no e f fe c t  on the public mind*'*
All was quiet*-^ Although a shock to  fo r e ig n e r s ,^  the
April 7, . 73.
3®Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes. 283.
^Records of the Department o f S tate; Wilson to  Knox, 
February 24* 1913*
^ S tron ge, the B r itish  M inister at Mexico City wired 
the B r it ish  Embassy in  Washington on the 21st that de la  Barra 
had given general assurance that Madero and h is  fam ily were 
to  be spared* Ib id .t  Memorandum, Department o f S ta te ,
D iv ision  of Latin American A ffa irs; Informal note, Dearing 
to  Nelson, February 21, 1913*
Adee from Mexico City,
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killing was no great surprise,^ The most important mistake 
made by the American Ambassador was to endorse the govern­
ment *s version so readily. It was his eagerness to have 
Huerta recognized by the United States in the short time 
left that caused him to neglect the moral side of the ques­
tion,^
It will be noted that in the last communication from 
Knox Wilson had only been assured that "at some future date" 
the recognition of Huerta might be "considered." As Woodrow 
Wilson would become President of the United States on March 
4th this "future date" would have to be within a few days 
at most and a cursory reading of the telegram shows that 
Knox had no such immediacy in mind,^ In New York, Woodrow
^The killing was discussed freely in Chihuahua on the day before it happened. Ibid.: Letcher to Knox, March 1,1913* This is an indication that the feeling against Madero had been so strong in much of the general public that most people assumed that he could not be allowed to live.This does not prove, of course, that the government (Huerta) deliberately staged the killing. As noted above, Madero had many enemies.
4-2Knox said later that he and Taft would have recog­nized Huerta had they known that Woodrow Wilson was not going to do so.
^See note 36, It was not the means by which Huerta came to power that concerned the Department of 3tate but the question of whether Huerta would accept the claims previously rejected by the Madero administration. Wilson claimed later that he had exacted promises from Huerta to honor them but he never really received any word of sufficient authority to submit to the Department,
W ilson’s only comment on the murders so far had been "It* 
too bad."^"
^Washington P ost. Bebruary 24, 1913
IX
THE TWO WILSONS AND THE QUESTION OF HUERTA'S RECOGNITION
It is time that historians stopped making excuses for 
the diplomacy of Woodrow Wilson in Mexico. The means by 
which Victoriano Huerta came to power were not essentially 
different from those employed by hundreds of other dictators 
in Latin America. President Wilson's non-recognition policy 
had to be achieved in a manner far short of that high degree 
of morality that Wilson wanted to inject into international 
politics. The first by-product of this policy was the per­
secution of Henry Lane Wilson.
Two days before Madero was killed, Ambassador Wilson, 
accepting the new government of Mexico as constitutional, 
queried the Department on the matter of recognition.* Knox 
countered with a warning that in the light of the past two 
years there must be strong evidence that outstanding claims 
were to be settled before such a course could be considered. 
In order to obtain such guarantees Wilson was given authority 
to circumvent de la Barra, the Foreign Minister, and go di-
lARecords of the Department of State; Wilson to Knox, February 20, 1913* File no. 612.00/6287. Huerta never asked for de .jure recognition during these days. His title was ' "The interim Constitutional President of Mexico." He was recognised as such by other powers. Ibid.; Fred Morris Dearing. Memorandum on Recognition, April 16, 1913. File no. 612.00/8066.
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r e c t ly  to  Huerta. Meanwhile the Secretary o f S tate put out
fe e le r s  to  find  out how the other foreign  governments were
3
rea ctin g . Wilson declined Knox’s suggestion  that he deal 
d ir e c t ly  with Huerta, saying that he had known de la  Barra 
for years and preferred to  deal with him -  a procedure that 
disturbed Knox because he was afraid  i t  would re su lt  in  
delays. Wilson was o p tim istic , however, over the prospect.^
A v er ita b le  in tern ation a l honeymoon was indeed taking shape
5
on the very day that was to  be Madero*s l a s t .  The Attorney-
Ib id .;  Knox to  Wilson, February 21, 1913. Knox, as 
w ell as the succeeding adm inistration , mistakenly assumed a 
c lo se  personal friendsh ip  between H. L. Wilson and Huerta.
The Ambassador favored Huerta’s provision al government. not 
Huerta h im self. The idea that he was c lo ser  to  Huerta than 
to  de la  Barra i s  based on poor lo g ic  as w ell as h is  own 
testim ony both at the time and la te r .  Taft Papers (Unassem­
b led); H. L. Wilson to  the New York World. July 5, 1916.
The Department’ s motive In try in g  to  s te e r  Wilson 
d ir e c t ly  to  Huerta was i t s  b e l ie f  that de la  Barra character­
i s t i c a l l y  clung to  an "unessential vantage" in  g iv in g  "non­
committal assurances" out o f a "sort o f mistaken pride and 
p atrio tism ,"  which i t  were b etter  fo r  the rea l good o f the  
nation to  forego. Ib id .s  Fred M. Dearing, Memorandum on 
R ecognition, April lo ,  1913. F ile  no. £12.00/8066,
^The Mexican M inister in  Washington to ld  Knox that 
B rita in  had said  i t  would not recognize any government that 
was not e lected  by the people. Knox in stru cted  the London 
Embassy to  try  to  fin d  out ju st  what had been said  to  the  
Mexican M inister th ere . Ib id .t Laughlin to  Knox and Knox to  
the American Embassy, London, February 21st and 24th respec­
t iv e ly .
^Ibid. ! Wilson to  Knox, February 22, 1913.
Îb id . ; The Embassy was so strongly  in favor o f  
Huerta that the Department f e l t  i t s e l f  deprived o f the 
a b il i ty  to  use recogn ition  as a weapon in  securing acknowl­
edgement o f claim s. Ib id .? Fred M. Dearing. Memorandum on 
R ecognition, April 16, W lj . F ile  no. 812.00/8066.
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General of the United S tates received  a telegram reading: 
"Everything fin ish ed  s a t is fa c to r i ly ,  new s itu a tio n  strongly  
augurs prompt, peaceful settlem ents."^  The murder of Madero, 
aside from i t s  inhumane asp ects, threw the w e ll-o ile d  ma­
chinery of in tern ation a l harmony out of gear*
Wilson learned from the Secretary of the B r it ish  leg a ­
tio n  that B rita in  would probably not now recognize Huerta*
The American Ambassador was disposed, as we have seen, to  
take the word of de la  Barra that the government had not 
been d ir e c tly  responsib le for the tragedy* He urged the
Department to  consider the matter closed  as th is  would be
7
of " in fin ite  value in  these d i f f ic u l t  moments*" The Mexi­
can M inister in  London, however, characterized the new gov­
ernment as "revengeful" and "self-seek ing*"  The B r itish  
government was in  the process o f adopting the p o licy  o f non­
recogn ition  u n til Huerta could show a co n stitu tio n a l e le c ­
tion*^
As la te  as February 21st, when the Diplomatic Corps 
met with Huerta, none of W ilsonvs colleagues possessed in -
^Records o f the Department o f S tate; Senator 
C aatellot to George V* Wickersham, February 22, 1913*
^Ib ld . : Wilson to  Knox, February 24, 1913*
eXbld. i  F ile  nos. $12.00/6372 and 6374.
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9atructions to recognize him. The American Ambassador had a
problem on his hands. His colleagues were waiting to see 
what the United States would do. Those who deluded them­
selves with the assumption that Wilson had great influence 
with Huerta and was responsible for his boldness in ousting 
Madero were puzzled that the Ambassador did not round out 
the picture by persuading Huerta to take immediate measures 
of pacification. Wilson, however, was dealing with de la 
Barra as a representative of the cientffico group who would 
supposedly dictate to the dictator just as the advisors of 
Porfirio Dfaz had made use of that old despot. Huerta was 
also faced with uprisings following Madero's deposition 
which he could not immediately quash. Furthermore, Wilson 
probably hoped that Djfaz would emerge as the real power and 
re-establish the regime of his illustrious uncle* But Huerta 
listened to nobody. He took just as much advice as' suited 
him and Ignored the rest* He listened to the Ambassador, 
patted him on the back, (he later accorded Nelson O’Shaugh- 
nessey the same treatment) and then did exactly as he pleased* 
As time went on, he ceased even to do much listening.
Nevertheless, the correspondence of the Department of 
State indicates that observers were correct in believing 
that the Taft policy was popular with Americans in Mexico.^
Wilson to Knox, February 21, 1913* File no.
10B e ll, P o l it ic a l  Shame. 340.
Many who had f led  the country in  March of 1912, had r e ­
turned, Most o f them now b elieved  that a fter  an in i t i a l  
"mopping-up" operation Huerta would be able to  keep order, 
Taft congratulated h im self that he had kept out o f a war 
with Mexico1'*’ and the S tate Department could be sa fe  in  
assuming that Huerta would not meet i t s  demands in  s u ff ic ie n t  
time to  claim recogn ition . Both Taft and Knox were w ell 
clear  o f p o l i t ic a l  c r itic ism  but Wilson had opposed Madero 
almost from the beginning and h is  a ttitu d e  was w ell known. 
Soon a fte r  the adm inistration l e f t  o f f ic e  Knox warned Taft 
not to  g ive Wilson wholehearted approval as th is  would trans­
fe r  the h o s t i le  a ttitu d es  o f  the p o l i t ic a l  opposition from 
Wilson to  Taft* The abandonment o f the Ambassador by h is  
superiors had become complete and e f f e c t iv e .  For a l l  prac­
t i c a l  purposes, Wilson could now assume that he was respon-
^ T a ft  Papers, Letterbook no. S; Taft to  Professor  
J. D, Brannon, Cambridge, M ass., February 27, 1913* "• • *1
am not going to  get in to  a war,w Taft to ld  Brannon, "with 
Mexico. I f  I have not demonstrated that by what I have done 
thus fa r , I have not succeeded very w e ll in  bringing my 
in ten tio n s  c lea r ly  to  the knowledge of the American p eo p le ,n 
Taft could use bold words now.
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12a ib le  to  a new adm inistration.
For the time being, nothing was done beyond obtaining  
some u n o ffic ia l assurances from the Huerta government that 
the American claims would be s e t t le d  for the most part on a 
favorable b a s is . Knox, several years la te r ,  remarked to  
Wilson that i f  Huerta had conceded to  the demands in  f u l l  o f  
the United S tates he would have recommended recogn ition  to  
Taft as la te  as ten o 'c lo ck  on the morning o f March 4th . ^
I t  may be in te r e stin g  at th is  point to  quote from the most 
recent authority on diplom atic r e la tio n s  between the United
^Knox Correspondence, Volume 20; Wilson to  T aft, 
June 3, 1913, Taft to  Knox, June 19, 1913, and an unfinished  
draft o f a l e t t e r  addressed to  Taft by Knox. I t  could not 
be determined whether or not th is  la s t  le t t e r  had been sent 
but i t  may sa fe ly  be assumed that i t ,  or something l ik e  i t ,  
was and i t  does r e f le c t  Knox's view. A lso, Taft did temper 
h is  r e p lie s  to  W ilson. 3ee a lso  Records o f the Department 
o f S tate; Wilson to  Knox, February 26 , 1913, in  which Wilson 
made an appeal for some expression o f approval o f h is  
e ffo r ts  to  get the Huerta government esta b lish ed . Knox 
rep lied  that "The Department perceives no reason to  doubt 
the u sefu ln ess o f such u n o ff ic ia l a c t iv i t ie s  undertaken upon 
i t s  own r e sp o n s ib ility  by the Embassy and always kept w ithin  
the lim its  o f cautious circum spection ." Ib id .;  Knox to  
W ilson, February 23, 1913.
13̂ Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes. 297. See a lso  Arthur 
S. Link, Woodrow Wilson a n d th e  Progressive Era. 1910-1917 
(New York; Harper ana B ros., 19$4), 1 0 8 . Knox s a l 5 t h a t i f  
he had thought Woodrow Wilson was not going to  recognize  
Huerta he and Taft would have recognized Huerta them selves. 
But see a lso  Records o f the Department o f S tate; Knox to  
W ilson, February 23, 1913 where Knox refused to  issu e  any 
public statement at a l l  on the matter of recogn ition .
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States and Mexico:
In the r is e  and f a l l  of Madero from 
1910 to  1913, Henry Lane Wilson spoke for  
the whole United S tates in  Mexico, but un­
fortu n ately  much that he sa id  represented  
nobody but Henry Lane W ilson. During h is  
tenure as Ambassador there were two, and 
sometimes th ree , United S ta tes p o lic ie s ;  
the State Department*s, T aft’ s and the Am­
bassador's own. Taft co n sis ten tly  wanted 
to  preserve con stitu ted  authority; the  
State Department chastised  Wilson and 
warned him against meddling, but in  1913 
they were w illin g  to  back him up i f  (on h is  
own personal r e sp o n s ib ility )  he was su ccess­
fu l;  and, as seen, Wilson was determined to  
unseat h is  bete noire at almost any cost 
and by whatever instruments which came 
conveniently to  hand. He succeeded, but 
the cost to  him, the United S tates and 
Mexico are in c a lc u la b le .1^
This i s  a far  more charitab le  view of Wilson than i s  
usually  given and the author's estim ate, arrived at inde­
pendently, o f W ilson's true p o sitio n  in  the events o f the  
Deoana Tr&tica i s  in  e s se n tia l harmony with the evidence 
presented above. I t  i s  the author's contention, however, 
that Wilson spoke more often  for h is  superiors than for him­
s e l f ,  that Taft and Knox were more concerned with the pro­
te c t io n  o f l i f e  and property than fo r  preserving con stitu ted  
authority and that Wilson was not warned against meddling 
u n til early in  1913 , when the adm inistration had d e f in ite ly  
decided to  leave the problem for the next President of the  
United S ta tes .
14C line, United S ta tes *n4  Maxico. 133*
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The "incalculable cost" to the United States came not 
so much from the Taft-Knox policy as from the negative 
approach to the issue by the Woodrow Wilson administration. 
The incoming President of the United States, so well schooled 
in political science and professing such regard for interna­
tional law in dealing with other countries, stubbornly and 
consciously departed established international practice in 
the present situation.
President Wilson entered upon his office with important 
domestic affairs to be carried out and with preconceived 
notions about Mexico and the American Ambassador. This; 
coupled with the inexperience of William Jennings Bryan in 
diplomacy, resulted in an almost unparalleled persecution of 
Henry Lane Wilson for four grueling months. During this 
period, Ambassador Wilson was largely ignored officially 
while every effort was made to unearth evidence that he had
been responsible for the overthrow and assassination of
15Madero.  ̂ He was subjected to unprecedented embarrassment 
by a flood of amateur sleuths sent out by Bryan and Wilson.
^Recent authorities are agreed that Woodrow Wilson was a dangerous novice in this matter and that he knew nothing fundamentally of Mexico or the Mexicans. See Cline, United States and Mexico. 143. The President was no doubt encouragea by such advice as was rendered by John W. Foster, a^former diplomat to Mexico who reminded him that Porfirio Diaz had not been recognized for eighteen months after he came to power. Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., Box 141; Foster to Woodrow Wilson. July 19, 1913* These papers were used with Mrs. Woodrow Wilson’s permission.
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The President finally dismissed Ambassador Wilson in the 
most humiliating public way* How pleased Madero would have 
beenj
When Woodrow Wilson and Bryan took office the situation 
at Mexico City was fluid* Although public opinion in the 
United States was turned against Huerta by the Madero assas­
sination, (H* L*) Wilson as we have seen, could hardly do 
otherwise than to continue to treat Huerta’s as the de facto 
government. Without necessarily committing his own govern­
ment to a de facto recognition he, along with the rest of 
the Diplomatic Corps, dealt with Huerta in this manner. He 
notified Bryan, his new superior, that "The Diplomatic Corps 
has entered into communication with the Provisional Govern­
ment without committing themselves in any way as regards 
formal recognition. • . This was approved and the Wilson 
administration allowed this relationship to stand officially. 
Thus, the Ambassador was left to carry on necessary dealings 
with a government which the United States refused to recog­
nize. The President was following the biblical admonition 
not to let the right hand know what the left hand was doingl
The usual course would have been to withdraw a repre­
sentative of this rank and leave a chargl at the post* The 
way was, in fact, made easy. In accord with custom, (H. L.) 
Wilson tendered his resignation on March 5th, though it was
^Records of the Department of State;(H. L4 Wilsonto Bryan, March 3, 1913*
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framed In such a way as to Ind icate that he intended i t  as a
form ality and did not n ecessa r ily  expect i t  to  be accepted*
President Wilson received a note from Huerta and rep lied ,
thanking him for h ie  "cordial congratulations."*^ Meanwhile,
a flood  of p e t it io n s  reached the S tate Department c it in g
Ambassador W ilsonfs c a p a b ilit ie s  and requesting that he be
ISretained on the scene* To the colony at Mexico C ity, he
17Woodrow Wilson Papers, LB 1 , F ile  VII; Wilson to  
Huerta, March 7, 1913*
1 8 See Records of the Department o f State; 812*00 
s e r ie s ,  Case books nos* 28 and 29 for  many such le tte r s*  
William C* P otter , former head of American Smelting and 
R efining Company in  Mexico and now Executive Chairman of 
In tercon tin en ta l Rubber Company, a lso  with large holdings 
in  Mexico, praised W ilson's e f fo r ts  on behalf o f those  
companies*
See a lso  Hearing -  Subcommittee on U*S* C itizens in  
Mexico, 66th  Congress, 2nd S ession , 2264-2272, for le t t e r s ,  
p e tit io n s  and memorandums of a congratulatory nature. 
Strongs, the B r itish  M inister, von Hintze, the German Min­
i s t e r ,  Ayguesparsu, the French Charg6 , Cologan, the Spanish 
M inister and D'Arenas de Lima, the Portuguese M inister, a l l  
addressed personal le t t e r s  o f gratitude to  Wilson for h is  
help rendered to  them and to  th e ir  n ation als in  the Decena 
TrAgica. The American colony addressed a telegram to  
President Wilson on March 4th , asking that (H. L.) Wilson 
be retained and th is  was follow ed by a committee v i s i t  from 
th is  aroup to  Washington which drew up a memorandum describ ­
ing W ilson's serv ice  to  Mexico, e sp ec ia lly  in  g e ttin g  Huerta 
and Diaz to  agree, as indispensable* The B r itish  colony 
addressed a le t t e r  o f thanks to  Wilson as did the American 
clergymen o f Mexico C ity. Much of the so lic itu d e  o f the 
American colony was based on the b e l ie f  that Wilson could 
esta b lish  more harmonious re la tio n s  with Huerta than he had 
been able to  do with Madero* Mrs. Alex Tweedie wrote th at;  
"Whatever approval President W ilson's p o licy  may have gained 
in  the United S ta tes , the withholding o f recogn ition  of 
Huerta was certa in ly  resented by Americans in  Mexico."
Mexico from Diaz to  the Kaiser (New York: George H* Doran
Company, n .d . ) ,  155.
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19was the roan of the hour. * Only a few voices in Mexico were
20ra ised  against him. As for the Ambassador h im self, he was 
certa in  that the new adm inistration would, with proper in ­
form ation, proceed to  the recogn ition  of Huerta. He was
^See note Id . The b e l ie f  that Wilson could handle 
Huerta was strong at t h is  tim e. Later, h is  "friends" lo s t  
enthusiasm.
^Records of the Department o f S tate; 612.00 s e r ie s ,  
Case books nos. 26 and 29. Some of the le t t e r s  from corre­
spondents in  the United S tates were, however, extremely 
b it t e r .  One to ld  Bryan that Wilson was ju st about f i t  to  
represent the Sultan o f Turkey at the court o f McBeth in  the 
dark ages. Others charged that the Ambassador aided and 
abetted the overthrow o f Madero. William 0. Manson of 
356 Pine S t . ,  San Francisco, C aliforn ia in  a le t t e r  to  Bryan 
dated March 15th sta ted  that i t  was common knowledge that 
Wilson was associa ted  with the Guggenheims who had gotten  
concessions from P o rflr io  Dias through Enrique Creel and 
de la  Barra. This w riter said  that a t ip  was gQing around 
advising the purchase o f Smelter stock as the Dias crowd was 
in  again . A telegram from R. V. Pesqueira, a member of the 
Congress who supported Carransa, inaugurated a pressure cam­
paign on the White House i t s e l f  on behalf o f the rebel 
fo rces . In a le t t e r  to  Woodrow W ilson, dated March 5th, he 
urged non-recognition o f Huerta on the grounds th at:
" . . .  Ambassador W ilson's statement that he i s  
in c lin ed  to  accept Huerta's statement of the a ssassin a tion  
i s  p a r tia l and not based on fa c ts ."
John Lind wrote Bryan on March 16th (F ile  no. 123 W 
691/ 126) that information he had gotten from an army o f f ic e r  
a year ago led  him to  b e liev e  that H. L. Wilson should not 
be reta ined . He said  th at he knew h is brother, John, the  
publisher and always regarded him as a "blowhard." This 
shows more o f L ind's character than i t  does o f e ith er  of the 
two W ilsons.
These charges and in sin u ation s would have been far  
more im pressive had they contained a shred o f evidence to  
show th at (H. L .) Wilson had been g u ilty  o f wrongdoing. They 
do in d ica te  that the Ambassador could not p lease everybody 
and that some who d is lik ed  him had fr iend s in  important 
p la ces.
W. P. Carmlohal o f S t. Louis. Mo. wired Bryan on 
March 12th, that he had known (H. L.J Wilson for many years 
and held i t  inconceivable that he could have connived at 
Madero's murder.
confident that Carranza would be defeated in spite of the 
warnings of the consuls in northern Mexico and did not 
interpret the opposition to the Huerta regime as formidable* 
Just how Wilson reacted to all of this is not certain* He 
may have been too busy to make a decision, but at any rate, 
(H* L*) Wilson*s resignation was not accepted* No excuse 
can be given for failure to do so within the next two or 
three weeks*
The Ambassador never meant to imply that Huerta’s suc­
cess in dealing with the uprisings was assured or even that 
he was particularly friendly to the United States* In fact, 
careful study of Ambassador Wilson's dispatches during this 
period reveal a growing impatience with Huerta. Wilson 
desired the authority to make strong representations to him 
just as he had requested such authority to deal with Madero* 
The difference was that he felt that Huerta would have sense 
enough to respond to pressure where Madero had ignored prac­
tical measures*
There may have been a deliberate attempt by friends of 
the Ambassador in the Department of State to commit that 
agency and its head to the views of (H* L*) Wilson* A tele­
gram, drafted by someone in the Department {Huntington 
Wilson??), went to Bryan's desk where it was signed* It 
contained a message of praise for the Ambassador for having 
followed the Department's instructions in the recent crisis. 
When Bryan saw the carbon copy he was disturbed and ordered
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the telegram recalled. His subordinates tried to shrug it
off, arguing that one might approve the skillfulness of an
action without approving the action itself. The matter was
not cleared up, however, as it hinged on the question of
whether a red tag, usually attached to such documents going
to the Secretary's desk, had actually been attached to this
telegram when 6ryan signed it. His clerk could not remember 
21seeing it. The message was withdrawn because Bryan sin-
22cerely felt thnt it was too early to make such commitments. 
Nor would he act on other advices of the Ambassador. "In­
opportune" was the reply of the Department to another request 
for a visit of American naval officers to Mexico City.2̂
Meanwhile, Huntington Wilson, the Assistant Secretary, 
who actually handled most of the details of the Taft-Knox- 
(H. L.J Wilson policy in Mexico, resigned in disagreement
21The clerk  who was charged with arranging Bryan's 
mail said  that he did not remember seeing  any red tag  
attached to the telegram . "Did somebody put one over on the 
Secretary of State?" asked the New York Times. See is su e s  
of March 11th and 13th, 1913#
22"We explained," says Huntington Wilson, "that the telegram approved only the manner in which things had been done; not the things that haa been done. Doyle even pointed out that one might admire the skill of a burglar's technique without at all approving of burglary." Francis Mairs Huntington-Wilson, Memoirs of an Ex-Piolomat (Boston: BruceHumphries Inc., 1945J, 247.
23‘'Records of the Department of State: Adee to Wilson,March 22, 1913.
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with the new President over the China loan* The President
accepted h is  l e t t e r  o f resign ation  as quickly as i t  was
received*2  ̂ Bryan was preparing at th is  time to  take a
vacation and Huntington W ilson9s action  caused him to  f e e l
some hesitancy about leaving* "Things w il l  go on p erfec tly  
w e ll,*  the President assured him, "without him so that th is  
need not d isturb your v a c a t i o n . "25
President Wilson sta ted  to  the press sh ortly  a fte r  he 
took o f f ic e  that he proposed to  end the p ractice  of "dollar  
diplomacy” and allow  Latin American s ta te s  to  e le c t  co n sti­
tu tio n a l governments, the only kind that would be recognized  
by the United S ta te s . Although he probably had more spe­
c i f i c  reference to  the Nicaraguan s itu a tio n  at the tim e, the 
government at Mexico City was already being referred  to  as
2Z*Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson.
L etterst Presiden t. 1913-1914 (New Torkt Doub 
and Company, 1931), I V , 72-73* The President would not 
permit the S tate Department to  back a large  loan to  China by 
a banking consortium*
2^Records o f the Department o f S tate; W* Wilson to
Bryan, March 20, 1911* Taft had once remarked: "I would
ju st l ik e  to  s i t  on ^Huntington/ Wilson once and mash him
f la t !  What Knox sees  in  him I do not see ."  B u tt, Roosevelt
and Taft. I ,  371* Kllhu Root sa id  that /H untington/ Wilson 
was "• • .o f  a mean d isp o s it io n , rather formal and quite
laoking in  a sense of humor*" Root to  Jessup. September 15,
1930, quoted in  P h ilip  C* Jessup, Elihu Root (New York:
Dodd Mead and Company, 1936), I* 457*
*
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the "Administration at Mexico C ity ,"2^
The p o licy  of ignoring Huerta and (H« L ,) Wilson,
o f f ic ia l ly ,  began at once. Without recognition  from the
United S ta tes , Huerta could borrow very l i t t l e  money but he
was able to  obtain a small loan in  Europe and was given
added courage by th e recognition  extended to  him by the rest
o f the world. While the sp ec ia l informants of the Wilson
adm inistration were appearing a l l  over Mexico, Bryan learned
from (H, L ,) Wilson that "The matter o f recogn ition  as
regards Great B rita in  i s  now c lo sed ," 2? Although Speyer and
Company o f New York, the firm that had handled Mexico*s la s t
b ig loan , warned the Wilson adm inistration that Huerta was
the only means o f obtaining order in  Mexico and that he must 
26have support, the recogn ition  by Great B rita in  deprived
26Records o f the Department of S tate; Wilson to  Bryan, 
April 22, 1913* R, 3, Baker holds that "there was no par­
a l l e l  o f Huertaf s case with th at o f a Peruvian President 
ju st recognised who • • » was ousted not by an ambitious 
despot who desired  to  play the ro le  o f a Huerta but by mem­
bers o f  a Congress, supported by the Army, who were r e s is t in g  
an attempt o f the President to  exerc ise  u n con stitu tion al 
power and se t  up a p ra ctica l d icta torsh ip ,"  Woodrow W ilson. 
IV, 251.
^Records o f the Department o f S tate; (H, L ,) Wilson 
to  Bryan, May 3# 1913. President Wilson and Secretary Bryan 
were convinced that Lord Cowdray, who had vast o i l  in v e s t­
ments in  Mexico, had influenced  the B r itish  government in  
extending recogn ition . Baker, Woodrow W ilson. IV, 256,
26Records of the Department of State; James Speyerto the Secretary of the Treasury, William MacAdoo, n,d.
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the United S ta tes of t h is  means o f forcing  the Mexican 
leader to  h is  knees. Speyer and Company was forced to  enter  
the new arrangement in  order to  protect th e ir  in te r e s ts .
The delay in  extending recogn ition  by the United S ta tes  
caused p ara lysis  in  in tern ation a l exchange on important 
questions; Huerta sorely  needed the added backing of the  
United S tates and he deemed the course o f  h is  northern neigh­
bor unwise and unfriendly. Important claims could not be
discussed  because the Ambassador could not deal with the
oQMexican government on an equal fo o tin g . 7
Some in fluence in  the matter o f withholding recogn ition  
was undoubtedly being exerted by maderiataa and even members 
of Madero*s fam ily, h is  w ife among them, who had gone 
promptly to  the United S tates to  p lace the g u ilt  o f Ambassa­
dor Wilson before high o f f i c i a l s .  This did not include a l l
29Ibid.! (H. L.) Wilson to Bryan. May 8, 1913. It was pointed out by a member of the State Department that recognition must be based on the ability of the government to fulfill its international obligations. The resignation of Madero under duress and his subsequent murder had only the remotest connection, if any. with the main question. Fred M. Dearing. Memorandum on Recognition. April 16. 1913* See also Knox Correspondence, undated memorandum signed J. R. C. (Clark. Counselor in the Department) which held that .van if Hu.rt« war. partloaea ori.an It eould hava no legal bearing on recognition and if he were in the United States, could not be extradited under existing treaties.Congressman William 0. Sharp of Ohio guessed cor­rectly that President Wilson*s policy was not based on lack of confidence in Huerta's ability to produce stability but on the means by which he came to power. Woodrow Wilson Papers. Box 141; Sharp to W. Wilson. July IS. 1913.
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of Madero's family,^® but the picture of the Ambassador's 
relations with Madero as painted by some of them, was very 
black. Rumors reached the Ambassador's ears that he might 
even be in danger of assassination*^ Had not Huerta under­
stood (H. L.) Wilson's position, the danger might, indeed, 
have been great since the Ambassador was isolated from his 
own government and a show of unfriendliness to the American 
Ambassador by the Mexican President might have been the 
signal to someone that he oould safely exterminate the 
former*
Huerta did not, indeed, act unfriendly toward (H* L.) 
Wilson but he notified the United States publicly that 
relations would henceforth be confined to routine matters*
No important questions would be discussed* It also became 
public knowledge that Mexican affairs involving the Ambas­
sador were being investigated* Wilson's appeal to the 
Department that this be stopped in the interest of common 
decency and fairness fell on deaf ears* He told Bryan that
^Ernesto Madero, claiming to speak for the family, as well as for himself, denied that he nad charged Ambassa­dor Wilson with working to undermine the Madero government* He said that his relations with Ambassador Wilson were always most cordial* New York Times. March 9, 1913*
^Records of the Department of State; (H* L.) Wilson to Bryan, May 9, 1913* The Mexican Foreign Office notified the Ambassador that the "Madero woman" was giving a dark pioture of Huerta and indicating that the madsristaa might seek vengeance even on the person of the Ambassador*
219
h is retention  at the Mexican post was a matter o f no per­
sonal in te r e st to  him and that the Department should support 
him in a dangerous situation* He asked that th is  be brought 
to  the atten tion  of the President. Bryan was away from 
h is  o f f ic e  for several days,  ̂ and no reply was sent u n til  
he returned. Not aware that the Secretaryfs absence had 
caused the delay, Wilson submitted h is  resignation  -  for the 
second time:
"After w aiting p a tien tly ,"  he said  
co ld ly , "a week for  an answer which should 
have been sent h ith er, I am obliged to  ask 
you to  immediately present to the President 
my resignation  as Ambassador to  Mexico.
Bryan explained to  (H. L.) Wilson the next day that he had
been absent when the telegram arrived and that he was issu in g
32Ib id ., May 10 , 1913.
33Bryan was away from the Department for a great 
deal o f the time during these days. He needed r e s t  a fter  the  
inauguration, and he was forced to  keep up h is  lectu re  
tours, he announced, because h is  salary as Secretary of 
State did not give him enough money to  pay expenses. No 
doubt he a lso  desired to  dodge o ff ic e -se e k e r s . The press 
did not deal kindly with h is  complaint that he needed extra 
money, retortin g  that he should have known that the o f f ic e  
would require expenditure of personal funds and could have 
refused i t  i f  he did not have the necessary means.
3^Records o f the Department o f State;(H . L.) Wilson 
to  Bryan, May 16, 1913. F ile  no. 123 W 691/201. Although 
th is  was the second formal resign ation , i t  w ill  be remem­
bered that Wilson had given n otice a l i t t l e  ea r lier  that he 
did not care whether he stayed at h is  post or not. Thus, he 
had r e a lly  given the new adm inistration at Washington no 
le s s  than three opportunities to  r e c a ll  him. Some explana­
tion  i s  needed for the determination of h is  superiors not to  
send him any in stru ctio n s. The only one that occurs to the 
author i s  that there was fear that he would carry them out. 
This would make h is  la te r  removal appear to  be insp ired  by 
p o li t ic a l  m otives.
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a statement to the press denying the reports that the De­
partment was conducting in v e s t ig a tio n s . This was simply not 
true except in  the sense that no " o f f ic ia l11 in v estig a tio n  
was underway, but i t  was in  the former sense that the Ambas­
sador made h is  complaint. Bryan a lso  discussed the subject
of (H. L.) Wilson*s resign ation  with the President who r e -
3 5fused to  accept i t .  '  Bryan cautioned hesitancy in  dealing
with th is  resign ation  and the d esire  to  use (H. L .) W ilson’s
in flu en ce with Huerta and thus play both ends against the
middle was too strong for the President to  pass up.
Mexicans could only in terp ret t h is  action  as in d ica tin g
a d esire  on the part of the American government for more
proof that Huerta could maintain order. Huerta was puzzled
that the United S tates did not recognize him and thus g ive
him the f in a l  aid needed to  restore  the country to  Federal
co n tro l. American Smelting and R efining Company and other
large in te r e s ts  in  Mexico held no p articu lar  b r ie f  fo r  Huerta
or anybody e ls e  but they did want some government recog- 
36nized . The concern o f A3ARC0, with heavy investm ents in  
that country, was that somebody be recognized in  order that
35Ib id .g Bryan to  (H. L .) W ilson, May 17, 1913.
3^Woodrow Wilson Papers, F ile  VI, Box 310; Bryan to  
W. W ilson. May 27, 1913. Wilson ignored a plan urged on him 
by such firm s as the Southern P a c ific  Railway, Phelps, Dodge 
and Company and others that he agree to  recognize Huerta i f  
the la t t e r  would guarantee an e le c tio n  by October 26 , 1913. 
Link, Woodrow W ilson. 111.
payments to  Mexican so ld ier s  for  "guarding* th e ir  property
17
might be r e g u la r iz e d .f
The p o s itio n  o f the United S tates became even more 
untenable as country a fte r  country extended recogn ition  to  
the Huerta government. Almost d a lly , Ambassador Wilson 
ca lled  the r o l l  o f  those countries th at had presented cre­
d en tia ls  and we may forg ive  him the tin ge o f I -to ld -y o u -so  
that appeared in  these d ispatches. To an American President 
who could lec tu re  others on the matter of in tern ation a l 
r ig h ts  such information was only a nuisance. The s ile n c e  o f  
the American government led  many Mexicans to  conclude that 
i t  might p ossib ly  favor such schemes as were being suggested  
by those Americans who counseled annexation of a large part 
of Mexico by fo rce .
The time was almost ripe for a public condemnation of  
Ambassador Wilson. The sp ec ia l agents in  Mexico were sending 
back volumes o f information whether spurious or otherw ise. 
That the d ism issa l o f Wilson under such circumstances would
^ P rop ertied  in te r e s ts  in  Mexico were to ld  in  many 
l o c a l i t i e s  that so ld ie r s  could not be maintained to  guard 
th e ir  holdings un less they received  su b sisten ce , which the  
government could not, at the moment, furn ish . This was not 
a new p raotice and i t  was accepted out o f n e c e ss ity , though 
i t  was more co stly  than the cen tra lized  p o lice  s ta te  o f  
P o rfir lo  D ias, had been.
Oovernor C olqu itt, who had begun hammering at 
Woodrow Wilson on fo rce fu l Intervention ju st as he had done 
with T aft, sa id  that Americans were having to  pay ransom 
fo r  th e ir  l ib e r ty . Records o f the Department o f S tate;0. B. C olquitt to  Woodrow Wilson, July 16, 1913, confiden­
t i a l .
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not help the problem at hand other than to  emphasise Woodrow 
Wilson*a righteousness before the American people, was 
apparently not considered* Bryan s t i l l  urged caution , prob­
ably because he wanted to  have a try  at g e ttin g  th e various 
fa c tio n s  in  Mexico to  confer and(H* L*) Wilson could s t i l l  be 
u se fu l, but the days o f the Ambassador were numbered*
I t  was a se r ie s  o f reports from William Bayard H ale^  
that to ld  President Wilson what he wanted to  hear and 
already believed* The President became more and more impa­
t ie n t  that(H* LJ Wilson had not yet "changed h is  point of 
39view"^' as Woodrow Wilson had already come to  the conclusion  
th at Huerta could not be accepted* The Ambassador*s p leas
3fJHale was an Episcopalian M inister turned jour­
n a lis t*  He had w ritten  for Cosmopolitan magasine and 
several other p ub lications ana naa air ax ted  President Wilson *s 
campaign speeches together with other campaign litera tu re*
3** Who*s Who In America. 1915-1916* Since the President 
did not tru st those who had f i r s t  hand knowledge o f Mexican 
cond itions. Hale*s lack  o f knowledge o f Mexico must have 
q u a lified  him in the President*s mind to  make an ob jective  
study* Information from those who were already on the  
scene was generally  taboo*
^Memorandum from the White House to  Secretary  
Bryan, June 3, 1913, in  Woodrow Wilson Papers, F ile  95* The 
reference here was to  (H* L.) Wilsonf s dispatch of May 15th 
in  which he characterised  the revolutionary s itu a tio n  asfe tt ln g  better* See a lso  Records o f the Department of S tate; H* L .I  Wilson to  Bryan, May 15, 1913-
Up to  t h is  p o in t, (H* L*) Wilson had no o f f i c i a l  
knowledge o f the p o licy  of the adm inistration, although he 
had not recommended the unreserved recognition  o f Huerta, 
but simply that he be recognised u n less there were some 
reason not to  do so* The Wilson adm inistration had been 
s i le n t  where the Embassy in  Mexico was concerned* Taft 
Papers (Unassembled), Draft o f Proposed A rtic le  on Mexico 
by H* L* Wilson -  n*d. (1916?)*
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for aome in te l l ig e n t  b asis  of representation  o f the American 
government were ignored. He was to ld  that the United S ta tes  
expected proof and assurances o f an early e le c t io n , free  
from coercion , in  which Huerta was not to  be a candidate, 
and o f absolute amnesty to  the o p p o s it io n .^  This was , of 
course, in tervention  far beyond anything that T aft, Knox or 
(H. LJ Wilson had ever considered. M ysteriously the Ambassa­
dor was cautioned that th ese  views were for h is  own p rivate  
information and were not to  be given to  Huertal The Provi­
sion al President must be given no opportunity to  e s ta b lish  
the le g a l i ty  o f h is  p o s itio n .
3y now, reports were coming in  from Hale who was making 
him self thoroughly obnoxious in  Mexico, w hile the Ambassador 
and everyone e ls e  wondered why he was th ere . A report dated 
June 18th, contained H ale's rev e la tio n s . Regarding Madero's 
adm inistration, he had to  admit that by 1912 , " it was fa ir ly  
certa in  th a t, un less an early change for the b etter  came, a 
popular revo lu tion  might be exp ected .n The President could 
have learned t h is  by going over h is  o f f i c i a l  Ambassador's 
dispatches. Hale recounted a highly garbled version o f the  
Decena Trtgica with s to r ie s  that the Ambassador had n o tif ie d  
reporters as to  when the arrest of Madero would take p lace , 
that Cepeda had "promised the Ambassador that he should be 
the f i r s t  man to ld  when we had done i t ,"  and other ta le s  that
^Records of the Department of State; Bryan to(H. L.) Wilson, June 15, 1913.
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were unaccompanied by v e r if ic a t io n . The fa c t that Cepeda 
wae in  j a i l  at the time for  a savage act o f murder was s k i l l ­
fu l ly  woven in to  th ese  accounts in  a manner that in  the  
1950fs would become " gu ilt by a sso c ia tio n * " Hale had d is ­
covered, in  conversation w ith Ambassador W ilson, that that 
in d iv idual "exh ib its no appreciation whatever of the nature 
o f the deed done the night o f  February 22nd, a fte r  the  
en tire  group of men resp on sib le  fo r  i t  had been guests at 
h is  house, no susp icion  that any r e sp o n s ib ility  rested  upon 
him self who, in  a sober view of the p ast, might be said  to  
have delivered  th e men to  death*" (H* L .) Wilson would not 
repentI
Having thus damaged h is  own a b il i ty  as an in v estig a to r  
seeking fa c t s ,  and attempted to  d iscred it  the Ambassador 
beyond a l l  reason, he sought to  g ive h is  report a sprink ling  
o f au th en tic ity  and fa irn ess  by saying in  a contradictory  
manner that "• • • i t  i s  in  my judgement, absurd to  p ictu re  
Mr* Wilson as a m alicious p lotter*"  Hale could not have 
rea lised  ju st how absurd h is  own reasoning would appear when 
he recorded in  conclusion to  h is  report t h is  observation:
T r if lin g , perhaps, in  the sum o f m iseries  
that have flowed from i t ,  yet not without 
importance in  a way, i s  the fa c t  that thou­
sands o f  Mexicans b e lie v e  that the Ambassador 
acted on in stru ctio n s  from Washington and 
look upon h is  reten tion  under the new Ameri­
can President as a mark o f approval and blame
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the United S ta tes Government fo r  the ... 
chaos in to  which the country has f a l l e n .^
T r if lin g  as th is  view might have seemed to  Hale, i t  was 
tru e . But Hale had been sent to  gather damaging information  
and here i t  was in  p len ty . President W ilson, who was in  New 
Hampshire, wrote Bryan that as soon as he (the President) 
returned from h is  outing he wanted to  d iscu ss ser io u sly  the 
n e c e ss ity  o f r e c a llin g  Henry Lane Wilson "in one way or 
another" so that he could have a ta lk  with him.*1’2 While 
th is  was being considered another report came from Hale 
estim ating that Huerta controlled  only a th ird  o f Mexico 
but that he gave no evidence o f intending to  re lin q u ish  
power. Oe La Barra was scored for  remaining In o f f ic e  in  a 
government that had not provided sa tis fa c to r y  proof of i t s  
innocence o f Madero's murder (a naive ob servation ). Hale 
included some sage comments that must have been music to  
President W ilsonfs ears as they included some in v itin g  po­
l i t i c a l  philosophys
We are, in  sp ite  o f ou rselves, the  
guardians or order, ju s t ic e  and decency on 
t h is  Continent} we are, p ro v id en tia lly , 
n aturally  and unescapaoly, charged with the  
maintenance o f humanity's in te r e s t  here.
C iv ilisa t io n  and humanity look to  us, and 
have a r igh t to  look to  us, fo r  protection  
on t h is  Continent. C iv ilisa t io n  i s  more 
important than the conventional claim of
^ Ib id . l Hale to  W. Wilson, June 18, 1913 
2̂Baker, Woodrow W ilson. IV, 262-263*
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n ation ality*  I t  i s  more necessary to  
maintain c iv i l i s a t io n  than to  pay fa n ta s­
t i c  deference to  the formal prerogatives 
o f  a Government that has lo s t  the a b il i ty  
to  maintain c iv il isa t io n *
This i s  no argument for in tervention  
in  Mexico* Intervention i s  not necessary.
Firm rep resen tation s, p o lite ly  made, as by 
a p erfec tly  fr ie n d ly , yet a fu lly  deter­
mined and powerful neighbor, would, I 
b e lie v e , save Mexico* To frame the exact 
plan, to  h it upon ju st the fashion  and 
manner in  which the necessary Influence  
can be brought to  bear, without involv ing  
us too deeply, may take long and hard 
thought* Then l e t  the Government o f the 
United S tates g ive i t  that thought* But 
l e t  i t  not abandon Mexico and the id e a ls  
our people have se t up here, extinguish  
the torch , lay  down the s t a f f  o f  leader­
ship committed to  our hands*
The la b e l "Hale-Wilson Corollary to  the Monroe Doc­
trine"  might w oll be assigned to  the above sentences* 
Evidently Hale had not been to ld  why Ambassador Wilson was 
being kept in  Mexico C ity, as the sp ec ia l in v estig a to r  
reported blandly that i t  was the general b e l ie f  that the 
Ambassador was remaining there to  look a fte r  personal in ­
te r e s ts !  Since ju st such a c t iv ity  as he was engaging in  
with the support o f the President was causing i t .  Hale could 
be highly exact in  describ ing the s ta te  of mind of the Ambas­
sador in  the midst of t h is  ordeal:
Mr* Wilson has lo s t  p r a c tic a lly  a l l  
h is  former friends* V irtu ally  every member 
o f the Committee which sent rep resen tatives  
to  Washington, in  h is  b eh alf, in  A pril,
(includ ing i t s  spokesman,) has to ld  me that 
he regarded Mr* W ilson's continual presence 
here an injury* The Ambassador i s  the sub­
je c t  o f constant snubbing at the hands of
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Huerta; and i s  in  a highly nervoua s ta te ,  
raging against the in d ign ity  o f h is  p o s i­
t io n , berating h is  s t a f f  and r e v ilin g  h is  
own Government
That W ilson9s former a sso c ia tes  were find ing him of no value 
to  them in  business and thus dropping him s o c ia lly  was prob­
ably true; but Hale shared the mistaken view of an outstand­
ing biographer of President Wilson that i t  was assumed that 
the Ambassador would cooperate and that he had fa ile d  to  do 
so while "clinging to  his, o f f i c e , T h e  assertion  that the 
President d is lik ed  personnel changes was a lso  made in  order 
to  explain the reten tion  o f the Ambassador, but personnel 
changes were made when p o l i t ic a l  expediency demanded i t  and 
Bryan eagerly sought diplom atic p o sitio n s for  deserving 
fo llow ers of the p a r ty ,^
^Records o f the Department of S tate; Hale to  W, 
Wilson, July 9 , 1913« Hale supplied no information that 
could not have been obtained by the President through regular 
channels. He was greatly  surprised that (H, L ,) Wilson did 
not seem to r e a liz e  how wrong he (Wilson) had beenl
^^aker, Woodrow Wilson. IV, 255*
^An important concern of Bryan was to  find  jobs for  
h is  numerous friends in  the Democratic Party, He wrote Jerry 
S u llivan , Receiver of Customs, Santo Domingo, a fter  Su llivan  
had been there long enough to  become acquainted, to  know 
what p o s itio n s  "you have at your d isposal with which to  
reward deserving democrats," Wayne C, W illiams, William 
Jennings Bryan (New York; G, P, Putnam9s Sons, !$$$>),3 41. 
See a lso  M, R, Werner, Bryan (New York; Harcourt Brace and 
Company, 1920), 211,
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News that Wilson had in v ited  Huerta to  a dinner at the  
Embassy on the night o f Madero*s murder, as se t  forth  in  
H ale's report of June 18th, had caused the President to  
begin the step s necessary to  r e c a ll  the Ambassador.^ He
w*
wrote Bryan that H ale's document was "indeed extraordinary"
and he expressed h is  d esire  to  d iscuss with him upon h is
return ( th is  time the Secretary o f State was away from h is
o f f ic e )  the n ecess ity  o f " reca llin g  Henry Lane Wilson in
one way or another perhaps merely for consu ltation  u n til we
can have a ta lk  with the man h i m s e l f . T h i s  was followed
two days la te r  by a message to  Bryan in  which the President
said  that a fte r  reading H ale's report, he hoped more than
ever that Bryan would consider the p o s s ib il i ty  o f r e c a llin g
(H. L .) Wilson and leav in g  a ffa ir s  in  the hands of O'Shaugh-
nessey, who was recommended by Hale as a "perfectly  honest" 
48man. A fter four months, an "honest man" was f in a lly  to  be 
put in  charge o f the Embassy at Mexico City. And i f  Hale
^ S ee  note 41* Hale had arranged h is  phrases care­
fu l ly  so as to  g ive the co incidental meeting at the Embassy 
and the la te r  shooting of Madero undue s ig n if ic a n c e . John 
Lind a lso  believed  that there was a connection between the  
two events.
^Records o f the Department o f S tate; Woodrow Wilson 
to  Bryan, July 1, 1913# co n fid en tia l. F ile  no. 812.00/786J.
^Woodrow Wilson Papers, F ile  95 (502 H. L. W.), 
Memorandum, White House to  Bryan, July 3* 1913* O'Shaugh- 
nessey hardly needed Hale to  e sta b lish  h is  honesty.
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said  he was honest, then he was honest. The im plication  
was, o f course, that the Ambassador was d ishonest, yet Hale, 
In h is  personal references to  him had pointed out h is  s in ­
c e r ity . Without a l l  o f th is  fan fare, a l l  that the President 
needed to  have done was to  accept one of the resign ation s  
being pressed upon him by the Ambassador h im self!
The actual s itu a tio n  in  Mexico had l i t t l e  bearing upon 
th is  immediate drama. As has been shown, Huerta could not 
have s a t is f ie d  the Washington government under any circum­
stances short of surrender o f sovereignty . The concern o f  
the moment was with punishment of someone for Madero’s death 
and Huerta looked l ik e  the most l ik e ly  ta rg e t. The Ambassa­
dor was embarrassed by being ordered to  spend the Fourth of 
July in  Vera Cruz so as not to  compromise the stand of the  
adm inistration . The Mexican newspapers, however, centered  
th e ir  cr it ic ism  on (H. L .) W ilso n .^  Additional m aterial was 
supplied them by the Wilson-Bryan in form ation -co llectors  
(there were no t i t l e s ) ,  among them, Bryan’ s Reginaldo F. del
^ New York Times. July 6 , 1913.
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V alle o f  Los Angelas.'50 Del V a lle , whose le t t e r s  were 
eagerly devoured by Bryan, asserted  at Mexico City th at he 
had no o f f i c i a l  s ta tu s  but that he had been sent from Wash­
ington to  get f i r s t  hand inform ation for the use o f the  
American government* He echoed the President by announcing 
the end of "dollar diplom acy,n saying that Woodrow Wilson 
and Bryan would not be in fluenced  by anyone with a personal 
in te r e s t  a t stake in  the Mexican s itu a t io n * ^
(H. Lj Wilson* knowing that he was being ignored at 
Washington, beset by a host o f  amateur p o l i t ic a l  s leu th s ,
Del Valle squirmed when queried by the Mexican press as to his status* He said that he had come to conduct "interesting investigations," but that while he was not an envoy, he was on a mission for the State Department and his commission had been entrusted to him by his friend, Presi­dent Wilson* Diario. Mexico City, July 7, 1913, enclo­sure in Records or the Department of States H* L* Wilson to Bryan, July 15. 1913* File no* S12*00/$l65*A trag i-com ica l note was introduced in  the fo llow ing  
amusing p ictu re o f p ro fessio n a l Jealousy between two "unof­
f ic ia l"  agents in  Mexico w ith the same mission* Hale t e l e ­
graphed Bryan that del V alle was g iv in g  elaborate newspaper 
in terview s and acting  l ik e  a p len ip o ten tiary , allow ing  
him self to  be described as the next Ambassador* Bryan 
admonished del V alle to  keep away from the newspapers*Woodrow Wilson Papers, Box 141S Bryan to W* Wilson, July S, 1913* Hale told the President that del Valle could not be taken seriously* Records of the Department of States William B* Hale to Woodrow Wilson, July 9, 1913*
51Mexican Herald. July B, 1913* It was the annour ;ed policy of the administration at Washington not to retain anyone at a foreign post who had engaged in business activity at that post*
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52and lacking Influence over Huerta sounded for  the la s t
time the note he so often  played upon during the Madero
regime. Complaining that the United S tates should e ith er
recognise the Mexican government or c lo se  i t s  diplom atic
53establishm ent,  ̂ he reported the increase of anti-American-
5 Liam'^ and urged that strong measures be taken. The Depart­
ment was to ld  that no business could be done with the  
Mexican government as o f f i c i a l s  from bottom to  top had 
in stru ctio n s  to  ignore American m a t t e r s . " A  strong and 
aggressive a ttitu d e  should be assumed at Washington,” he 
wrote as Mexico planned a b ig  welcome for the new Japanese 
M in is te r .^  Americans were beginning to  show lack of fa ith  
in  the d esire o f th e ir  government to  do anything for  them. 
Some were leav in g  the country (a fa ct confirmed by Hale) 
w hile others were seeking the aid o f other foreign d ip lo -
^2The fa c t that (H. L .) Wilson developed no c lo se  
personal friendship  with Huerta, so w ell borne out in  the 
diplom atic correspondence, was e ith er  misunderstood or 
ignored because i t  did not f i t  the accepted b e l ie f  that the  
Ambassador had placed Huerta in  power.
^Records o f the Department o f S tate; (H. L .) Wilson 
to  Bryan, July 9 , 1913*
54 „  addition  to  W ilson's dispatches see New York 
I ia g £ , July 13, 1913.
^Records o f the Department o f S tate; (H. L .) Wilson 
to  Bryan, July 11, 1913*
^ Ibid.. July 12, 1913, confidential.
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57mats. '
Among those Americans leav in g  Mexico during the middle 
o f July was the American Ambassador h im self, f in a l ly  
reca lled  a fte r  four months* The motive behind t h is  was 
puzzling to  contemporaries* They guessed that some European
eg
nation had forced th e President*s hand' but few r e a lly  knew 
the true reason*
The Ambassador l e f t  Mexico on July 18th on the Ward 
Line steamer, Mexico, never to  return* Traveling in  company 
w ith del V alle , (H* L*) Wilson learned that Bryan*s agent 
was at le a s t  in  earnest* The two men enjoyed each otherf s 
company* Upon reaching the S tates the Ambassador was d i­
rected  to  come immediately to  W a s h i n g t o n * ^  Emeterio de la  
Garzla. who sty led  h im self "co n fid en tia l agent1* o f the Huerta 
government d e lib era te ly  scheduled h is  exodus to  coincide  
with that o f Ambassador Wilson from Mexico, remarking nThank 
God Ambassador Wilson has been recalled* • *n̂ ° Garzia had 
been as thoroughly ignored as had Wilson*
57Ibld.. July 13, 1913, confidential.
58B*11, Political Shane. 354.
KQ
''Records o f the Department o f S tate; F ile  no*123 W 691/220.
6°New York Tin**. July 17, 1913.
Did the Ambassador know that he was about to  be d is ­
missed or did he suppose that i f  he gained the ear o f the  
President he could bring him around to  the Taft policy? He 
gave every in d ica tion  that he expected to  return* The Mexi­
can press had been to ld  that he would be back in  three weeks 
and he announced in  New York that he could think of no 
reason why he should be removed* I t  looks as though he had 
taken the P resid en t's  reluctance to  accept h is  resignation  
at face value* Perhaps a p o licy  was in  the making* I f  so , 
he was w illin g  to  help put i t  in to  effect*  I t  must be 
remembered that he was a career diplomat with much experi­
ence that could be useful* I f  the President was sincere in  
wanting to s ta b i l iz e  conditions in  Mexico he could not 
sa fe ly  ignore one who had been so c lo se  to  th ings fo r  such a 
long time* But there were rumors that England might be 
reconsidering her recognition  o f Huerta^ and the New York 
Times reported on the 22nd that from o f f ic ia l  sources there  
was enough information to  imply that the Ambassador would 
not return to  h is  post*
t
^W alter Hines Page, Ambassador to  the Court of 
S t. James, wired Bryan co n fid en tia lly  on the 17th o f July, 
that there was ta lk  of a reversa l o f p o licy  in  Parliament 
and even o f jo in t  in tervention  with the United S ta tes in  
Mexico* Page said  la te r  that opinion was divided along 
f in a n c ia l l in e s  rather than party lin es*  Bryan hastened to  
warn Page not to  issu e  a statement on these matters without 
further in stru ctio n s  and not to  encourage the idea of Joint 
intervention* Records of the Department of S tate; F ile  nos. 
£12*00/3067 and 8231.
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On the way to  Washington, Wilson had received a p e t i ­
tio n  from the Mexican colony at Havana asking him to  counsel 
against the recognition  o f Huerta* These people cred ited  
him only with having been mistaken in  h is  view o f the Mexi- 
can President, and thus he oould be forgiven* Upon 
reaching New York, the Ambassador le t  i t  be known that he 
would g ive  the press a l l  o f  the information he could w ithin  
the bounds o f propriety* And ta lk  he did! Asked about h is  
view o f  Huerta* he rep lied  en igm atically  that no man knew 
what h is  views were nas to  the r ig h t or wrong o f the Huerta 
cause"^3 but he expounded at, length on conditions in  Mexico 
and the n ecess ity  of recognition* He in s is te d  that Mexico 
was b a s ic a lly  stable* I t  must have been embarrassing to  the 
President to  have Wilson ta lk in g  so fr e e ly , e sp e c ia lly  as he 
even c r it ic is e d  the wisdom of the Department o f S ta te 's  
le t t in g  del Valle have the communications code which he had 
seen the la t t e r  use at Havana* Also, s in ce the Ambassador 
had been retained  at h is  p o st, the public might be led  to  
b eliev e  that he expressed the views o f the Wilson adminis­
tration* The Ambassador was reported as openly c r it ic iz in g  
the sending o f sp ec ia l envoys such as Hale and d el V alle to
62NgE York Times. July 22, 1913*
63Ib id *. July 26, 1913.
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That the P resid en t's  in ten tion  was not known i s  i l l u s ­
trated  by a statement o f the Army and Navy Journal in  an 
e d ito r ia l which proclaimed that the v i s i t  o f Ambassador
Wilson should s tr ik e  the hour for reading Mexico the same
65lesson  that had Just been read to  Nicaragua. While 
w aiting to  see the P resident, Wilson b riefed  the Department 
on a f fa ir s  in  the Latin American republic and prepared a 
sp ec ia l memorandum for  the President to  read in  order to  be 
able to  ta lk  more in te l l ig e n t ly  about the s itu a tio n . This 
la s t  hopeless task was a complete waste o f tim e. The P resi­
dent had made h is  d ec ision  long ago and had no in ten tio n  of 
reading or hearing anything Henry Lane Wilson had to  say.
A f i f t y  minute conference with the President was 
f in a l ly  held on July 2Sth* After a cool greetin g , the Am­
bassador r e a lise d  that h is  v i s i t  was u s e le s s . The President 
gave l i t t l e  evidence o f even lis te n in g  to  him. He wanted
formed ii __ ___  . __  w____ _ rreepondence with
the S tate Department to  the and th e New
York Edward L yell to  Joseph “ummulty, Woodrow Wilson
Papers (502-H. L. W.) and undated telegram , Harvey P. 
B ittn er  o f the Spokane Chronicle to  President Wilson, 
October 16, 1913, in  the same p lace .
House was in -
65New York July 28, 1913.
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only one version o f the story  and he already had i t . 66 The 
President was a lso  responsib le for  stopping the diplom at’s 
testimony before the House Foreign A ffa irs Committee. He 
did appear b r ie f ly  before the Senate Committee on Foreign 
R elations but was asked no s ig n if ic a n t  q u e s t io n s .^
The New York Times o f August 5th, carried two announce­
ments that were given out by the S tate Department in  rapid  
succession  on the previous day. The f i r s t  was the resigna­
tio n  of Henry Lane Wilson and the second was the news o f the  
Lind m ission to  Mexico. Bryan’s statement to  the press 
read:
Ambassador W ilson’s resign ation  has 
been accepted to  take e f fe c t  October 14.
The part which he f e l t  i t  h is  duty to  take 
in  the e a r lie r  stages o f the recent revolu­
tio n  in  Mexico would make i t  d i f f ic u l t  for
v _  66Wilson, Diplomas!g gpj.tfodqg. 313. See a lso  Nfiw 
York Tjjnea. July 29. 1913 and August 1 , 1913. The Times 
e d ito r ia lis e d  that (H. L .) Wilson had been shamefully m is- 
represented s in ce  h is  return and **• • • by the P resid en t’s 
orders has had words put in  h is  mouth. • • •" President 
Wilson may have been Influenced a lso  by an assurance o f the 
Carransa forces that i f  the embargo were l i f t e d  they would 
be in  control o f Mexico in  s ix ty  days. Records of the De­
partment o f S tate; I* L. Pesqueira, Governor o f  Sonora and 
Alvaro Obregdn. Commander o f C onstitu tion al Forces of Sonora 
to  President W ilson, July 27, 1913. Needless to  say, the  
l i f t i n g  o f the embargo did not a f fe c t  th is  s ta te  o f  a f fa ir s .  
John Lind was summoned to  Washington on the day o f the  
conference! Stephenson, John Lind. 214.
67New York August 2, 1913. When asked for
comment on the statem ents o f some Mexican governors, (H. L.) 
Wilson rep lied : "I do not want to  say anything that i s
contradictory to  the views o f the President / o f  the United 
S ta te f / ."
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him to  represent tha views o f tha presant 
Adminiatration in .v iew  o f tha a ltu atlon  
which now e x i s t s * 0
Bryan could not, of course* add that tha " situ a tio n ” that 
ex istad  was tha fa u lt  o f tha adm inistration and not that o f  
Henry Lana Wilson* Tha former Ambassador was not allowed to  
return to  Mexico even to  c o lle c t  h is  belongings* Tha De­
partment o f State jumped at an opportunity to  take the 
usual step o f guaranteeing him a fa ir  price for  h is  prop­
erty in  the Embassy*
Thus a diplomat with years of serv ice  and experience 
was abruptly dismissed* I f  he ever had occasion to  f e e l  
that he had been wrong or negligent* morally or otherwise* 
he never expressed i t  publicly* In speeches and writing*  
he p e r s is te n tly  defended h is  policy* contending that he had 
acted according to  what he and other members of the Diplo­
matic Corps b elieved  to  be the best course* He never 
apologised in  the le a s t  for h is  a ttitu d e  toward Madero and 
so far  as the Mexican p o licy  of Woodrow Wilson was concerned* 
i t  f in a l ly  resu lted  in  the armed in tervention  in  Mexico that
6ftIb id*, August 5$ 1913* See a lso  Stephenson* John
Lind. 214*
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60T aft, Knox and Henry Lane Wilson had foreseen* 7
6Q7The former Ambassador had eons to  b e liev e  by 
1919, that the only so lu tio n  to  the Mexican problem would 
be armed in terven tion , a t le a s t  down to  the 22nd p ara lle l*  
This portion , rioh  in  resources, but extremely unruly, could 
then be reorganised as a separate s ta te  or joined  in  a new 
union with the " c iv i l is e d ” part o f Mexico south o f the 22nd 
p ara lle l*  Wilson, "What Must Be Done With Mexico; The 
O bligations o f the United S tates In Our I l l i t e r a t e  and 
B andit-Infested  Neighbor N ation .” The Forum. Sent amber. 
1919*
EPILOGUE
I t  i s  b elieved  that s u ff ic ie n t  evidence has been pre­
sented to  warrant the conclusion th at the tra d it io n a l view 
o f Henry Lane Wilson in  diplomacy in  Latin America demands 
some rev is io n . In the f i r s t  p lace , h is  contribution to  
Chilo-American friendship  and trade deserves more n o tice  
than has, h ith erto , been g iven . Secondly, h is  pessimism  
regarding the in s t itu t io n  o f immediate democracy in  Mexico 
was not unusual at the tim e. He was a ty p ica l agent of 
"dollar diplomacy** in  th is  resp ect. Thirdly, w hile h is  ex­
treme b ittern ess  toward Madero i s  fr e e ly  admitted, h is im­
patience with that Mexican leader was not without some 
ju s t i f ic a t io n . I t  has been shown that Madero*s regime was, 
in  many resp ects , a fa ilu r e .
L a stly , the foregoing account in d ica te s  that previous 
estim ates o f the r o le  o f Henry Lane Wilson in  Mexico have 
fa ile d  to  consider W ilson's sid e o f the question s u f f ic ie n t ­
ly .^  Furthermore, the easy a sser tio n , by the fa ir e s t  and 
most recent presentation  o f W ilson's work in  Mexico, that he 
follow ed a stronger p o licy  toward Madero than did Taft .and 
Knox, should be more ca refu lly  considered. Wilson did not
xGruening, Mexico *&£ ££* H eritage. 561-576.
2C line, United S tates g&A Mexico. 120-134.
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fully understand that Taft and Knox had ravlaad their 
stronger policy In the declining days of the Taft administra­
tion* Thus, Wilson did appear to be making his own policy 
in the early weeks of 1913* Also (H* L*) Wilson's desire 
to recognize Huerta was in accord with standard international 
practice and with the traditional recognition policy of the 
United States* Some explanation should be made, however, as 
to why Wilson was so badly misunderstood*
Henry Lane Wilson was a man who had something of a natu­
r a l f a c i l i t y  for  arousing controversies around himself* I f  
he made a good many fr ie n d s , he a lso  made enemies by a some­
what se lf-r ig h te o u s  attitude* Although he had a tendency to  
act im pulsively , he would seldom admit that any action  o f h is  
had been unwise or ill-co n sid ered *  He soon learned to  take 
f u l l  advantage o f the inaccuracy that often  characterizes the 
press to  deny anything that might co n stitu te  unfavorable pub­
l ic i ty *  He was one o f  those people who could not to le r a te  
disagreement with h is  own a tt itu d e s  and opinions and occasion­
a l ly  imputed unwholesome motives to  those who c r it ic iz e d  him*
A middle-aged man with f in e  fa c ia l  fea tu res , a s l ig h t ly  bald 
head (during h is  diplom atic serv ice  he began wearing a toupee
and had, by the time he was transferred  to  Mexico, acquired a« ♦
th ick  moustache) and a fa s t  walk, he could show, at tim es, a 
keen sense o f humor and a shrewd, a n a ly tic a l mind* He was 
rather sm all o f sta ture and did not p ossess an overly strong  
constitu tion*  His sa r to r ia l appearance was usually  neat and
2 U
correct. He had l i t t l e  d if f ic u l ty  in  making the tr a n s it io n  
from an ordinary lawyer and p o l i t ic a l  o f f ic e  seeker to  d ip lo ­
mat* Robert Hammond Murray, a newspaper reporter, gave a 
d escrip tion  o f W ilson’s physical and mental ch a ra cter istics*  
Although Wilson seems not to  have borne a grudge against 
Murray, the la t t e r  was obsessed by a rather suddenly acquired 
d is lik e  for the former Ambassador* I t  seems that Murray had 
been expelled  from the Embassy by the Ambassador for such 
"ungentlemanly conduct" as scaring the la d ie s  o f the Embassy 
by g iv in g  exaggerated reports* The author suspects that 
Murray may have been poking fun at Wilson* At any r a te , the 
ch ie f h is to r ic a l value o f Murrayvs comments l i e s  in  h is  de­
scr ip tio n  o f the Ambassador which enables us to  see him 
through the eyes o f one who was not p a r ticu la r ly  impressed 
with h is  personality*
Murray r e la te s  that Wilson was a "broken r e a l-e s ta te  
speculator in  the S tate o f Washington" when he entered the 
diplom atic serv ice  and that brother John L* kept him there*
He describes Wilson as a "• • • neat gray l i t t l e  man with a 
fo x - lik e  fa ce , a p erfect toupee, admirable c lo th in g , stoop­
shouldered, tru cu len t, a tr o tt in g  walk, a sn iggering laugh, 
broad, black prlnce-nes ribbon • • • ," and adds that he had 
an unfortunate f a c i l i t y  for g e ttin g  in to  messes* Murray con­
ceded though that th is  im plied no moral lap ses or, u n t il  h is  
serv ice  in  Mexico, p rofession a l lapses* W ilson, says Murray, 
was given to  "• * • In fir m itie s  o f temperament, lack o f ta c t
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and extravagant conception o f what was due to  h is  p o s itio n  in  
deference and precedence#" He was "• • • ir a s c ib le , touchy, 
peevish , nervous, e g o tis t ic a l#  • • ^an<j7 vain • • •" and 
"• • • rowed with people over t r i f l in g  things#" Murray adds 
further that the Mexican o f f i c ia l s  referred to  him as "chico" 
meaning that he was in c lin ed  to  exhaust h is  energies in  con­
sid eration  o f matters that had no Importance in  eyes other 
than h is  own# One o f h is  colleagues in  Mexico describes  
Wilson as an "• • • hombre f la o o , de mediana estaturat 
nervioso , im paclente, im presienable; facciones dura y sem- 
blante seco; b igote g r lsj  mirada penetrante; y lo s  cab ellos  
en gran pobreza, d iv ides en raya sobre la  mitad de la  
frente#
Those who were a ssoc ia ted  with Wilson in  the Department 
remember him as a man with much in te l le c tu a l a b i l i ty  and as 
a gentleman o f the "old school" o f diplomats# The la t e  
Honorable William R# Castle^ who knew him "only s l ig h t ly 1* 
to ld  the author that Wilson was the kind of man who was very
^Murray, "Huerta and the Two W ilsons," in  Harpara 
Waaklv. March 25, 1916# Murray*s a r t ic le s  fo r  Harpara 
Weekly  were designed to  r a ise  the c ircu la tio n  o f thr p u b li­
cation  and were o f a h ighly sen sation a l character#
^ S tir lin g , Los Ultimos D ias. 534#
^Castle was appointed Undersecretary of S tate in  
1930# His connection with the Department o f S tate  began 
a fte r  Wilson*s a c tiv e  serv ice  but he seems to  have known 
Wilson w ell enough to  have formed th is  carefu l judgement# 
see Wfrojg 12isl ia Aairiga*
prejudiced in  h is  thinking but that hs was often  "right in  a 
somewhat b s llig sr a n t manner which ir r ita te d  other people."  
C astle observed that th is  nay have prevented hia from being 
as valuable to  the serv ice  as might have been the case.^  He 
was ambitious to  be accepted in  the higher c ir c le s  o f so c ie ty  
and p o l i t ic s ]  he enjoyed the deference paid him because of  
h is  p o sitio n  by the upper c la ss  fa m ilie s  o f Latin America.
He often  magnified out o f a l l  proportion to  th e ir  read worth 
honors paid him and at tim es lacked the a b il i ty  to  laugh at 
h im self, but th is  should not be allowed to  obscure the fa c t  
that p ra ise o f h is  character and work was often  honestly  
given or that he was often  due outstanding tr ib u te . His 
shortcomings in  th is  respect were seldom anything more than 
those that might ord in arily  be a ttr ib u ted  to  an ambitious 
man anxious to  r is e  to  greater heights of esteem and finan­
c ia l  secu r ity . He may w ell have been, because o f e a r lie r  
experiences, overly anxious to  prove that he was a worthy in ­
d iv id u a l. Although he could recognize and appreciate lo y a lty  
in  h is  underlings he was often  im patient with the more inde­
pendently minded ones, e sp e c ia lly  when th e ir  opinions were at 
variance with h is  or when they were slack  in  th e ir  d u tie s .
His expressions o f appreciation were often  reserved for those  
who had been chosen by him self or with h is  approval.
^Castle to  the author. October 14. 1949. See a lso  
Marvin W. W ill, a former employee o f the S tate Department, 
to  the author. February 23. 1956. W ill expressed no reserva­
t io n s  in  h is  frank p ra ise  o f Wilson*s serv ic e , s ta tin g  that 
he was prejudiced in  favor o f th e "eld school** o f diplom ats.
Wilson*a resign ation  was e f fe c t iv e  in  October o f  1913*
He continued to  fo llow  a f fa ir s  in  Mexico with in te r e s t  and 
deplored more and more the blundering p o licy  o f President 
W ilson, the r e su lts  o f which, v ind icated  h is  own approach as 
a servant o f the Taft adm inistration . He was occasion a lly  
in v ited  to  make speeches on conditions in  Mexico and was 
rapidly forced in to  an unpleasant defense of h is  own p o s i­
t io n , even to  the extent o f s u it s  in  court. The fa c t  that he 
favored Huerta*s ascendancy at the time o f the breakdown of 
Madero*s government led  to  the im plication  that he had been 
darkly involved with Madero*s downfall and even h is a s sa s s i­
nation , Those who sympathized with the leg itim a te  demands o f  
the Mexican revo lu tion aries welcomed such a p icture o f the  
reactionary American Ambassador and gave utterances to  ex­
aggerated and even paten tly  fa ls e  versions o f h is  ro le  in  
Mexico, some through d elib erate  d is to r t io n , others by simply 
accepting th ese extreme v erd ic ts  without question,
Wilson s e t t le d  down a fte r  1913, to  a rather routine l i f e  
of business and p o l i t i c s .  He served as attorney for  the 
Pantepee Petroleum Company whose president was W, B, Buckley, 
a c lo se  fr ien d . He had presented some problems regarding the 
o i l  business to  the Mexican government on behalf o f Buckley 
and other o i l  men w hile in  Mexico and was in  a p o sitio n  to  be 
o f further serv ice  to  them. There i s  ample testimony to  the  
fa c t th at Wilson did not make use o f the Embassy in  these  
matters in  any improper way* He became associa ted  w ith.
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among other organ isation s, the League to  Enforce Peace headed 
by ex-President Taft and even presided over the Indiana 
branch o f the League for a while but resigned as a r e su lt  o f  
d issen sion s in  the leadership  in  that s ta te .^  He continued 
to  g ive  advice to  congressmen and others who sought i t  and 
was ca lled  to  t e s t i f y  before a congressional committee in  
1920, on conditions in  Mexico* He was discussed fo r  appoint­
ment to  another diplom atic post during the Coolidge adminis­
tra tio n  but for some reason the appointment was never made* 
Except for a few years in  C aliforn ia , he liv e d  in  h is estab-
g
lish e d  residence in  Indianapolis u n til h is  death in  1932*
7
The former Ambassador continued to  arouse h o s t i l i t y  
in  h is  associates*  He withdrew from the Indiana Branch of 
the League to  Enforce Peace, t e l l in g  Taft that the Democratic 
fa c tio n  was gaining ascendancy and that more and more of  
Yoodrow W ilson’s philosophy was creeping in to  the League* 
There were a lso  some Republicans in  the leadership  in  Indiana 
who f e l t  that (H* L*) W ilson’ s resign ation  would be a help  
in stead  o f a hindrance* Taft Papers (Unassembled); C* C* 
Michener to  T aft, January 27, 1917, and correspondence 
between Taft and H* L* Wilson*
g
Who’s Who in  Anariea. 1932- 33. He received  the  
A.M. and LL* D .d e g reesfro m  wabash^College in  1930 (un­
doubtedly honorary)• He belonged to  the S ociety  of Colonial 
Wars, the Loyal Legion, and the National In s t itu te  o f S ocia l 
Sciences of New York; a lso  he was a fe llow  of the Geographic 
Society  of New York and President o f the Society  of Cauca­
sian  Republics in  America*
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